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In the summer of 1940 around five thousand aircraft clashed during several months 
for control of the skies over Britain. The fighter aircraft used by the German Luftwaffe 
and British Royal Air Force were, for the most part, very similar. They were 
monoplane airframes (fig. 3) made with a metal structure and covered with fabric or 
metal skin, their engines produced around 1,000 h.p., and the aircraft themselves 
achieved speeds of around 350 to 370 m.p.h. They had retractable undercarriages and 
were bristling with armaments.1 These aircraft stood in stark contrast to those used 
just over twenty years earlier in the First World War. Those machines (fig. 2) were 
biplanes,2 almost exclusively made from wood, covered in a doped fabric, their 
engines produced around 400 h.p., with speeds at around 120 m.p.h., they had fixed 
undercarriages, one or two machine guns and were largely un-armoured.  
 In a little over twenty years the basic form of fighter aircraft had changed, and 
the materials used in their construction had changed. The engines, guns, interior 
structure and even the operational roles to which they were assigned had been altered 
to greater or lesser extents. The period 1918-1939 was, therefore, very important in 




                                                
1 The Supermarine Spitfire Mk. I used in the Battle of Britain was powered by a Rolls-
Royce Merlin Mk. II 1,030 horse-power aero-engine and achieved a top speed of 
around 367 m.p.h. The main fighter used by the Luftwaffe, the Messerschmitt Bf 109 
used a 1,085 h.p. Daimler-Benz 601A engine and achieved around 342-348 m.p.h.  
2 Monoplanes also existed at this time, as did triplanes and even quadruplanes, but 
biplanes were overwhelmingly used as the form for combat aircraft of all types.  
3 For example see: C. H. Gibbs-Smith, Aviation - An Historical Survey, Second ed. 
(London: HMSO, 1985). David Edgerton, England and the Aeroplane - An Essay on 
a Militant and Technological Nation  (Manchester: Macmillan, 1991). Peter Fearon, 
"The British Airframe Industry and the State, 1918-1935," The Economic History 
Review 27, no. 2 (1974). 
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WHAT IS A ‘FIGHTER’? 
It may be helpful here to set out what a ‘fighter’ aircraft actually is, delineating some 
terms used frequently throughout the thesis, not only to have a clear idea in mind of 
what we are talking about but also, at this early stage, to be made aware of the fact 
that we are discussing not one technology (the ‘aircraft’) but hundreds. A fighter 
aircraft of the first half of the twentieth century (from 1916 when the Royal Flying 
Corps was first equipped with fighter squadrons)4 was distinct from other forms of 
military aircraft such as bombers and reconnaissance, in that its sole mission was 
attacking other aircraft.5  
 
Figure 1 - Hawker Typhoon (1941)6 
                                                
4 J. O. Andrews, "The Single Seater Fighter Tactical Unit for Home Defence," Royal 
United Service Institution 77(1932): p. 384. 
5 For instance, a bomber design would prioritise ‘useful load’ or the amount of 
munitions and fuel it can carry, reconnaissance aircraft would prioritise speed (they 
were generally unarmed). 
6 From Flight magazine. The Typhoon is a World War Two-era fighter/bomber. 
Although not a part of this thesis, this cutaway is one of the best to illustrate the 
different parts and layers of a military aircraft of the latter 1930s..  
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A fighter was therefore supposed to possess the highest speed and rate-of-climb (time 
to reach a given altitude) possible, superior manoeuvrability, and was designed, in 
essence, as a gun platform.7 Its operational roles would be changed and defined 
throughout the First World War. Indeed, papers written on the best use of fighter 
aircraft in the 1930s still took the experience gained during the War as their starting 
point.8  The War defined two main operational roles for the new fighter aircraft. The 
first was the interception and destruction of enemy aircraft (fighters, bombers, 
zeppelins, balloons, and reconnaissance aircraft). The second was the protection of 
friendly aircraft against the enemy.  
Regarding construction, designers wanted the lightest possible airframe for the 
greatest strength they could achieve. Designing a fighter, as with any other aircraft, 
was a series of trade-offs searching for the optimum economies of form, weight, fuel 
and maintenance.9 In terms of the major component systems of an aircraft, broadly, 
there is the fuselage, wings, flaps and ailerons, engine, propeller, undercarriage and 
weapons systems. Figure one illustrates just some of the many smaller components 
that make up an aircraft of that time.  
 During the inter-war period the Royal Air Force developed two types of 
fighter, designed with two different operational roles in mind. Their role in the 
defence of London and the Air Staff distinction between the two types is an important 
factor in understanding RAF fighter development during the period.10 Firstly, the 
‘interception fighter’ operated only during the day to compete with the faster enemy 
                                                
7 Rate-of-climb improved by 40% in fighters between 1918 and 1931. J. O. Andrews, 
"The Strategic Role of Air Forces," Royal United Service Institution 76(1931): p. 742. 
8 Ibid. Andrews, "The Single Seater Fighter Tactical Unit for Home Defence." 
Saracen, "Air Forces and the Offensive," Royal United Service Institution 78(1933). 
9 R. V. Goddard, "The Development of Aircraft and its Influence on Air Operations," 
Royal United Service Institution 79(1934): p. 450. 
10 Colin Sinnott, The R.A.F. and Aircraft Design, 1923-1939 - Air Staff Operational 
Requirements  (London: Cass, 2001). p. 18. 
 9 
day bombers. They were required to be fast and operated from advanced bases near 
the coast, and had a high performance and volume of fire. However, this concept, to 
intercept incoming formations and chase outgoing ones, was found to be flawed 
during the Air Exercises of the late 1920s and early 1930s due to the inability to give 
squadrons adequate warning of attack and at that point the inadequate performance of 
the aircraft used.11 
 Secondly, there was the ‘zone fighter’, which was used during both day and 
night. The defence of Britain using zone aircraft was laid out in three stages: first, the 
anti-aircraft Gun Zone; then, the Aircraft Fighting Zone; and third, a second Gun 
Zone (for defence of London). The Aircraft Fighting Zone comprised (in 1923) 
fourteen ‘Fighting Squadrons’ with “each squadron assigned to a defensive sector that 
it would not leave”.12 These aircraft required a high rate of climb to quickly attain 
their patrol height, but this sacrificed top speed (something which was also hampered 
by the requirement for a lower landing speed as they operated at night). The Zone 
fighter concept dominated Air Staff thinking on fighter aircraft for much of the inter-
war period. 
 The people, institutions and ideas governing what was to be needed from a 
fighter aircraft changed a great deal over the twenty years 1919-1939. Priorities would 
change constantly. For instance, just some of the priorities were  top speed, landing 
speed, destructive power, pilot view and aerodynamics. Nevertheless, the essence of 
what a fighter was expected to do remained unchanged: to intercept enemy aircraft 
and protect friendly ones. 
                                                
11 W. T. S. Williams, "Air Exersises, 1927," Royal United Service Institution 72, no. 
Feb./Nov. 1927 (1927). W. M. Yool, "Air Exersises, 1930," Royal United Service 
Institution 75, no. Feb./Nov. 1930 (1930). F. A. Robertson, "Air Exersises, 1932," 
Royal United Service Institution 77, no. Feb./Nov. 1932 (1932). 
12 Sinnott, The R.A.F. and Aircraft Design: p. 17. 
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WHY THE INTER-WAR PERIOD? 
The inter-war period suggested itself for several reasons. Firstly, the historiography 
upon which part of this thesis is hinged deals largely with its latter years and the years 
leading to World War Two. Due to this concentration on the mid-late 1930s, there is 
no real sense of what was going on in the 1920s, or attempts to understand the 
changes that the technology, and the institutions behind them, went through over the 
years. Secondly, following the First World War, the British aircraft industry was 
possessed of some considerable degree of competence and experience. To study the 
development of aviation technology before the war would be to catalogue the efforts 
of a number of pioneers each doing their own thing and following their own beliefs. 
To look at such development during the First World War would be to look at what 
happens when money is no serious object to research and development, production 
space, labour, management and so on. In looking at the inter-war years, we can 
examine a new industry that has just come out of a very considerable baptism of fire 
(in the case of Britain this baptism came just five years after her first successful flight 
was conducted). We can examine an industry that had to deal with enormous 
cutbacks, governmental micromanagement and lacking, for a long time, a fertile 
market in which to operate.  
Furthermore, the twenty years of the inter-war period allows us to look at a 
protracted period of technological change enabling us to account for the many varied 
and changing factors influencing the development of British fighter aircraft. Finally, 
the approach of the Second World War, the danger of Adolf Hitler and National 
Socialism and the proliferation of the Luftwaffe was not lost on policymakers13, and 
                                                
13 Not least of all the Baldwin government who assured air parity with Germany in 
1934 following warnings from Churchill of German rearmament. 
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so this period also allows us to examine the effects of wider international events on 
technology.  
 
THE QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED 
As it will be shown in the section dealing with historiography there has been plenty of 
work examining the British aircraft industry, individual aircraft and even the 
technologies which appeared over the twenty years that this thesis covers. However, 
there has been a great scarcity of work attempting to explain how such technologies 
appeared, how they linked together and how aircraft technology changed over the 
period. These are important questions, not only in terms of providing comprehensive 
explanations for their creation, development and existence but also in providing 
crucial context when attempting to pass judgement (as many historians have done) on 
the industry and the technology it created, and the politics and bureaucracy involved 
in shaping the technology.  
Using the example of British fighter aircraft during the 1920s and 1930s, this 
thesis will look at how the pace of technological change was set. How and why did 
British fighter aircraft develop the way they did and at the pace that they did? In 
particular, it will address the central issue of how the shift from the wooden biplane-
type fighter of 1918 to the metal monoplane-type of 1939 came about. And can this 
change be conceptualised as a ‘paradigm shift’ from one ‘technological paradigm’ to 
another? 
This is particularly interesting because many consider that aviation now needs 
to carry out another paradigm shift, due to concerns about environmental impacts, 










Figure 3 - Supermarine Spitfire (1936) 
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RECORDS AND SOURCES 
A major challenge faced by historians of aviation in the 1920s and 1930s is the lack 
of records from the firms of the industry. As the aircraft firms of the United Kingdom 
merged in the 1950s and 1960s records were simply thrown out, deemed too 
expensive to archive. As a result the most common academic discussions of the inter-
war aircraft industry tend to focus on the Air Ministry records at the National 
Archives, Kew, and historians have attempted to judge the efficacy of the Ministry in 
meeting the needs of the Royal Air Force (RAF) and its various operational 
requirements, which themselves changed dramatically over time.  
This study focuses on Air Ministry records but attempts something different. 
Rather than judging the Air Ministry, the industry or the RAF in terms of its 
technological ability, efficiency in research and so on, it attempts to explain how 
technological changes, both big and small, embodied in RAF fighter aircraft occurred 
within a wider context and across different levels, i.e., the firm, industry, Air 
Ministry, RAF and occasionally Government. It must be understood that from the end 
of the First World War until well into the 1930s the Air Ministry and to a lesser extent 
the RAF had almost complete control over the way military aircraft were conceived 
and, thus, an enormous amount of control, tacit or otherwise, over the design of those 
aircraft.  
So, while the primary aim of this thesis is to explain how Britain developed its 
fighter aircraft between the World Wars, its other major aim is to attempt a different 
approach to this kind of history. It is a collection of different types of story; in chapter 
two, for instance, the main focus is the shift from the use of wood to metal in airframe 
construction and as such takes a major technological shift as its focus. Chapter four, 
on the other hand, looks in detail at the conception and development of a technical 
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idea, in essence, the search for a low-wing monoplane fighter. The aim here is to 
illustrate the various complexities and evolving nature of the technical development 
of British fighter aircraft. It does not seek to judge the aircraft industry or Air 
Ministry, for example, but simply tries to tell the story from a different angle and 
account for the various factors and influences shaping the technologies, as well as 
how the whole system14 of military fighter procurement evolved and was shaped.   
 
CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The thesis is split into five chapters. The first looks at the development of aeronautical 
technology up to the end of the First World War and provides some context for the 
later chapters. The remaining four are divided into rough periods of the inter-war 
years. It was difficult to decide how best to do this as some of the changes talked 
about span two or more periods.  
The first chapter gives a brief overview of the development of aviation in a 
military context looking at some of the major advancements over the centuries from 
kites and balloons to zeppelins and finally heavier-than-air craft. This chapter will 
also examine the influence of the First World War on establishing the wooden biplane 
as the dominant design, or paradigm, for aircraft.  
 Chapter two covers the so-called ‘lean years’ of around 1918-1924, and the 
fight for survival of the Royal Air Force. It is a significant period in the history of 
aircraft development between the World Wars because it established the RAF as an 
                                                
14 By ‘system’ we are talking about the whole array of social and technical factors 
influencing aircraft development. While by no means an exhaustive list some factors 
or influences would certainly include: the treasury; specifications; those who 
formulated specifications; research institutions like the National Physical Laboratory; 
Air Ministry sub-committees and heads of department; firms of the industry; 
designers; individuals at firms who decided what to spend money on, like Robert 
McLean at Vickers; Royal Air Force test pilots; industry test pilots and so on. 
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autonomous Service, placed Sir Hugh Trenchard firmly in control of aircraft 
procurement as well as defining, to a large extent the operational roles required by the 
Air Force. Furthermore, it introduces into the story the concept of the Air Ministry 
‘ring’ system, which was another highly significant event in this early post-war 
period. Essentially, it gave the Air Ministry almost complete control over an aircraft 
industry whose very survival relied solely on military orders. The extent to which 
they wielded this control cannot be underestimated and is a thread that is picked up 
throughout the thesis.  
 This chapter also presents the first, most substantial part of the wood-metal 
shift.  Following the First World War, this was the first and largest widespread change 
to occur in British military aircraft. It will be argued that the change itself relied on 
the creation of a consensus of opinion within the UK aviation community and for the 
first time shows the extent of Air Ministry control over technical choices made 
relating to British military aircraft. concerns the influence of doctrine and strategy on 
developing aeronautical technologies. Finally, it looks at the institutional doctrine, 
strategy and policy of the Royal Air Force in shaping British military aircraft 
technology. For instance, it looks at the change in thinking regarding aerial warfare 
from a strong bomber offensive, supported wherever possible by fighters, to a strong 
bomber offensive with a counterpart fighter defence for the UK mainland.  
 The third chapter (1925-1930) finishes the wood-metal story by looking at 
how the decision to switch to metal was made and how it was actioned by the Air 
Ministry. The bulk of this chapter, however, is concerned with how the Air Staff 
planned technical development during peacetime in anticipation of what might be 
needed in war. This chapter is also concerned with the Schneider Trophy seaplane 
races of the 1920s and 1930s. It examines the aircraft developed by Supermarine for 
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the contest and tries to show that such competition had a valuable impact on aircraft 
development in Britain outside of competition aircraft. It examines the story from the 
perspective of both the designers and the Air Staff, as well as the research 
establishments. The Schneider Trophy really allowed for the most advanced of 
aeronautical research to be conducted, although purely in terms of performance, not 
reliability, stability and so forth. Nevertheless, the influence of the contest on the 
development of military fighter aircraft was significant and therefore worth looking 
at. It will also contend that the Schneider Trophy proved the superiority of the 
monoplane in terms of performance.15 
 Chapter four (1931-1936) picks up from the previous chapter in continuing to 
look at how the Air Staff planned during peacetime, but in the early-mid 1930s. This 
was a time of change at home and abroad. The Air Ministry went through some 
important changes in personnel, and abroad it was becoming clearer that Germany 
(and her air force) would be the nation to plan against. This chapter also covers a 
crucial component of this thesis. Specification F.7/30 was the first time the Air 
Ministry called for a low-wing monoplane fighter.   
 It looks at the Royal Air Force/Air Ministry system of aircraft procurement 
from around 1930-1935. It is highly significant in that such a system involved highly 
details specifications, in essence, designing an aircraft on paper and asking the 
industry to deliver it. The Air Ministry’s policy was to pick an aircraft on best price 
and on technical quality. Generally, the aircraft with best performance was chosen, 
but this chapter tries to look in detail at how a specification was made and how the 
debates about what performance to ask for were conducted. 
                                                
15 Performance being to a large extent the most important aspect of fighter aircraft.  
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Chapter five examines a much, if not entirely, neglected conference held in 1935. The 
conference itself was incredibly important and a lot of the highest ranking people in 
the Air Ministry, research establishments, industry and government attended. The aim 
of the conference was to discuss how to radically improve the system of research and 
development as regarding military aircraft. This was a response to the growing 
realisation that Britain had been left some way behind her potential enemies. Most 
notably, it must be said, Germany. This chapter will examine the conference in as 
much detail as possible, firstly, because it has been completely ignored, and also 
because it is rare to see a document which brings together the thoughts of Lord 
Rayleigh, Sir Henry Tizard and Sir Hugh Dowding on the one hand, and Frederick 
Handley Page, Roy Fedden and Arthur Maund on the other. It is a fascinating look at 
the complexities surrounding aircraft development, research and everything else 
borne from institutional politics, distrust between the industry and the Air Ministry 
and so on.  
 Finally, it will will chart the RAF rearmament programmes of 1934-1939 and 
some of the technical developments experienced by aircraft in this period. The 
rearmament schemes are important in that they created something of a technological 
‘lock in’ with regard to aircraft design. The pressure to produce as many aircraft as 
possible left little time for a lot of the interference on the part of the Air Ministry that 
had happened in previous years.  
 
NOTE ABOUT THE INTER-WAR PERIOD(S) 
It is suggested that it is helpful to think of the ‘inter-war years’, or ‘inter-war period’ 
as it relates to military aviation, not as one single period, but as a succession of four or 
five smaller phases. The ‘lean years’ of 1919-1923 are entirely different from the 
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rearamament years of 1934-1939. In between there were several important social, 
political and economic changes that had enormous impact on aircraft development. 
The ‘Geddes Axe’, for instance, slashed R&D funding for aircraft and set 
development back around 18 months. Staff of the Air Ministry changed over time and 
many of these changes were highly significant, bringing about their own ‘periods’. 
For example, the retirement of Chief of the Air Staff Lord Hugh Trenchard, and the 
promotion of his replacement Sir John Salmond changed the way in which aircraft 
were developed and purchased. As a final example, the increase in funding for aircraft 























































The central issue of this thesis can be put quite simply – ‘how did the shift in British 
fighter aircraft from wooden biplanes to metal monoplanes occur, and why did it take 
as long as it did? – but addressing this issue is far from simple. This shift in aviation 
technology could be conceptualised as a ‘paradigm shift’ or as a ‘socio-technical 
transition’, to take two of the most obvious theoretical approaches, but examining the 
utility of such concepts and their relationship to the historical material presents some 
potential pitfalls. A key task is to construct a historical account from primary archival 
sources, but this would be largely shapeless and voluminous  if done without a 
theoretical framing. However, too strong an emphasis on the theoretical concepts runs 
the risk of constructing a biased historical account.   
 
BACKGROUND: THE HISTORICAL AND HISTORIOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT 
The idea for this research originally came about several years ago when researching 
my undergraduate dissertation regarding the British military aircraft industry and the 
production of aircraft during World War Two. While reading the secondary literature 
I was introduced to two now familiar schools of thought regarding the state of the 
British aircraft industry, scientific and industrial research related to aeronautics, the 
production of aircraft and the preparedness of the Royal Air Force and the industry to 
go to war 1939. Although this will be covered in greater detail in the literature review, 
it is worth noting here to provide a proper context for my choice of conceptual 
framework.  
 Since the end of the Second World War right up to the early 1990s, studies of 
British technological and economic performance in the inter-war and post-WWII 
period were dominated by what has been termed the ‘declinist’ school. Scholars of 
business and economic history such as Correlli Barnett and Martin Weiner held that 
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Britain’s industrial performance, for example, had declined in absolute terms as well 
as relative to nations such as the United States and Germany over the middle part of 
the twentieth century. Specifically, when talking about the aircraft industry declinist 
historians, Barnett most prominently, paint a stark picture of managerial 
incompetence, industrial frailty, anaemic designs and so on, all governed by a 
technically incompetent and backwards looking (or at least stagnating) Air Ministry 
and technical staff. 
 Declinist history of the aviation industry (and declinist history more generally) 
has been strongly criticised for judging the Royal Air Force “by the standard of 
perfection rather than of its peers, and to emphasise failures while ignoring successes 
and context”.16 Indeed, it is also argued that some recent works on the Royal Air 
Force “begin by invoking causes which do not exist, continue with arguments based 
on imagination instead of evidence, and end by describing events which did not 
happen”.17 Similarly, Leslie Hannah is worried by “…our [Britain’s] own brand of 
counterfactual history…that explains an outcome that never happened…by a cause 
that is equally imagined”.18  
 For instance, a persistent misunderstanding over the effects of the ‘ten year 
rule’ has led some scholars to place it firmly at the centre of British defence policy 
and military spending. The effect, in essence, was that the RAF received “far less 
money than it needed, by implication far less that other leading air forces dud, and 
was prevented from developing the forces or the planning needed for major wars”.19 
In fact, the idea of the ‘ten year rule’ as a major factor shaping the pace and 
                                                
16 John R. Ferris, "The Air Force Brats' View of History: Recent Writing and the 
Royal Air Force, 1918-1960," The International History Review 20, no. 1 (1998): pp. 
119-20. 
17 Ibid., p. 120. 
18 Leslie Hannah, "Afterthoughts," Business and Economic History 24(1995): p. 248. 
19 Ferris, "The Air Force Brats'," p. 120. 
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development of aeronautical technology has been largely debunked.20 Despite such 
strong refutations the ‘ten year rule’ was a factor, at least in as far as it shaped 
operational roles. For instance following the First World War there was an emphasis 
on colonial policing more than defence of Great Britain, one result of this policy was 
cuts in the Home Defence Force.  
Over the last twenty years or so there has been, what has been called a 
‘decline of declinism’.21 David Edgerton, prominent amongst the alternative 
‘revisionist’ school, made the distinction between ‘absolute’ decline and ‘relative’ 
decline, central to his thinking. For him, “the appropriate question is why the United 
States was so much more productive, not why Britain lagged”.22 For revisionists such 
as Edgerton and Sebastian Ritchie, declinist work proved highly misleading and 
somewhat dangerous given the influence it wielded. In its, often cursory or heavy-
handed, discussion of British aviation it saw failure everywhere, in every aspect of 
aircraft design, development, management and production. Successes were dismissed 
out of hand or explained away. There has been an implicit assumption made by 
declinist historians of aviation that peacetime levels of R&D, production, the urgency 
and quality of new designs incorporating new technologies should be approaching 
those during war. Of course, this is not the case as Ritchie points out: 
…the circumstances in which industry has to operate in wartime are often very different from 
those obtaining in peacetime. War may impose many of its own constraints on industrial 
production but, conversely, wartime conditions may also offer solutions to problems which 
might not be easily be solved in peacetime.23 
                                                
20 Edgerton, England and the Aeroplane. 
21 David Edgerton, "The Decline of Declinism," The Business History Review 71, no. 
2 (1997). 
22 Ibid., p. 202. 
23 Sebastian Ritchie, Industry and Air Power - The Expansion of British Aircraft 
Production, 1935-1941  (London: Cass, 1997). p. 2. 
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Ritchie also points out that “it is all too easy in the context of Britain’s post-war 
economic problems to explain why Britain did not produce more aircraft during the 
war. It is much more difficult to show how British industry managed to produce as 
many aircraft as it did”.24 However, even Ritchie is only really concerned with the 
expansion of aircraft production beginning in 1935. For declinists and revisionists 
alike the inter-war aircraft industry and its technology is a useful resource to bolster 
their arguments. The problem is that there is never any real attempt to understand how 
the technology of this new25 industry developed.    
 
OPENING THE ‘BLACK BOX’ OF TECHNOLOGY: TECHNOLOGICAL PARADIGMS AND 
PARADIGM SHIFTS 
Within the context of this declinist/revisionist historiography the shift from wooden 
biplanes to metal monoplanes is a key example. For declinists, the shift happened too 
slowly, thus exemplifying the failings of the British state to nurture and exploit 
innovation. The overarching question addressed here is: to what extent is this 
characterisation a simplification? 
 To answer this requires the documentation of the detailed development of 
aircraft technology (specifically British fighter aircraft between the World Wars). 
How did the shifts from wood to metal and biplane to monoplane come about? In 
what ways were these two technical areas interrelated? To what extent were these 
technologies adopted more slowly in the UK than elsewhere, and what factors might 
explain any differential uptake? 
                                                
24 Ibid., p. 3. 
25 ‘New’ in the sense that immediately following the First World War the British 
aircraft industry was entirely distinct from the one that entered the War in 1914. It 
was still learning about everything: design, production techniques, materials, not to 
mention the forces acting on an aircraft when in flight. By the end of the War in 1918 
there was still no universally accepted understanding of how an aircraft stayed up.  
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Furthermore, at the centre of this issue lies a fundamental question about the nature of 
technological change. What constitutes a paradigm shift or technical transition? 
Indeed, how useful is it to conceptualise technological change in terms of paradigms , 
and or incremental versus radical innovation? 
 Science and Technology Studies (STS) theorising about the concept of a 
paradigm has its origins in Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions (1962). Kuhn described scientific paradigms as “…the concrete 
puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as 
a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science”.26 
 Following Kuhn a number of scholars have adapted the Kuhnian scientific 
paradigm for use in the study of technology. One of the first, and one with particular 
relevance to this study of aircraft technology was Edward Constant. In his work on 
the ‘turbojet revolution’ – which can be characterised as a paradigm shift from 
propeller to turbojet-engined aircraft – Constant argues that: 
A technological paradigm is not just a device or process, but, like a scientific paradigm, is also 
a rationale, practice, procedure, method, instrumentations, and a particular shared way of 
perceiving a set of technology.27 
Constant put forward this definition of technological paradigm as part of an 
alternative explanation of technical change and posited the concept of ‘presumptive 
anomalies’. A presumptive anomaly occurs when advances in science imply “future 
difficulty for the normal system and the possibility of an entirely new system”. For 
Constant, revolutionary paradigmatic change is for the most part the result of 
“functional failure” whereby “either the conventional paradigm proves inappropriate 
to ‘new or more stringent conditions’ or an individual assumes intuitively that he can 
                                                
26 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Third ed. (Chicago 1996). 
27 Edward W. Constant II, "A Model for Technological Change Applied to the 
Turbojet Revolution," Technology and Culture 14, no. 4 (1973): p. 554. 
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produce a better or a new technological device”.28 The difference between a 
functional failure and a presumptive anomaly is that the anomaly is derived from 
science and presumed to exist – no functional failure exists.  
What we define here as presumptive anomaly occurs when scientific insight or assumptions 
derived from science indicate either that under some future conditions the conventional 
paradigm will fail (or function badly) or that a radically different paradigm will do a much 
better job or will do something entirely novel.29 
Constant’s view of radical technological change maintains an emphasis on 
practitioners. In this view “revolution occurs when a significant portion of the 
relevant community shifts its professional commitment to a new paradigm and begins 
a new normal technology”.30 
 Other scholars, notably Giovanni Dosi, have focussed more on what might be 
called, in Kuhn’s terms, ‘normal’ technology, the incremental improvement of an 
existing technology paradigm. Dosi defined a technological paradigm as: 
…”model” and a “pattern” of solution of selected technological problems based on selected 
principles derived from natural sciences and on selected material technologies.31 
For Dosi, technological change is the result of technological ‘trajectories’, which 
he defined as “the pattern of ‘normal’ problem solving activity (ie of ‘progress’) 
on the ground of a technological paradigm”.32 The trajectory is a “cluster of 
possible technological directions whose outer boundaries are defined by the 
nature of the paradigm itself”.33 Dosi also argues that a technological paradigm 
has “a powerful exclusion effect: the efforts and the technological imagination of 
                                                
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., p. 555. 
30 Ibid., p. 556. 
31  Giovanni Dosi, "Technological Paradigms and Technological Trajectories - A 
Suggested Interpretation of the Determinants and Directions of Technical Change," 
Research Policy 11(1982): p. 152. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., p. 154. 
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engineers and of the organisations that are in are focused in rather precise 
directions while they are, so to speak, “blind” with respect of other technological 
possibilities”.34 
 This concept of technological paradigms that produce ‘technological 
trajectories’ through incremental improvement, but that are displaced by new 
paradigms in paradigm-shifts, has become widely used. In innovation studies it 
has become typical to speak of a ‘dominant design’.35 For example, Tushman and 
Anderson argue that “technological progress constitutes an evolutionary system 
punctuated by discontinuous change” after which “a dominant design emerges”.36 
 However, the work of economist Nathan Rosenberg points to one weakness in 
a view of technical change as characterised by technological trajectories comprising 
periods of continuous, incremental improvement of paradigms or dominant designs 
interrupted by radical discontinuities. Rosenberg’s classic studies of American 
machine tool development between 1840 and 1910 suggest a much more complex 
process in which radical and incremental innovations overlap and in which the former 
often depend on the latter to succeed.37 Rosenberg has shown that in the case of 
machine tools change was a gradual process that was fed by a number of diverse 
manufacturing industries utilising similar processes using machine tools. 
                                                
34 Ibid., p. 153. 
35 William J. Abernathy and James M. Utterback, "Patterns of Innovation in 
Technology," Technology Review 80, no. 7 (1978). M. L. Tushman and P. Anderson, 
"Technological Discontinuities and Organizational Environments," Administrative 
Science Quarterly 31(1986). 
36 Tushman and Anderson, "Technological Discontinuities and Organizational 
Environments," pp. 440-41. 
37 Nathan Rosenberg, "Technological Change in the Machine Tool Industry, 1840-
1910," The Journal of Economic History 23, no. 4 (1963). Nathan Rosenberg, "The 
Direction of Technological Change: Inducement Mechanisms and Focusing Devices," 
Economic Development and Cultural Change 18, no. 1 (1969). 
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A continuous adoption of established techniques such as automatic operation to new uses, and 
by a systematic improvement in the properties of materials employed in machine tool 
processes.38 
There was, therefore, not one discrete paradigm-shift, but rather many inter-related 
improvements, some more ‘radical’ and some more ‘incremental’. As Rosenberg 
notes, a key aspect of this innovation in machine tools was “the cumulative impact of 
relatively small innovations”.39 So, for Rosenberg, profound shifts in technologies can 
often take a long time (sixty years in this case) and require many incremental 
complimentary improvements to be achieved. 
More recently, other authors have taken issue with the apparently mechanistic 
way in which some, notably Dosi, have portrayed the role of paradigms in 
technological trajectories. For example, although MacKenzie agrees that the 
Kuhnian scientific paradigm “does…point us by analogy to important phenomena 
in technological change”40, he is sceptical of the mechanical analogy implied by 
Dosi: 
What is wrong [with technological trajectories] is the fundamental idea that 
technological change can be self-sustaining, that its direction and form can be explained 
in isolation from the social circumstances in which it takes place.41 
As MacKenzie and Wajcman note, such an approach does not do full justice to 
the richness of Kuhn’s concept: 
…to do this would be to miss perhaps the most fundamental point of Kuhn’s concept of 
paradigm: the paradigm is not a rule that can be followed mechanically, but a resource 
to be used. There will always be more than one way of using a resource, of developing 
                                                
38 Rosenberg, "Technological Change in the Machine Tool Industry, 1840-1910," p. 
433. 
39 Ibid., p. 424, fn 19. 
40 Donald MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy - A Historical Sociology of Nuclear 
Missile Guidance (MIT Press1990). p. 79, n. 138. 
41 Ibid., p. 167. 
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the paradigm. Indeed groups of technologists in different circumstances often develop 
the same paradigm differently.42 
MacKenzie and Wajcman note that Kuhn used paradigm to refer to two 
‘interrelated by distinguishable’ meanings: 
In the more basic sense, the paradigm is an exemplar, a particular scientific problem-
solution that is accepted as successful and which becomes the basis for future 
work…The paradigm in the first sense of exemplar plays a crucial part in the paradigm 
in the second, more famous, wider sense of the ‘entire constellation of beliefs, values, 
techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given [scientific] community.43 
This thesis will look at the question of why to took Britain longer than some other 
nations to develop the metal monoplane for Service use. At the end of the First 
World War the major nations concerned with large-scale aircraft production 
(Germany, France, the United States and Britain) were working from the same 
exemplar of the wooden biplane (with some metal monoplanes already in 
production in Germany). During the inter-war period there was a ‘paradigm-
shift’, as the generally (though not exclusively) accepted best aircraft design 
changes from the wooden biplane of 1918 to the metal monoplane of 1939.  
 
SOCIO-TECHNICAL SYSTEMS AND TRANSITIONS 
Although useful, the paradigm concept has limitations in understanding technological 
change. The emergence of paradigms or dominant designs help explain incremental 
innovation – what Dosi called technological trajectories – but provides less insight 
into radical innovation, the process by which one paradigm is displaced by another. 
As a concept, paradigms help explain stability, but they are less useful in 
                                                
42 Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman, eds., The Social Shaping of Technology 
(Open University Press: 2003), p. 9. 
43 Ibid. 
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understanding change. Moreover, despite the clarifications noted above, a focus on 
paradigms runs the risk of emphasizing the technical artefact over the socio-technical 
system.  
 Thomas P. Hughes’ work on ‘the system builders’ and the electrification of 
America has utilised a systems approach for the analysis of a particular historical, 
technological development.44  Hughes’ vocabulary of ‘systems’ and ‘reverse salients’ 
offers us important conceptual tools. It helps us to move away from viewing 
technology as a single object or artefact such as ‘an aircraft’, by asking us to be aware 
of the influence and interplay of components within both the social and technical 
systems.  
At the heart of Hughes’ view of innovation is the role of inventor-entrepreneurs, and 
their ability to combine scientific and technical advances with the necessary 
enrolment of political and financial support. Hughes’ system-builders are thus what 
Law has termed ‘heterogeneous engineers’, able to shape simultaneously both the 
technical and social.45 
 Hughes’ notion of the ‘reverse salient’ is a useful concept for conceptualising 
some of the changes occurring in aeronautical technology during the inter-war years. 
For Hughes: 
As technological systems expand, reverse salients develop. Reverse salients are components 
in the system that have fallen behind or are out of phase with the others. Because it suggests 
                                                
44 Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power - Electrification in Western Society, 1880-
1930  (Johns Hopkins1983). Thomas P. Hughes, "Edison and the Electric Light," in 
The Social Shaping of Technology, ed. Judy Wajcman and Donald MacKenzie (Open 
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45 John Law, "Technology and Heterogeneous Engineering: The Case of Portuguese 
Expansion," in The Social Construction of Technological Systems, ed. Weibe E. 
Bijker and Trevor Pinch (MIT Press). 
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uneven and complex change, this metaphor is more appropriate for systems than the rigid 
visual concept of a bottleneck.46 
As an example from Hughes’ work on electric light and power systems, engineers 
may alter the characteristics of a generator to make it more efficient. Due to the 
changes made in the generator it may be then be necessary to alter the characteristics 
of another component, such as the resistance, voltage or amperage of a motor, so that 
it functions optimally with the newly adjusted generator.47 Thus, in the evolution of a 
technological system (electric light and power, an aircraft, an aero-engine, 
manufacturing systems), the adjustment of one component may require the adjustment 
of numerous other components in order that they might “contribute efficiently to 
overall system output”.48 A brief illustration of this concept as it applies to this thesis 
would be the development of aero-engines. Certain components within an aero-engine 
may be identified as having fallen behind certain others, requiring further 
development. Notable examples in this case include superchargers for higher 
performance at high altitude or ducted radiators for increasing thrust and reducing 
drag. Each was developed differently but in response to problems raised by other 
improved components.  
 MacKenzie has noted that the term ‘reverse salient’ is actually more fitting 
than: 
...static, mechanical metaphors such as “bottleneck” because it captures the flux, dynamism, 
and confusion of the process of technological change. Not only can change bring into being 
reverse salients where previously components functioned satisfactorily…but it may not 
always be clear where progress is being held up, nor what should be done about it. 49 
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More recently, Frank Geels and other have expanded on the concept of socio-
technical systems, and sought explicitly to understand the factors involved in 
technological transitions. As it happens, one of Geels’ case studies covered the 
same history as Constant in examining the shift from the propeller to the turbojet 
in aircraft propulsion systems between 1930 and 1970.50 Geels has adopted an 
approach which emphasises the relationship between the co-evolution processes 
of “markets, user practices, regulation, culture, infrastructure and science”51 and a 
multi-level perspective dealing with the three levels of niche, regime and 
landscape. Geels’ argument is that transitions in technology occur when co-
evolutionary dynamics at the niche, regime and landscape levels “link up and 
reinforce each other”. 
 Beginning in the 1930s, Geels identifies the DC-3 passenger aircraft as a 
new dominant aircraft design which prompted the adoption of a wider socio-
technical system consisting of concrete runways (as opposed to grass), radio-
based navigation instruments and techniques, greater regulation and new markets. 
The DC-3 is seen as a result of the alignment of component innovations 
developed in previous years such as all-metal construction, the mono-wing 
configuration, retractable landing gears and so on – “the so-called airframe 
revolution”.52 He identifies various causal links between the innovations adopted 
for aircraft such as the DC-3 configuration and the socio-technical system. For 
instance, the heavier DC-3 required that runways were changed from grass to 
                                                
50 Frank W. Geels, "Co-Evolutionary and Multi-Level Dynamics in Transitions: The 
Transformation of Aviation Systems and the Shift from Propeller to Turbojet, 1930-
1970," Technovation 26(2006). 
51 Ibid., p. 999. 
52 Ibid., p. 1006. 
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concrete, which in turn required greater precision in landing procedure and new 
navigation systems.  
 However, piston and propeller driven aircraft had limitations at high 
altitudes and at high speeds. The adoption of the variable-pitch propeller and 
superchargers were incremental innovations designed to solve these problems. 
Due to the strong nature of improvement in piston-engine aircraft, regime actors 
(the Air Ministry for example) had little interest in alternative engines believing 
that the progress in piston engines would continue. 
 At the landscape level Geels identifies the approach of the Second World 
War as the window of opportunity for pioneers of jet engine technology (Frank 
Whittle, Hans Von Ohain and Herbert Wagner). Increasing defence R&D budgets 
allowed for more resources for those innovative projects previously thought 
“impractical”. There was increased interest in aero-engines with higher 
performance allowing Whittle in Britain and Von Ohain in Germany to build a 
support network to further develop their ideas. By the late 1930s, then, the 
pioneers of jet technology had created a technological niche for their ideas. 
Throughout the Second World War this niche for jet technology was adopted for 
use with interceptor fighters culminating in Britain with the Gloster Meteor I. 
After the War, however, Britain had little money to continue developing military 
aircraft with jet engines and so concentrated on commercial aviation which was 
experiencing a strong decline throughout Europe in the immediate post-war years.  
 In the decade following the War, jet engine technology was developed 
most strongly in the United States, while Britain concentrated on the more 
efficient turboprop and by the 1970s commercial aviation had become a “mass 
phenomenon”. Geels has thus attempted to show that technological transitions 
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and transitions in the socio-technical system can occur “not only as technological 
discontinuities, but as long-run co-evolution processes that also involve changes 
in markets, user groups, infrastructure, science, culture and regulation”.53 
 However, while saying much about the context of technological change 
there are serious limitations when discussing the content. The focus of such 
studies is very much at the macro level of technological change at the expense of 
the micro level. This thesis aims not just to explain how the paradigm shift (or 
technological transition) in inter-war aircraft technology happened but also to 
show that certain received wisdom from the inter-war aircraft story might be 
simplistic.  
 
WRITING HISTORY AND USING THEORY 
Writing more than twenty years ago, Edward Constant suggested that: 
It is probably fair to say that more serious historical treatment of technology falls into one of 
two broad traditions: intellectual and artifactual accounts that have their origins in classical 
approaches in the history of science, or in biographical and organizational accounts that count 
business and economic history as their nearest scholarly kin.54 
In terms of the topic covered here – broadly, the British military aircraft industry of 
the inter-war years - this largely holds true today. Work is split into examinations of 
the industry55, narratives of individual aircraft56, and biographies of people involved.57  
                                                
53 Ibid., p. 1013. 
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Nevertheless, various scholars have produced excellent histories looking into 
the ‘micro’. Some have looked at the change from wood to metal in aircraft structures 
in the United States58, some have produced excellent detailed accounts of the 
development of individual aircraft59, and others have looked into the complex and 
complicated process of the development of operational requirements, which are 
themselves incredibly important tools in shaping an aircraft and embody both social 
(or political) and technical aspects.60 
 Initially, this thesis was to be based around British industrial capacity and the 
production of aircraft between the wars, set in the context of the declinist/revisionist 
debate. It was not until I was exposed to science and technology studies (STS) and 
was able to concentrate more on the history of technology as a subject area that my 
focus shifted to what is presented here.  
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 The central theme of this thesis is the switch from the widely used wooden 
biplane of 1918 to the metal monoplane fighters used by front line RAF squadrons by 
1939. The question has been looked at before to greater or lesser extents and covers, 
for instance, the material and structural revolutions, the development of variable 
camber wings, retractable landing gears, stressed skins and so on. These innovations 
have been treated by some historians as if they were developed in a vacuum, as if they 
followed logical trajectories that ‘made sense’.61 
 Applying theory to historical research has been the topic of much debate 
amongst historians and sociologists of technology. The theoretical options available to 
the historian or STS scholar are many and varied, each designed to help focus on a 
particular aspect of a research topic. The danger of relying on one framework to 
explain weapons development (in our case military aircraft) is that such an approach 
may not adequately cover the complexity involved in such developments. 
Furthermore, the strict adoption of a theory may lead to problems in the collection and 
analysis of data, a tendency to ignore or explain away evidence that does not tick the 
proper conceptual boxes. Especially, as in our case, one that takes place at different 
levels (i.e., designer, engineer, firm, Air Ministry, Royal Air Force, Government and 
so on), and across more than two decades.  
While there is a need for a detailed micro approach to understand the changes 
in inter-war aircraft technology this should not detract from consideration of the 
macro context in which this shift took place. It will be important therefore, to be 
aware of the effect each may have on the other. Historians have pointed to the 
approach of World War Two as the major catalyst of technological change in aircraft. 
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One question examined in this thesis is the extent to which this explanation takes 
account of the groundwork laid well before the War.  
Graham Spinardi has suggested that: 
…single factor explanations are not very successful in accounting for the complexity of 
weapons development. What is clear from previous studies is that both international and 
domestic determinants can be important, while rarely is either completely irrelevant. 
He has also warned against the use of just one model in that theoretical suitability 
may overrule empirical findings and that fitting the historical narrative into a chosen 
theory may end up getting rid of any insights gained by the use of a theory in the first 
place.62 
 Spinardi is not alone in raising such concerns. Various debates have raged 
between historians and sociologists of technology about the suitability of the use of 
theory in history.63 Historians writing on the subject and practice of history have also 
addressed the question.64 Generally speaking, these discussions have thrown up two 
major positions: firstly, historians seem reluctant, if not hostile, to the idea of making 
use of any strict framework for examining and interpreting data. Secondly, 
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sociologists of technology are keen to make use of theory in historical studies of 
technology, whilst bristling at the suggestion that the theoretical frameworks they 
advocate are detrimental to historical practice. Simply put – for sociologists, 
historians have misunderstood the nature of theory, and as historians see it, 
sociologists want to force historical evidence into a rigid framework.  
 Buchanan has argued that it is time to reassert the importance of narrative in 
writing about the history of technology.65 His charge is that there has been too much 
focus on the theoretical and he states, for instance, that Thomas Hughes’ approach 
“adds little to the comprehension of what is, essentially, good old-fashioned narrative 
history”.66 However, although for the most part historians are reluctant to use 
theoretical frameworks, they have nevertheless been implemented with some success. 
I believe that historians can go further, however, by making use of concepts 
put forward in the field of STS. I think the most realistic way for historians to look at 
the use of theory can best be shown in a quote from economic historian Thomas 
Cochran: 
…since theory must be either implicit or explicit, it is better for scholarly purposes that it 
should be explicit. Carefully formulated theory restricts unconscious bias, gives meaning to 
otherwise formless data, and is more likely to reveal unexpected relationships.67 
In a similar vein, Diane Vaughan has noted that: 
We choose a case because we have good theoretical and empirical reasons to think it might be 
an example of x. The analysis can be developed from ethnography, interviews, original 
documents, or secondary analysis. Some theoretical logic is always part of our selection, 
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either implicitly or explicitly, so first we want to make it explicit, then we use it as an heuristic 
device to guide the analysis and organize insights.68  
Ideally, historians must be possessed of adequate theoretical frameworks to guide the 
process of data collection and then, in turn, to interrogate that data. Generally 
speaking, the historian adopts a more implicit approach to the use of theory which 
may result in unconscious, or perhaps even sometimes conscious, bias. Occasionally, 
there is a tendency to be highly selective and ignore or explain away evidence which 
does not fit with the historian’s view of the subject. Such an inclination might account 
for the kind of history written by declinist historians (indeed, there is also a tendency 
within the revisionist school to ignore or explain away obvious problems in design, 
production or management for instance).  This tendency is brought about, I suspect, 
from the kinds of questions posed in historical work, or in basing arguments upon a 
faulty premise. Vaughn has also suggested that: 
Perhaps the guiding theory is better thought of as an analytic framework that opens 
possibilities at the same time that it focuses the research...which forces us to take into account 
and integrate all data that bear on the incident or activity in question.69  
I think it is fair to say that often it is the case that some historians are not guilty of 
inaccuracy,70 but of constructing stories from evidence in a selective way and thus 
producing an account that may be said to be both accurate and misleading. To qualify 
this statement further I will use an example from Barnett’s Audit of War.  
…on 25 June 1919, three days before the signing of the Treaty of Versailles appeared to seal 
the German eclipse as a power…the first all-metal cabin monoplane, the Junkers F-13…made 
its maiden flight in Germany. The F-13…became the most widely used transport aircraft in 
the world during the 1920s. It was followed in 1931 by the Junkers 52 three-engined all-metal 
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monoplane…In 1927 the Lockheed Vega, designed by a German engineer, pioneered light 
monocoque construction. In 1932 [there] appeared in the United States…the Douglas DC-1, a 
fast, twin-engined, low-winged, all-metal, stressed-skin monoplane…This was the technology 
that was to lead to the first generation of high-speed all-metal monoplane military aircraft, 
such as the Junkers 87 dive-bomber, the Heinkel 111 and the Dornier 17 medium bombers, all 
of which reached squadron service with the Luftwaffe in 1936, and were faster than biplane 
fighters then forming the frontline strength of the RAF.71  
This statement, while factually correct, completely ignores several important points 
about RAF re-armament policy in the mid-1930s. Barnett leads the reader to believe 
that in 1936 the Luftwaffe’s bombers were faster than the RAF fighter aircraft and 
that because of this (and fitting in nicely with his overall argument) British 
technology and technology policy were backwards and out of date. Though it is an 
obvious example, he fails to point out that the British effort in racing sea-planes was, 
in fact, some years ahead (in terms of speed and aerodynamics) of his German 
example. The all-metal stressed-skin racing monoplanes72 built by Supermarine for 
the Schneider Trophy contained all the technological virtues he felt were lacking in 
Britain.  
Furthermore, he makes no mention of another Supermarine success, the 
Spitfire, which was again an all-metal, stressed-skin, low-winged monoplane (first 
flown in 1936)). The simple fact is that by as early as 1934 the Air Ministry had 
begun, in earnest, plans to modernise the RAF and in so doing replace many aircraft 
considered obsolete at the time by purchasing large numbers of the new Spitfire and 
the Hawker Hurricane. So Barnett, like certain other historians to greater or lesser 
extents, can be said to be both accurate in his facts but misleading in his claims. 
                                                
71 Barnett, Audit of War: p. 129 (emphasis added). 
72 The S.4, S.5, S.6, and S.6b. 
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I do not wish to suggest that this is a problem from which all historians suffer, or to 
suggest that to be misleading is some sort of historians’ disease. But the fact remains 
that to label oneself as a ‘declinist’ or ‘revisionist’ does betray a particular view of the 
historical world, which carries with it many assumptions and preconceptions as to the 
way events happened. To be a declinist in the vein of Correlli Barnett for example 
means believing in the idea of a British industrial decline in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century and early twentieth century. This belief is then reflected in his 
savage portrayal of British industrial competence. Thus, evidence to the contrary, 
such as consistently rising aircraft export and production figures, or improvement in 
aircraft technology is completely ignored or explained away. 
 Going back to Angus Buchanan, however, who states that: 
…the imposition of an alien conceptual vocabulary on the subject matter of history is 
misleading, causing obfuscation and unjustified selectivity in the use of historical evidence. 
Evidence, the reader feels, is welcome when it fills the preconceived conceptual boxes and is 
otherwise likely to be discarded.73 
But while Buchanan’s criticism is levelled at the use of social science theory in 
narrative history, this is precisely the problem with historical works which are devoid 
of any explicit theory to help shape the questions and to limit on occasions the data 
we look at. John Law, in response to Buchanan, suggested that his critique of social 
science theory in the history of technology stemmed from the idea that social science 
theory and narrative history are “driven by different kinds of concerns and 
interests”.74 Assuming that is true I have tried to find my own blend of narrative and 
theory based upon my concerns and interests.  
                                                
73 Buchanan, "Theory and Narrative," p. 370. 
74 Law, "Theory and Narrative: Response," p. 378. 
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 So on the one hand there is a desire to make good use of theory, while on the 
other is the concern that too much theoretical rigidity runs the risk of an incomplete or 
misleading story. Thus, at this stage my position regarding the use of theory is to 
borrow concepts from theories that I think will be useful based on the particulars of 
my topic and period.  
 
THEORY AS METHODOLOGY 
This research thus draws on broader STS theory to guide the methodological 
approach used to carry out the research and construct the historical accounts. The 
concepts I have chosen are from a variety of STS theories and have been selected 
based upon their suitability for adoption within a historical methodology, as well as 
for their critical capacities in dealing with both technical and social elements and 
complexity. The theories I have drawn upon are Actor-Network theory (ANT), the 
social construction of technology (SCOT), socio-technical systems and the Sociology 
of Scientific Knowledge (SSK). 
 The first concept that I have tried to bear in mind is from the Sociology of 
Scientific Knowledge. ‘Symmetry’ asks us to treat both success and failure equally 
and to “…seek the same kinds of causes for both true and false [and]…rational and 
irrational beliefs”.75 Trevor Pinch and Wiebe Bijker adopted the symmetry principle 
for SCOT: 
Given our intention of building a sociology of technology which treats technological 
knowledge in the same symmetrical, impartial manner that scientific facts are treated within 
the sociology of scientific knowledge, it would seem that much of the historical material does 
                                                
75 David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery  (Chicago1991). pp. 175-79. 
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not go far enough. The success of an artefact is precisely what needs to be explained. For a 
sociological theory of technology it should be the explanandum, not the explanans.76 
This particular concept is important for avoiding the assumption that failed 
technologies were doomed from the outset, and similarly, that successful technologies 
had success written into them from the beginning. In short, it should help the historian 
of technology avoid the assumption that technological development is autonomous.  
 For instance, it may help us explain why the monoplane was first dropped in 
favour of the biplane (around 1913) and then reintroduced some twenty years later as 
the dominant design for military aircraft. On a smaller scale there is also the issue of 
new designs for the Royal Air Force. With each specification for a new aircraft from 
the Air Ministry there were at least four designs submitted and at least two or three 
prototypes built for Service trials. Most of the time just one of these designs was 
chosen for Service use and so there were many choices made in the selection of new 
aircraft.  
 Actor-Network theory and the Social Construction of Technology were 
developed during the 1980s to explain the creation, development, success and/or 
failure of technology and scientific knowledge. From ANT77 I want to make use of 
the concept of ‘heterogeneous engineering’, whereby the technical and social are 
simultaneously shaped by, say, an actor or institution.78 I have chosen it because 
successful engineers, such as Thomas Edison (or in the world of aviation Reginald 
Mitchell or Sydney Camm) had to be able to engineer both the social and the material. 
                                                
76 Wiebe E. Bijker and Trevor J. Pinch, "The Social Construction of Facts and 
Artefacts: or How the Sociology of Science and the Sociology of Technology Might 
Benefit Each Other," Social Studies of Science 14(1984): p. 406; ibid. 
77 Actor-Network theory is a theory of the relationships between ‘things’ and 
‘concepts’. Applied to technology studies, ANT is perhaps most usefully employed in 
describing the interactions between people, ideas and technology.  
78 Law, "Technology and Heterogeneous Engineering."; ibid. 
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The story of aircraft development between the World Wars is replete with both actors 
and institutions that might be termed heterogeneous engineers. I have used this 
concept to help frame some parts of the story such as the Aeronautical Research 
Committee which helped to shape both the political and technical landscape by 
advising the Air Ministry on one hand, and directing aeronautical research and 
advising the industry on the other.  
The next concept I have made use of independently from its larger SCOT 
framework is ‘interpretive flexibility’ which points out that artefacts mean different 
things to different actors, and further, that technical development raises new problems 
to be negotiated and solved. This concept was again chosen to focus attention on the 
highly social nature of technological change and the almost constant negotiation of 
the development of a technology. Stewart Russell has pointed out that: 
…interpretive flexibility may allow us to explain how groups relate the potential of an artefact 
to their objectives, and provide a basis…for interpreting statements in historical records...79 
The amount of historical records that I have used has meant that this concept has been 
useful in mapping out the interests that varying groups or individuals have in the 
technology and the differing requirements those groups may have of the technology. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
The bulk of this research was carried out at the National Archives, Kew and the 
National Aerospace Library at Farnborough. Due to the time period covered in the 
thesis (1918-1939), certain types of data collection were necessarily excluded. I could 
not rely on interviews as a source, and so I had to work with archives, contemporary 
publications and secondary literature. 
                                                
79 Stewart Russell, "The Social Construction of Artefacts: A Response to Pinch and 
Bijker," Social Studies of Science 16, no. 2 (1986): p. 343. 
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The National Archives 
The National Archives in particular, were a very useful and fruitful source for 
conducting this research. As the aircraft firms of the British industry merged or went 
out of business in the 1950s and 1960s the records of these businesses were simply 
thrown out, deemed too expensive to keep. In a sense though, they were not essential 
as the Air Ministry played a singularly important role in shaping and developing 
military aircraft technology throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Therefore, the holdings 
of the National Archives (in particular AIR – records created by the Air Ministry, 
Royal Air Force and related bodies and AVIA – records created or inherited by the 
Ministry of Aviation) were central in constructing the history of the participation of 
the government. What little we can gather from the firms through these holdings are 
glimpses of correspondence, agreements, contracts, designs and so forth.  
 The data taken from the National Archives was chosen based on its content 
pertaining to design, policy relating to the industry, management of the industry, the 
technology that might be required by the Royal Air Force and why, the strategy and 
policy of the Royal Air Force and so on. Because this thesis is not interested in 
levelling normative judgements at the performance or ‘quality’ of the industry, Air 
Ministry, technology and so forth, records discussing production figures, industry 
performance and the like were largely ignored. Anything that might shed light on how 
military aircraft technology developed in the inter-war years was chosen.  
  
National Aerospace Library, Farnborough (The HUB) 
I was fortunate to be introduced to the head librarian Brian Riddle who was a great 
help to me during my work there.   
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 Mainly, the HUB was used for secondary literature, but there were a number 
of useful sources, such as the entire proceedings of the Royal Aeronautical Society 
(RAeS) and the technical reports and memoranda of the Royal Aeronautical 
Establishment (RAE) at Farnborough.  
 
Limitations of Data Collected 
Perhaps unavoidably, there are limitations to my data collection. Some of which were 
imposed upon me (the destruction of company records for instance), while others 
were due simply to time, space and cost issues. Concentration on Air Ministry 
archives might be considered a limitation in looking, as it does, at one side of the 
topic. However, the extent of control exercised by the Ministry in the inter-war years 
was such that I do not consider it to be as limiting as might be supposed.  
 Again, time spent at the HUB was time spent looking at the most promising 
publications and proceedings of the RAeS.  
 
Strengths of Data Collected 
I have tried wherever possible to bring into this thesis data which has been previously 
ignored or deemed unimportant. The fact that my thesis focuses on something 
different from what has gone before in terms of British military aviation technology 
means that I have been able to use a lot of the archive holdings in a different way. For 
example, the files pertaining to Air Ministry specification F.7/30 (the first 
conscientious search for a low-wing fighter monoplane) have been used in this thesis 
to try and explain exactly why the Air Ministry deemed such a search to be important 
and how they went about it. It is interesting to note that in Barnett’s Audit of War the 
chapters looking at aircraft contain very little research from the Aviation Ministry 
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(AVIA), none at all from the Air Ministry (AIR) and almost everything else from 
Cabinet files (CAB). How can one take seriously a critique of technology without any 
































































The earliest man-made flying machines bore little resemblence with their more 
successful cousins which appeared between 1903 and 1910. Yet, the principles 
formulated from the use of such early inventions were at the core of the first gliders 
and later powered machines in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Kites 
capable of lifting a human being were used in China as early as 1000 B.C., and its 
form was used as the wings of Sir George Cayley’s first model glider in 1804.80 The 
European style windmill, first emerging in illustration in c.1290 with its horizontal 
spindle has been claimed to be the “passive ancestor of the active aircraft airscrew”.81 
Still further, it has been suggested that children’s toys of the same era based upon the 
windmill worked in precisely the same way as a helicopter and were the active 
ancestor of the airscrew.82 To detail the lineage of these inventions and how they 
came to bear on the experiments in aviation of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and 
eighteenth centuries would take far too long and divert from our primary purpose 
here, which is to discuss the evolution of the first heavier-than-air craft, and their use 
in a military context.  
 If the glider experiments of Cayley,83 Otto Lilienthal,84 Clement Ader85 and S. 
P. Langley86 (to name just a few) were the first concentrated efforts to achieve 
                                                
80 Gibbs-Smith, Aviation - An Historical Survey: p. 3. 
81 Ibid.; ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Sir George Cayley (1773-1857). One of the most significant figures in the 
development of modern aviation, his work influenced the pioneers of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Perhaps most notable Orville and Wilbur 
Wright.  
84 Otto Lilienthal (1848-1896). German aviation pioneer. Conducted and documented 
a number of successful flights using gliders. His experimental approach followed that 
established by Sir George Cayley. Authored The Problem of Flying (1893). Killed in 
a glider accident.  
85 Clement Ader (1841-1925). French Inventor and engineer who constructed his first 
‘flying machine’ in 1886 along with a lightweight steam engine of his own design to 
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sustained, controlled and powered flight in a heaver-than-air craft, then the balloons 
and dirigibles of von Zeppelin, the Montgolfier brothers and Thaddeus Lowe marked 
the importance of altitude in a strategic military setting. A brief look at the story of 
balloons and dirigibles is enough to demonstrate their importance in persuading many 
militaries87 of the value of using lighter-than-air craft to achieve a tactical advantage 
over their enemies. It is important to note that these principles were adopted in Britain 
decades before military aircraft were to be built.  
 
CAYLEY AND CRYSTALLISING THE ‘PROBLEM OF FLIGHT’ 
Sir George Cayley (1773-1857) has been described by French historian Charles 
Dollfus as “the true inventor of the aeroplane and one of the most powerful geniuses 
in the history of aviation”.88 And further, that, “the aeroplane is a British ‘invention’; 
it was conceived in its entirety by George Cayley”. His work on aerodynamics in the 
decade 1799-1809 was to provide the foundation upon which “the whole vast science 
of flying is founded”.89  
                                                                                                                                      
power it. Published L’Aviation Militaire in 1909: “An airplane-carrying vessel is 
indispensable. These vessels will be constructed on a plan very different from what is 
currently used. First of all the deck will be cleared of all obstacles. It will be flat, as 
wide as possible without jeopardizing the nautical lines of the hill, and it will look 
like a landing field”.  
86 Samuel Pierpont Langley (1834-1906). American astronomer, physicist and pioneer 
of aviation. Experimented with rubber-band powered models and gliders around 
1887. Largely unsuccessful.  
87 Most notably, the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany.  
88 C. H. Gibbs-Smith, The Invention of the Aeroplane, 1799-1909  (London: Faber & 
Faber, 1966). p. 5. 
89 Gibbs-Smith, Aviation - An Historical Survey: p. 23. 
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Sir George Cayley 
Furthermore, his work in this decade crystallized the conundrum of aviation: “The 
whole problem is confined within these limits, viz. to make a surface support a given 
weight by the application of power to the resistance of air”.90 The research and work 
conducted by Cayley attempted to “cover those four main subjects that were – and 
must remain still – central to any reputable aeronautical curriculum: propulsion, 
structure, aerodynamics, and stability and control”.91 
 Cayley’s work influenced most of the pioneers that would follow him. His 
methodology was used by Lilienthal to great effect and, indeed, many of the early 
pioneers believed Cayley to be the father of aviation. Victor Tatin,92 writing in 1907: 
“In following the chronological order, one finds, at the head of the inventors of the aeroplane 
Sir George Cayley; this man of genius...the masterly work of Cayley”.93 
Another similar example is that of Alphonse Berget: 
                                                
90 Gibbs-Smith, The Invention of the Aeroplane, 1799-1909: p. 7. 
91 J. A. D. Ackroyd, "Sir George Cayley, the Father of Aeronautics, Part 1: the 
Invention of the Aeroplane," Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London 56, 
no. 2 (2002): p. 171. 
92 Victor Tatin (1843-1913). French inventor who created the first model aeroplane to 
achieve takeoff under its own power in 1879.  
93 C. H. Gibbs-Smith, The Rebirth of European Aviation, 1902-1908  (London: 
HMSO, 1974). p. 210. 
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This inventor, the incontestable precursor of aviation, was an Englishman, Sir George 
Cayley…the name of Sir George Cayley should be inscribed in letters of gold at the beginning 
of the history of the aeroplane.94 
Even Wilbur Wright writing in 1909 said: 
About 100 years ago an Englishman, Sir George Cayley, carried the science of flying to a 
point which is had never reached before and which it scarcely reached again during the last 
century.95 
His contributions, though separated from the first practical flights by a century, 
should not be underestimated. Gibbs-Smith’s Aviation – A Historical Survey fairly 
credits him with being the first man in history: 
i. To divorce the system of thrust from that of lift, and so inaugurate the concept of the 
modern fixed-wing powered aeroplane; 
ii. To use a whirling arm for aeronautical research; 
iii. To use model gliders for aerodynamic research; 
iv. To design, build and successfully make to fly, proper aeroplanes (unpowered) in the 
form of both model and full-size man-carrying machines supported by fixed wings, 
stabilized by an adjustable tail-unit and wing-dihedral96, and controlled by a 
combined elevator and rudder; 
v. To formulate and to publish the basic aerodynamics of the fixed-wing aeroplane, 
including longitudinal and lateral stability…and to apply this to both model and full-
size man-carrying aeroplanes; 
vi. To surmise that a cambered aerofoil gives greater lift than a flat one; 
vii. To design, build and apply a light cycle-type undercarriage; 
viii. To suggest an internal combustion engine for aircraft propulsion.97 
                                                
94 Ibid., p. 211. 
95 C. H. Gibbs-Smith, "Sir George Cayley: 'Father of Aerial Navigation', 1773-1857," 
Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London 17, no. 1 (1962): p. 53. 
96 The upward tilt of aircraft wings and tailplanes.  
97 Gibbs-Smith, Aviation - An Historical Survey: pp. 23-24. Gibbs-Smith’s complete 
list is not reproduced here as it is simply too long.  
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The direct significance of Cayley’s work to this thesis, although separated from the 
inter-war years by over a century, is that he laid down and ‘crystallised’ many of the 
problems and questions to which answers and solutions were being sought throughout 
the 1920s and 1930s – in many respects the solutions of that era are still being 
improved upon today. It is interesting to note, that throughout the 1920s the whole 
question of how an aircraft flew was still being debated.98  
 
BALLOONS AND DIRIGIBLES 
The origins of the use of aircraft as a military technology undoubtedly lie in the 
development of air balloons as observation posts for various armies. The idea of using 
altitude as an aide in warfare originated in China, and the first example for which we 
have adequate evidence occurred in around 206 B.C. when kites were used to 
determine the distance between an army and its target.99 It was 1783, however, before 
the first manned ascent in a balloon took place.  Invented by the Montgolfier brothers 
in France, balloons were pioneered as military aids in the United States during the 
American Civil War (1861-1865) by Thaddeus Lowe amongst others; Lowe perhaps 
being the most famous, or notorious depending on one’s point of view.  
Lowe’s balloons could ascend to around 1,000 feet, and report observations by 
telegraph on troop movements over three miles away and thus were considered highly 
effective.100 Balloons were also used with great success in the direction of artillery 
fire during the American Civil War. Before the conflict ended, however, interest in 
                                                
98 David Bloor, The Enigma of the Aerofoil - Rival Theories in Aerodynamics, 1909-
1930  (London: University of Chicago Press, 2011). 
99 Robert Jackson, Army Wings: A History of Army Air Observation Flying, 1914-
1960  (Pen and Sword Aviation2006). p. 7. 
100 E. B. Block, Above the Civil War: The Story of Thaddeus Lowe, Balloonist, 
Inventor, Railway Builder  (Howell-North1966). C. D. Ross, Trial by Fire: Science, 
Technology and the Civil War  (White Mane2000). 
 53 
aeronautics died thanks in large part to Lowe’s resignation from the Balloon Corps101 
and would not be resurrected in the United States for some thirty years.  
Balloons were used as observation tools throughout the armed forces of Europe and 
particularly in Germany. The change from balloons to rigid airships capable of being 
steered (hence, dirigible), as opposed to the tethered balloons (or ‘captive balloons’) 
used in the latter half of the nineteenth century originated in Germany by Lieutenant 
General Count Ferdinand von Zeppelin. He was a balloon enthusiast and upon leaving 
the German army in 1898 he was determined to build efficient rigid airships. The 
first, 420 feet long, was completed in 1900.102 By 1908 Britain had just begun its own 
concentrated dirigible airship programme. They had been enthusiastic about 
developing balloon technology for forty years however, with experiments at the 
Woolwich Arsenal in 1878, and from 1894 there had been a Balloon factory at South 
Farnborough, the forerunner of the Royal Aircraft Factory, which later became the 
Royal Aeronautical Establishment.103 It is worth noting here that before 1912 when 
the Royal Flying Corps was established, the British military had no dedicated flying 
Service. Instead, the Admiralty and War Office were involved in developing aviation 
for their respective Services.  
British work on aeronautics was not quite as fragmented as that of the United 
States and as mentioned above Britain was enthusiastic for the technology. After the 
establishment of the Balloon Equipment Store at Woolwich, the first British balloon 
was used in 1879 and then in 1880 it was used in military manoeuvres before being 
                                                
101 His Balloon Corps was transferred to the Corps of Engineers and a 40 per-cent pay 
cut was imposed causing Lowe to resign in protest. Thus, it was neither a failure of 
technology or an institutional one that caused the Balloon Corps to be disbanded. That 
being said, Lowe was also to blame for establishing a monopoly within the Union 
Army, failing to support other balloonists requiring aid from his Corps. When he 
resigned there was, therefore, no one to fill the gap he left.  
102 P. M. Brooks, Zeppelin: Rigid Airships, 1893-1940  (Smithsonian1992). 
103 J. D. Scott, Vickers - A History  (London1963). p. 69. 
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taken, in 1884, on an expedition to Botswana.104 Balloons were used with further 
success in the Boer War of 1899-1900. Their value on the battlefields of South Africa 
went a long way to convincing certain British Army officers that aerial 
reconnaissance was a legitimate concern and could be developed further into a 
valuable asset.105 
The first British airship (the Nulli Secundus) flew in 1907, and opinions were 
divided amongst the officers of the armed Services. Some were skeptical of the new 
technology, while others believed that in light of the German head start, Britain 
should begin further development of airships with an aim to integrating them into the 
Services as soon as possible. J. D. Scott has noted that there was a sharp division in 
the opinions of the Admiralty over airship development: 
The Admiralty…had been looking with interest at Zeppelin’s achievements, but they were by 
no means in a hurry. Many admirals regarded airships as they had regarded submarines, with 
hostile skepticism; others felt that anything a German cavalryman could do British sailors 
could do better in their own good time. But a number of officers felt differently…These 
men…had that particular type of enthusiastic, dissident, thrusting Service 
temperament…They were the same men who had backed submarines [in the face of 
opposition some years previously]…106 
In July 1908 proposals were submitted for what was to become the first Naval Air 
Service. The proposals were that a Naval Air Assistant should be appointed to the 
Admiralty, that the War Office should make advice from the Balloon School available 
to the Admiralty, and that Vickers Sons and Maxim should be consulted about the 
design of a rigid airship for Naval use. Vickers, a company traditionally engaged in 
                                                
104 Jackson, Army Wings: p. 13. 
105 Ibid., p. 15. 
106 Scott, Vickers: p. 70. 
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the design and manufacture of steel, guns and gun turrets was thus being asked to 
change their thinking from the design of these products to those of silk and light alloy. 
 The most important argument in favour of airships, as far as the Admiralty 
were concerned, was the notion that they could, if necessary, undertake an emergency 
descent at sea.107 This lay at the root of the Admiralty’s policy of concentrating on 
airships rather than heavier-than-air craft. It took Vickers two years to construct the 
Mayfly. Tragedy struck, however, when she broke her back while being brought out 
of her shed. This added an important string to the anti-air movement bow, and it was 
also becoming clear that when the British air Services were eventually established, 
they would depend mainly upon aircraft.  
 
THE WRIGHT STUFF (!) 
Orville and Wilbur Wright were the first aviators to achieve a sustained flight in a 
heavier-than-air craft. Their interest in aviation was first aroused by the work, and 
dramatic death of the German glider pioneer Otto Lilienthal.108 Their very early work 
convinced them that Lilienthal’s method of control, based solely on body-movement, 
was inefficient. They built their first aircraft, a biplane kite with a span of five feet, in 
1899 to test the virtue of wing warping as a method of control in unsteady winds.109  
Being appraised as a successful method of control, they decided to build a 
full-scale glider, adopting the wing warping method as soon as possible, eventually 
finishing in September 1900. This glider had a span of 17 feet and 165 sq. ft. area. 
The Wright brothers were conspicuous in that their approach to design and 
development lay in some scientific reasoning and the use of experiments with wind 
                                                
107 Ibid., p. 71. 
108 C. H. Gibbs-Smith, The Wright Brothers - A Brief Account of their Work, 1899-
1911  (London: HMSO, 1987). p. 4. 
109 Ibid., p. 5; ibid. 
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tunnels, as opposed to the cut and try empiricism of other pioneers. Initially, the 
brothers followed the work of Lilienthal and others in order to calculate the lift 
generated by their wing sections, but came to realise that much of the data might be 
flawed. As Wilbur put it: 
Having set out with absolute faith in the existing scientific data, we were driven to doubt one 
thing after another, till finally, after two years of experiment, we cast it all aside, and decided 
to rely entirely upon our own investigations.110 
The glider experiments conducted by the brothers led to many modifications to their 
design, both major and minor. The brothers also developed their own aero-engine and 
propellers which both went through several changes, and after overcoming several 
problems with broken drive shafts and bad weather they made their first controlled, 
sustained and powered flight on the 17th December 1903 at Kill Devil Hills near Kitty 
Hawk, North Carolina.  
 Having achieved this goal, the brothers decided to offer their machine to the 
United States government. Due to several unforeseen circumstances, the letter 
intended for William Howard Taft, the Secretary of War, ended up being delivered to 
General Gillespie at the War Department’s Board of Ordinance and Fortification, who 
misunderstood the intentions and achievement’s of the Wrights and wrote to them, via 
their go-between Congressman Robert Nevin that: 
It appears from the letter of Messrs. Wilbur and Orville Wright that their machine has not yet 
been brought to the stage of practical operation, but as soon as it shall have been perfected, 
this Board would be pleased to receive further representations from them in regard to it.111 
The consequences of this misunderstanding were that the brothers simply looked 
elsewhere for a buyer for their machine. The first country to express an interest in 
                                                
110 Ibid., p. 6. 
111 Alfred Gollin, "The Wright Brothers and the British Authorities, 1902-1909," The 
English Historical Review 95, no. 375 (1980): p. 301. 
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purchasing the Wright Flyer was the United Kingdom. There was an unusually close 
relationship between the Wright brothers and several prominent aviators and aviation 
enthusiasts in Britain: Lieutenant-Colonel John Capper of the Balloon Section of the 
British Army; Patrick Alexander, a prominent member of the Aeronautical Society of 
Great Britain who sought out the Wrights as early as 1902 upon learning of their 
experiments with gliders and Major B.F.S. Baden-Powell of the Scots Guards, an 
authority in the field of military aviation.112 
 By 1905 these relationships, bolstered by an overwhelmingly favourable 
impression of the brothers by everyone involved in British aeronautics,113 encouraged 
the Wrights to enquire if the British government would consider purchasing the 
machine along with the “scientific and practical knowledge and instruction we are in a 
position to impart”.114 
 
HALDANE AND THE EARLY BRITISH ‘SCIENTIFIC APPROACH’ 
An important figure in the British government’s dealings with the Wright brothers 
was Richard Burdon Haldane who became the British Secretary of State for War in 
1905.115 It was Haldane who would ultimately decide whether or not to purchase 
aircraft from the Wright’s in view of the aeronautical situation in Britain. Indeed, his 
decision to not use the Wright brothers caused damage to his reputation and he was 
largely a victim of media and public enthusiasm for aviation which saw his refusal to 
                                                
112 Ibid., pp. 294-96. 
113 Ibid., pp. 293-94. Lt. Col. Capper, for example, had this to say: “…they have 
something to be even more proud of than their great invention, and that is their 
simple-minded honesty and kindness…This is most delightful…to find people so 
utterly unaffected and unspoilt”.  
114 Ibid., p. 302. 
115 Alfred Gollin, "The Mystery of Lord Haldane and Early British Military 
Aviation," Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies 11, no. 1 
(1979): p. 46. 
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do business with the Wrights as backwards thinking. However, his position on 
aviation was far more complex than has been assumed by certain historians in the 
past. For example, he has been lambasted as “the apostle of military stagnation” by E. 
Charles Vivian116 and has been accused by Marvin McFarland as having caused 
England to miss “the aviation bus as completely as Neville Chamberlain was to miss 
another bus at a subsequent stage of world history”.117 These criticisms, however, 
have failed to take proper account of the complexity of the situation in 1905-1910.118 
The situation was so complex that it has been noted that “Haldane’s actions behind 
the scenes may never be known with certainty”.119  
 Haldane was responsible, however, for helping to develop a rigorous scientific 
approach to developing aviation in Britain with a strong emphasis on the stability of 
aircraft in flight. In May 1909, he reported to the House of Commons that he was to 
be working with the director of the National Physical Laboratory (NPL), Lord 
Rayleigh and Dr. Richard Glazebrook to discuss developing the Air Services. The 
direct result of this was the appointment of the Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 
presided over by Rayleigh: “The idea was to bring the “highest scientific talents” to 
bare on the aeronautical problems of the army and navy”.120  
 He still regularly came under fire in the House of Commons and was accused 
of being “hypnotized by the blessed word ‘Science’”.121 The major criticism levelled 
                                                
116 E. Charles Vivian, A History of Aeronautics  (New York1921). p. 176. 
117 Marvin McFarland, "When the Airplane was a Military Secret," The Air Power 
Historian 2, no. 4 (1955): pp. 78-79. 
118 Haldane was determined to follow the German example, or at least emulate their 
scientific approach. He also was aware that stability in the air would be crucial and 
that the Wright brothers machine required constant adjustments on the part of the pilot 
to keep it stable.  
119 Percy Walker, Early Aviation at Farnborough, 2 vols., vol. 1 (London1971). p. 
254. 
120 Gollin, "Mystery of Lord Haldane," p. 62. 
121 Ibid. 
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at Haldane was that he was not sufficiently practical. In August 1909 Lord Lee of 
Fareham, chairman of the Parliamentary Aerial Defense Committee, argued that: 
Instead of devoting our energies so exclusively…to the study of pure theory, we ought to go 
further than we have done in…purchasing accumulated experience that is being gained in 
other countries.122 
The ‘accumulated experience’ referred to by Lord Lee was, to give one example, the 
knowledge gained by the Wrights in the development of their aircraft. But Haldane 
was not interested. In a letter to Lady Jane Taylor123 (who was, at that time, trying to 
persuade Haldane about the Wright Flyer) he wrote: “The War Office is not disposed 
to enter into relations at present with any manufacturer of Aeroplanes”.124 Haldane 
felt the United Kingdom was at a “profound disadvantage compared with the 
Germans, who were building up the structure of the Air Service on a foundation of 
science”.125 He considered those with ‘successful’ designs (i.e., those aircraft which 
actually flew, or might well do with proper backing) as “only clever empiricists”.126  
And yet David Bloor has noted that in the early years of flight:  
A division of labour quickly established itself. Practical constructors continued with their trial 
and error methods, while scientists and engineers began to study the nature of the airflow and 
the relation between the flow and the forces that it would generate.127  
For Haldane, as he saw it, the piecemeal, cut and try empiricism of the pioneers was 
not good enough. He wanted a strong scientific basis for British aeronautical work. 
                                                
122 Walker, Early Aviation at Farnborough, 1: p. 255. 
123 The wife of General Sir Richard Taylor. 
124 Gollin, "Mystery of Lord Haldane," p. 51. 
125 Richard Burdon Haldane, An Autobiography  (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 
1929). p. 232. 
126 Gollin, "Mystery of Lord Haldane," p. 51. 
127 Bloor, The Enigma of the Aerofoil: p. 2; ibid. 
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Indeed, so ‘hypnotised by science’ was he that in 1908 and again in 1909 he fired two 
men making great strides in their practical work, J. W. Dunne and Samuel Cody.128  
There was much debate between ‘practically’ and ‘scientifically’ minded men 
about the early development of British aircraft. Indeed, Cody was sacked for not 
being properly scientific in his experiments (never mind his results).  Dunne had 
designed an aircraft that was meant to be stable. This was directly at odds with the 
Wrights’ aircraft that required a great deal of effort on the part of the pilot to achieve 
stability. Haldane ordered tests in the Scottish highlands on Dunne’s aircraft and it 
was unable to achieve sustained flight. Dunne was subsequently dismissed.129 But 
Haldane was responsible for establishing important practical and political institutions 
for further developing British aviation. After sacking Cody he organised the Army 
Aircraft Factory for the design and development of aircraft, and the Advisory 
Committee on Aeronautics which was to be headed by Britain’s “most distinguished 
physicist…Lord Rayleigh”.130 By that time, however, many other pioneers such as A. 
V. Roe, Geoffrey de Havilland, and Samuel Cody were making significant progress in 
creating a working aircraft. The Wrights did eventually find a buyer in the French 
Army, selling them a biplane in February 1910.131  
 
EARLY AIRCRAFT AND THE INDUSTRY 1909-1914 
The inaugural edition of the journal Flight in January 1909 took as its starting point 
the First Paris Aeronautical Salon; indeed, this was the first exhibition of aeronautical 
technology at all. The article discusses the nature of the aircraft industry at the time: 
                                                
128 Cody made the first successful flight in Britain in October 1908. 
129 Bloor, The Enigma of the Aerofoil: p. 13. 
130 Edgerton, England and the Aeroplane: p. 4. 
131 Jackson, Army Wings: p. 16. 
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At the present time flight is only just commencing its career as an industry…[and] Although 
these are the earliest of days, it is impossible to ignore the fact that the flying industry is 
already born. It is one of those half-hidden aspects of the present situation which makes itself 
unobtrusively apparent at the Salon, but might have remained unrealised for a much longer 
period to come had such an occasion not offered an opportunity for bringing it to light. It is a 
little apt to be forgotten that the more prominently successful experimenters have been at 
work for a long time…132 
The article also has some interesting things to say about the monoplanes and biplanes 
present at the Salon: 
Monoplanes have a distinct superiority in numbers over the biplanes at the first Aeronautical 
Salon, but presumably it is only a matter of individual preference at the present time as to 
which of the two types has been adopted. The monoplane has of course less surface that a 
biplane occupying the same width of spread, and is therefore a higher speed machine. It lends 
itself to simplicity of construction, and if fitted with a tractor screw133, as most are, to the use 
of a direct coupled engine.134 
Early aircraft manufacture around 1905 to 1908 was characterised by one-off designs 
usually constructed by very small teams rather than the larger drawing offices of later 
years. There was general, incremental improvement in performance during these 
years as illustrated in the following table: 
Distance or 
Time 
Place Aeronaut Date 
Few seconds Bagatel le Santos Dumont 22 Aug.,  1906 
                                                
132 Anon, "The First Paris Aeronautical Salon," Flight Vol. 1 No. 1(1909): p. 7. 
133 A ‘tractor screw’ is a propeller arrangement placed in front of the supporting 
planes of an airframe instead of behind them so that it exerts a pull instead of a push. 
Hence, tractor biplane or tractor monoplane. Although this is the most common 
arrangement for modern propeller driven aircraft, this clearly was not so at the time 
this article was written. The significance of this being the choice that was still to be 
made.  
134 Anon, "The First Paris Aeronautical Salon," p. 8. 
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7-8 meters “  “  “  14 Sept. ,  1906 
50 meters “  “  “  24 Oct. ,  1906 
60 meters “  “  “  13 Nov.,  1906 
82.6 meters “  “  “  “  “  “  
220 meters “  “  “  “  “  “  
363 meters Issy Henry Farman 25 Oct. ,  1907 
403 meters “  “  “  “  “  “  
771 meters “  “   “  “  “  “  
1.  5 ki lometers  “  “  “  13 Jan. ,  1908 
2.  04 ki lometers  “  “  “  21 Mar. ,  1908 
2.  5 ki lometers  “  Delagrange 10 Apri l . ,  1908 
5 ki lometers Rome “ “ 27 May, 1908 
9 ki lometers “  “  “  “  “  “  
 From Flight, 2nd January 1909 ‘Progress of Mechanical Flight’, p. 12 
 
The first controlled flight in Britain was an important step in aviation as several 
European countries, as well as the United States, had already developed successful 
flying machines. As mentioned above, the Wrights had offered the British War Office 
their flyer and technical knowledge. Their offer was rejected in large part due to the 
fact that the Wrights would not demonstrate the flyer until they had a signed 
contract.135 
Even before the Mayfly disaster in 1910 there was a fledgling or, more 
accurately, cottage aircraft industry established in Britain by firms such as A. V. Roe, 
and Short Brothers. For firms such as Vickers two options existed as they considered 
entering the aircraft industry. They could either design and manufacture a machine 
from scratch, or they could obtain a license to manufacture a machine designed by 
                                                
135 Edgerton, England and the Aeroplane: p. 2. 
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another company. The Admiralty for their part favoured purchasing a manufacturing 
license. There were two choices that appealed to the Vickers board; the Sommer 
Biplane, or the Esnault-Pelterie Monoplane (the R.E.P).136 Eventually a license was 
purchased for the R.E.P. The Admiralty however, were not interested in purchasing 
any aircraft for Service use.  
 
AERO-ENGINES 
Early aero-engines owed much to the development of motor car engines.137 Many 
were custom made for their machines; the Wright Flyer for example used a 12 horse-
power (h.p.) custom built engine which, incidentally, marked the first use of 
aluminium in construction of aircraft components. Others adapted motorcycle engines 
for use in their experimental aircraft. Alliott Verdon Roe used a (rather inadequate 
and underpowered) 6 h.p. JAP motorcycle engine to power his biplane design in 
1907. Finding that he did not have enough power to take off he borrowed a French 
manufactured Antoinette eight-cylinder ‘vee’138 24 h.p. engine.  
                                                
136 An interesting aside to the R.E.P. is that it is mentioned in the inaugural issue of 
Flight emphasising the hard work done behind-the-scenes. “…it was six years ago 
that M. Esnault-Pelterie first commenced the work which he has since continued 
without interruption to the present day…he has built aeroplanes, designed and 
constructed a very successful engine, and laid down an aviation factory which…is at 
present probably the largest in existence. And yet he is one of the youngest in the 
field; in fact, M. Pelterie is a “flying engineer” pure and simple, for he commenced 
his practical career as soon as he had left his regiment – which he joined directly after 
taking his degree in science…[his example] so aptly points [to] the moral of “going 
slow” at first in a new thing. As M. Pelterie himself remarked…”Everywhere to-day I 
hear the same expressions of surprise and wonder at what is on view, [at the 
Aeronautical Salon] followed by optimistic conclusions of further wonders to come 
immediately. I am afraid they are going too fast; they forget about our past laborious 
work””. Anon, "The First Paris Aeronautical Salon."January 2nd 1909, p. 7 
137 Anon, "Engines for Aeroplanes," Flight Vol. 1 No. 3(1909): p. 33. 
138 ‘Vee’ refers to a particular arrangement of cylinders within the engine vertically in 
a V shape. Other arrangements include ‘inline’ where the cylinders are in a straight 
line or a ‘flat six’ where the cylinders are laid horizontally, facing each other, in banks 
of three.  
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 By 1908 engine horse-power was climbing towards 50 h.p. and debates were 
occurring in the aviation press about the best materials and configurations to use in 
order to achieve maximum power and efficiency. Forged steel vs. cast iron and air vs. 
water-cooling were just some of the subjects being discussed.139 At this stage the 
design, development and manufacture of aero-engines was for the most part being 
conducted in France. Gnome, Renault, R.E.P, and Antoinette were among the 
manufacturers displaying goods at the Aeronautical Salon in Paris.140 This was a 
cause for some consternation in the British aviation press with Flight commenting 
that: 
It is common knowledge that the United Kingdom has utterly failed to get away well at the 
start; but all may yet be well if the recognition of that fact is made to act as an immediate 
stimulant to the British nation…The prospects of the coming season are bright enough for 
England if only sufficient enthusiasm can be aroused in place of past lethargy…It [British 
aviation technology] only needs, in fact, more pioneer investigators like Mr. Moore-Brabazon 
[English aviation pioneer] –who will now, we trust, find sufficient encouragement to keep him 
at work in this country.141 
These comments offer several important insights into the development of aviation 
technology in Britain at that time. Firstly, there is the frank admission of the lack of 
progress in British design and development that (so Flight believed) could be 
remedied by an increased interest in domestic aviation. Secondly, there is the 
suggestion that some of the more progressive pioneer inventors were being drawn to 
more enthusiastic locales and indeed Flight mention that “…even in France it is two 
English-speaking men who have so far led the van”.142 
                                                
139 Anon, "Engines for Aeroplanes," p. 34. 
140 Anon, "Engines for Aeroplanes continued," Flight Vol. 1 No. 4(1909): p. 46. 
141 Anon, "The Position of the Aeronautic Industry," Flight Vol. 1 No. 2(1909): p. 18. 
142 Ibid. 
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 Having secured sufficient funding Geoffrey de Havilland was able to design 
and construct his first airframe and aero-engine (the F.E.1) in 1909. It developed 45 
h.p. and could achieve 37 miles-per-hour.143 As promising a development as this was, 
when de Havilland’s F.E. 1 crashed in 1911 it was rebuilt (as the F.E. 2) with a lighter 
50 h.p. French Gnome engine. From 1910 the situation was improving somewhat in 
British aero-engine design as small pioneering firms with little capital and funding 
were supplemented or supplanted by larger, financially stable companies set up and 
run by professional businessmen. Bristol Aeroplane Company for example was 
started in 1910 by Sir Geoffrey White and later became one of the world’s foremost 
producers of aero-engines.  
 By 1911 some real innovation was taking place in the development of aero-
engines. The New Engine (Motor) Company had designed an entirely new two-stroke 
petrol engine.144 This was a significant step in aero-engine design. Two-stroke 
engines fire once every revolution as opposed to the four-stroke engine which fires 
once every other revolution. This gives the two-stroke engine a significant power 
advantage. Furthermore, the two-stroke engine does not use valves and so is also 
significantly lighter than the four-stroke as well as being simpler to construct. In the 
case of the N.E.C. two-stroke: 
…[It] appears to justify its claim to be the lightest engine in the world for its power; and 
although it is at the moment difficult to give actual comparative figures it would appear to be 
an advance upon all others in this respect, mainly due to the difference in the weight of the 
lubricating oil required by it in comparison with engines of the rotary pattern. It is, at any rate, 
sincerely to be hoped that this new and extremely interesting flight motor will justify in actual 
practice all its makers’ hopes, for if it does so it will not only put England in a unique and 
                                                
143 C. Martin Sharp, D.H. A History of de Havilland  (Shrewsbury: Airlife, 1982). pp. 
34-35. 
144 Anon, "The N.E.C. Two-Stroke Flight Engine," Flight Vol. 2 No. 52(1910): p. 
1052. 
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much to be desired pre-eminent position but it will have accomplished something of even 
wider importance, which is the opening of the door of progress for the two-stroke engine.145 
The development of a two-stroke aero-engine offered an important potential avenue 
of development if it could be proved as a reliable and efficient technology and thus as 
a suitable alternative to the four-stroke aero-engine.  
 
MATERIALS 
The first aircraft constructed by pioneers were made of the lightest and most basic 
materials. The airframe was manufactured of wood obtained from local lumber yards. 
In the case of Geoffrey de Havilland’s first aeroplane white wood “was employed for 
the longerons and struts…and for the spars and ribs of the wings and the inter-plane 
struts”146, piano wire was used for all the bracings due to its strength and a thin cotton 
cloth was used for covering the surfaces.147 The undercarriage was constructed of 
bicycle wheels and bicycle steel tubing.148 This was in 1908, but by 1909 there were 
industries devoted to the manufacture of materials for aircraft construction.                 
              
Figure 4 - de Havilland (Royal Balloon Factory F. E. 1), 1910 
                                                
145 Ibid.; ibid. 
146 Sharp, D.H. A History of de Havilland: p. 20. Longerson 
147 Longerons, stringers or stiffeners are strips of material to which the skin of the 
aircraft is attached. Struts are supports between the wings, or as part of the 
undercarriage.  
148 Sharp, D.H. A History of de Havilland. 
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While wood was the favoured material for airframe construction there were firms 
engaged in constructing such specialised products as hollow beams, struts and elliptic 
lattice girders as opposed to the solid beams like as those used by de Havilland.  
 The type of materials didn’t change very much over the course of the First 
World War and typical British military aircraft were made with a wooden structure 
covered in a treated fabric. Likewise, in Germany most Service aircraft were 
constructed using these materials, however, German aircraft manufacturers were also 
much more willing to experiment with metal construction in both the structure and 
skin of their aircraft with many successful examples appearing throughout the war. A 
short discussion on the relative benefits or drawbacks of metal and wood should be 
useful here.  
   
THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND INFLUENCE ON AIRCRAFT DESIGN 
In 1910 Colonel J. E. B. Seely149 reported to a group of aviation pioneers that “…[the 
Government] does not consider that aeroplanes are of any possible use for war 
purposes”.150 The widespread use of aircraft as military machines had not occurred to 
the Admiralty and War Office much before 1911. By April of that year Britain had 
just six military aeroplanes in contrast to the French War Department which had 
208.151 It was the growing prospect of war in Europe that made the British 
government more enthusiastic about military aviation and as a result, many orders for 
military machines were placed. By the start of the First World War in 1914 “the 
Naval Wing of the [Royal Flying Corps] had a total of ninety-three heavier-than-air 
                                                
149 British politician, Secretary of State for War (1912-1914), and despite his 
protestations to the contrary in 1910, the development of a Flying Corps was of 
special interest to him. 
150 Peter Fearon, "The Formative Years of the British Aircraft Industry, 1913-1924," 
Business History Review 43, no. 4 (1969): p. 479. 
151 Ibid. 
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craft [including airships] and the Military Wing, 179”.152 All of which were unarmed 
and used solely for reconnaissance. 
 Initially, military aircraft were used primarily as reconnaissance tools for 
spotting troops and the fall of artillery as well as taking aerial photographs of 
battlefields. Pilots began taking pistols and rifles up with them to take pot-shots at 
enemy reconnaissance aircraft. ‘Fighter’ aircraft developed as a response to these 
reconnaissance machines and a desire to stop the enemy from gathering intelligence 
from the air. In conventional terms a ‘fighter’ aircraft was a machine that was able to 
carry a pilot, machine gun and gunner with the purpose of shooting down enemy 
aircraft. One crucial piece of technology which really furthered the use of military 
aircraft as fighters was the ‘interrupter gear’ which allowed a forward facing machine 
gun mounted in front of the pilot to fire through the propellers without hitting them.  
 Tactically, the interrupter gear provided the German Luftstreitkräfte (Imperial 
German Army Air Service) with an enormous advantage over the Royal Flying Corps 
when it appeared. Previously, the advantage had been held by the Vickers Gun Bus 
(F.B. 5). This was a pusher153 biplane with the propeller mounted behind the pilot 
which allowed for a pilot operated forward facing machine gun. The Gun Bus was 
“the only definitely offensive aeroplane then in existence”.154 
                                                
152 Ibid. 
153 The pusher design contrasts with the tractor design of aircraft mentioned above 
whereby the propeller and engine is arranged behind the pilot producing a push rather 
than pull effect and giving an unobstructed forward view. It was therefore ideal for 
mounting a machine gun. 
154 Anon, "Milestones - The Vickers Machines," Flight Vol. XI No. 24(1919): p. 760. 
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Figure 5 – Vickers F. B. 5 Gun Bus155 
 
The Gun Bus held a decisive advantage over the Luftstreitkräfte for around eight 
months until the arrival of the new Fokker aircraft using the new interrupter gear 
swung the balance back in Germany’s favour. The Fokker interrupter design had the 
trigger mechanism of the machine gun enabled and the interrupter mechanism would 
disable it when the propellers were in the way. By contrast the first British 
synchronization gear had the trigger mechanism normally disabled and would enable 
it to fire when the propeller was clear. The effect of the German mechanism before 
the R.F.C. could bring in its own had a devastating effect on the morale of British 




                                                
155 Ibid. Note the position of the propeller at the rear of the pilot and the forward 
facing machine gun allowing for a wide offensive firing arch.  
156 Scott, Vickers: p. 121. 
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STABILITY AND CONTROL 
Early British aircraft largely followed the same developmental process as the Wright 
brothers in America and Henri Farman in France, for example. The inductive trial and 
error process served the early pioneers well. However, as interest in the potential 
military use for aircraft increased and following a number of accidents, the Advisory 
Committee for Aeronautics became keen to adopt a strict set of testing procedures 
before any commitments were made to purchase any aircraft for Service use. 
 Testing covered two main areas: (i) strength, stability, and reliability of 
components, and (ii) performance.157 Initially, particular attention was paid to the 
development of testing procedures relating to the strength and stability of the airframe 
and the reliability of the engine. It was found by the ACA committee investigating 
accidents that while the majority of such incidents were caused by engine failure, 
stronger airframes and airframe components would give the pilot a better chance of 
landing the aircraft when such problems arose.  
 In a report to the Secretary of State for War, the Accidents Committee, made 
up chiefly of members from the Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (ACA), 
recommended that: 
…with every machine purchased, stress diagrams or calculations should be required, which 
should be carefully checked. They [the Committee] would suggest that the Advisory 
Committee for Aeronautics be asked to report on the best method of carrying out these 
calculations.158 
This was the beginning of a systematic and standardised approach to testing. The 
ACA wanted a comprehensive system of tests devised to be applicable to any 
machine under consideration for adoption by the military. Furthermore, in addition to 
                                                
157 Speed, range, rate-of-climb, degree of control and so on.  
158 NA AIR 1/2100/207/28/12 – Report of the Departmental Committee on the 
Accidents to Monoplanes, 1912, p. 8 
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tests measuring strength and stability, a set of tests was also devised to measure 
performance. These tests had the ultimate purpose of deciding the suitability of a 
machine for adoption, and also for deciding between machines under consideration.  
 There was a great desire to achieve the most accurate results possible, and to 
that end the formulation of testing procedure and the design of instruments used for 
testing were continually developed to achieve greater accuracy.  
 The Advisory Committee for Aeronautics was in large part responsible for 
recommending additions to the equipment at the National Physical Laboratory. 
Beginning in 1910 the ACA was to recommend several upgrades to testing equipment 
at the NPL in their yearly report. The ACA reports covered many different aspects of 
testing relating to aircraft and the range of work undertaken was very wide. The NPL 
was tasked with determining such diverse things as the strength and elasticity of 
fabric and metal, obtaining greater efficiency of propellers, as well as work on aero-
engines, aerodynamics and so on.  
In 1920 the ACA produced a report titled ‘Summary of the Present State of 
Knowledge with Regard to Stability and Control’.159  
The present analytical method of investigating the stability of an aeroplane has been 
developed from the analysis of Professor G. H. Bryan. The problem considered by Bryan is 
the behaviour of the aeroplane after it has suffered a slight disturbance from the conditions of 
equilibrium, and it is important to remember this limitation, since theoretical results deduced 
by this method will not necessarily correspond to the behaviour of the aeroplane for larger 
disturbances.160 
                                                
159 NA AIR 1/2100/207/28/11 – Summary of the Present State of Knowledge with 
Regards to Stability and Control, December 1920.  
160 Ibid. p. 2 
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The report noted that “The theoretical aspects of the problem of stability are…well 
developed, but further work is required to correlate theory and practice”. At that time, 
the Air Ministry considered that the main lines of progress open were: 
1. to obtain the values of the stability derivatives due to the wings from model tests and to 
develop satisfactory formulae for predicting these values from their geometrical 
properties. 
2. to obtain the stability derivatives due to the airscrew, and also the effect of the airscrew 
on the derivatives due to the slipstream. 
3. to compare the observed and predicted behaviour of aeroplanes.  
Certainly, one of the most important methods of appraising the stability and control of 
an aircraft was observation and the experiences of the pilots flying the aircraft. 
Testing of the Armstrong-Whitworth reconnaissance machine, powered by a 150 h.p. 
Lorraine-Dietrich engine found the following: 
1. Stability 
a. Longitudinal  Good. 
b. Lateral  Good. 
c. Directional  Would be good if trimmed correctly. 
2. Controllability 
a. Longitudinal  Good. 
b. Lateral  Very heavy. 
c. Directional  Very heavy, on one side. 
d. Taxiing  Very Good.161 
Therefore, based on the observation and experiences of the pilot it was reported that 
although stability in the air was good, controllability was ‘heavy’, making the 
machine “very tiring” to fly.162 It is important to realise that whatever the predictions 
about how an aircraft might fly when built, ultimately it was the pilots who gave the 
ultimate appraisal of the aircraft’s performance.  
                                                
161 NA AIR 1/716/27/19/26 – Reports on Trials of Various Aircraft, March 1917 – 
Feb 1919, 150 h.p. Armstrong Whitworth Reconnaissance Machine p. 10 
162 Ibid. 
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In striking contrast to the Armstrong Whitworth reconnaissance machine, the Vickers 
F.B.14 A reconnaissance machine, powered by the same Lorraine-Dietrich 150 h.p. 
engine, was found to have poor stability and control: 
1. Stability 
a. Longitudinal  Good. 
b. Lateral  Fair, but slow. 
c. Directional  Fair. 
2. Controllability 
a. Longitudinal  Fair. 
b. Lateral  Very bad. 
c. Directional  Fair.163 
Over 100 F.B. 14s were built, despite its poor stability and control that made it tiring 
to fly. It seems from the test reports that the Air Ministry were more concerned with 
speed and altitude at the time rather than control and handling characteristics which is 
not unreasonable when considering a reconnaissance aircraft. Indeed, the machine 
powered by the Lorraine-Dietrich engine was a one-off as the 160 h.p. Beardmore 
engine that was used in the production F.B. 14s was notoriously unreliable, with 50 
machines delivered to squadrons without engines fitted.  
By 1920, however, the Aerodynamics Sub-Committee of the ARC agreed 
“that the problems of control and stability should take precedence over those of 
performance”.164 
The opinions of test pilots were highly important for further refinement of the 
aircraft after its first flight. After the first flight of the Supermarine Spitfire in 1936, 
chief test pilot Mutt Summers declared: “I don’t want anything touched”. Fellow 
Supermarine test pilot Jeffrey Quill noted that: 
This was destined to become a widely misinterpreted remark. What he meant was that there 
were no snags which required correction or adjustment before he flew the aircraft again. 
                                                
163 Ibid. Vickers Reconnaissance F.B. 14 A, p. 10 
164 NA DSIR 23/1525 – ARC Scheme of Research, 1920-1921, p. 3 
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Mutt’s comment has crept into folklore as implying that the aeroplane was perfect in every 
respect from the moment of its first flight – an obviously absurd and impracticable notion. 
After one 15-minute sortie the aircraft could not be other than still largely untested and 
unproven.165 
First flights were an important part of the development process of all aircraft, and it 
was based upon these initial observations by the test pilot, communicated to the 
engineers and designers, that the first modifications could be made. Aircraft 
prototypes designed for the military were sent to the Royal Aeronautical 
Establishment at Martlesham Heath for further trials and testing. The RAE reported to 
the Air Ministry and usually their recommendations proved decisive.  
 In the case of the Spitfire, initial testing at the RAE focused entirely on 
performance figures and gave no information on the handling characteristics of the 
aircraft. This kind of focus shows that at the time the Air Ministry was only interested 
in the aircraft’s performance. As the tests on the Spitfire were being carried out at the 
RAE, the Hawker Hurricane, six months ahead of the Spitfire in development, was 
showing a similar top speed and performance to the Spitfire. This meant that should 
the Supermarine aircraft not demonstrate a substantial increase in speed over the 
Hurricane then an order would not be placed.  
 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
In 1922 the Royal Aeronautical Society (RAeS) wrote an article for the journal Flight 
reviewing the importance of aeronautical research in Britain and describing British 
aeronautical activity. 
Four bodies represent British Aeronautical activity, and these bodies respect each other’s 
domains and are connected by agreements and joint committees; they are:- 
                                                
165 Quill, Spitfire - A Test Pilot's Story: p. 85. 
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(a) The Royal Aero Club, concerned with the control of races, competitions and 
touring, the international sporting and touring rules and triptyques.166 (b) The Air League of 
the British Empire, concerned with propaganda, mainly in the interest of aerial defence. (c) 
The Royal Aeronautical Society, whose province is the spread of the study of aeronautical 
technics, both in theory and practice, including those branches of physics, chemistry, etc., 
which relate to the aeronautics – as well as scientific research and publications therewith. This 
Society is officially represented on the Aeronautical Research Committee of the Air Council. 
(d) The Society of British Aircraft Constructors, the organised body of British aircraft 
constructional firms. The technical staff of the last are, in significant numbers, members of the 
Royal Aeronautical Society.167 
The RAeS considered applied scientific research in the same article and summed up 
the general state of British scientific research: 
Applied scientific research has in England, for one reason or another, suffered from serious 
and increasing disabilities since the earliest flight. These disabilities arose from many causes, 
but notably from the fact that, though research has forced itself into public recognition as 
fundamental to any technical advancement, when it comes to the detailed allocation of time 
and work this recognition becomes blurred by reason of other factors, technical, 
administrative and financial, which tend to obscure its fundamental importance and crowd it 
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The years immediately following the First World War of 1914-1918 were difficult for 
both the newly anointed Royal Air Force (RAF), which came into existence on the 1st 
April 1918, and the fledgling British aircraft industry. The so-called ‘Lean Years’ of 
1919-1924 followed a period of intense investment in aeronautical technology, of 
changing doctrine and strategy within the Royal Flying Corps (the predecessor to the 
RAF) and of the organisation of aircraft production on a mass scale. Some historians 
have derided the development of aeronautical technology in this period, scarcely 
looking beyond the low aircraft production figures in these years. This is apparently 
enough to paint the now familiar picture of managerial incompetence, a backwards 
looking Air Ministry and technologists uninterested in pushing developmental limits 
with respect to aircraft (for instance, a reluctance to push for the monoplane) and 
component design (delayed adoption and work on the retractable undercarriage for 
example).168 
 However, the ‘Lean Years’ produced some of the most forward thinking 
developments in aeronautical technology. Perhaps the most notable of these, and the 
main focus of this chapter, was the change from wood to metal in the construction of 
military aircraft. Research and development was scaled back but there was a greater 
prioritisation of items for research, changing from a system where anything that 
promised success was looked into, to one where those items offering the greatest 
chance for results were given priority. 
 This chapter looks at the aircraft industry as it came out of the First World 
War and examines how it dealt with a radically reduced market for not only military 
but also civilian aircraft. It will also discuss the changing ways in which research and 
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development (R&D) was conducted, the ways in which the doctrine and strategy 
formulated by the RAF affected the design of aircraft and it will tell the first part of 
the story of the change from the use of wood to metal in the structure of the airframe.   
The end of the First World War brought with it a sharp contraction in the 
market for aircraft and the very real danger that the autonomous air service, the Royal 
Air Force (RAF), would be shut down. Edgerton discusses the massive growth 
experienced by the British aircraft industry throughout the war in his England and the 
Aeroplane, and the figures are startling: 
The war saw the creation of a very large aircraft industry, with increases in output accelerating 
through the war. Monthly output increased from about 10 per month at the beginning of the 
war to 122 in 1917 and 2688 in 1918. The labour force employed making aircraft engines and 
parts, but excluding materials, rose from nearly 49,000 in October 1916 to 154,000 in 
November 1917 to 268,000 in October 1918.169 
The end of hostilities in 1918 left £165m in outstanding contracts for aeronautical 
material in Britain, and left the RAF in possession of around 22,600 airframes and 
38,500 aero-engines.170 This enormous surplus and drastically reduced operational 
role for the RAF meant that demand for aircraft was extremely low in the years 
immediately following the War and firms were, for the most part, engaged in 
reconditioning surplus aircraft for Service use rather than designing their own 
machines and spending money on research and development programmes.  
 That is not to say that research and development did not continue, however, 
and the research establishments at the National Physical Laboratory (NPL) based at 
Teddington and Royal Aeronautical Establishment (RAE) at Farnborough sustained 
effort in research and development throughout the ‘lean years’ which was, 
                                                
169 Edgerton, England and the Aeroplane: p. 14. 
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unsurprisingly, heavily prioritised due to extensive funding cuts.  For the most part, 
the NPL was concerned with the aerodynamic qualities of airframes and the testing of 
materials. From an NPL publication on its history: 
One of the NPL’s earliest areas of research after its foundation was in the magnitude and 
distribution of wind forces on structures such as bridges and roofs. In 1908 these techniques 
were brought to the study of flight leading to rapid advances in the efficiency and safety of the 
aeroplane…171 
The NPL constructed a wind tunnel and began testing materials. By 1920 the 
properties of engineering materials that could be tested included: “strength, elasticity, 
ductility, hardness, abrasion resistance, fatigue resistance and impact resistance”.172 
As to the practical work with aeronautical technology undertaken by the NPL, Patrick 
Hassell has noted that: 
The story of Mitchell’s…[S.4], S.5, S.6, and S.6b [the Supermarine Schneider Trophy entries] 
and their engine development has been told many times, but with too little emphasis on the 
many hours of wind-tunnel testing at NPL, which whittled away at the profile drag of these 
machines so that, for example, the fuselage of the S.5 had 29 per cent less drag than that of the 
near-perfect looking S. 4.173 
By contrast the RAE was responsible for testing the performance of aircraft 
components such as engines, airframes, propellers, landing gears or anything else 
specific that could be submitted for performance testing, as well as overall aircraft 
under consideration for Service use. However, before getting into the demarcation of 
research and development work it is worth describing the position of aviation in 
Britain at the end of the First World War.  
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RAF SURVIVAL AND AIR MINISTRY CONTROL 
 
The establishment of the Air Ministry and RAF in the early months of 1918 brought 
with them at least a temporary end to the “bitter inter-service exchanges over reform 
proposals, spiced with political manoeuvring and acrimonious public debate. When 
hostilities ceased, however, the muted groundswell of discontent heightened and 
many of the old arguments against an independent air ministry and separate air force 
once more found favour”.174 There was a period of uncertainty concerning the future 
of the RAF as an independent air force and for a time it appeared as if the air services 
would once again be divided between the Army and Navy.  
                                   
         Chief of the Air Staff Lord Trenchard 
When Prime Minister Lloyd-George offered Winston Churchill a choice between the 
Admiralty or War Office in 1919 he is reported by Churchill to have said: 'You can 
take the Air with you in either case; I am not going to keep it as a separate 
department'.175 As Sweetman notes, “this was precisely the fear of [Independent] Air 
                                                
174 John Sweetman, "Crucial Months for Survival: The Royal Air Force, 1918-1919," 
Journal of Contemporary History 19, no. 3 (1984): p. 529; ibid. 
175 Ibid., p. 530. 
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Force protagonists; for if the Air Ministry were lost, the independent air force must 
soon follow into oblivion”.176 Chief of the Air Staff Lord Trenchard and Churchill 
went to work on re-inventing the RAF as a service while reducing its size.177 It was 
crucial that they be able to present the air force as an economic alternative to the other 
forces used for Imperial defence, and that the reorganisation of the RAF be brought in 
on (or preferably under) budget: 
It should be added that the financial provision which the cabinet have approved as governing the 
scale of the Royal Air Force during the next few years is approx. 15 million pounds per annum. 
It is upon this basis that this scheme [the organisation of the RAF] has been prepared, and it is 
upon his basis that it is hoped the Estimates of next year will…be framed.178 
Thus, while Trenchard set about defining new operational roles for the Royal Air 
Force, he reduced its size from roughly 200 squadrons and 150,000 officers and men 
in 1918, to 79,570 in 1919-1920, and to 29,730 in 1920-1921.179 One example of the 
savings that could be made from using air power in the colonies is that of Somaliland: 
Trenchard…suggested to Churchill that the RAF be given the opportunity to subdue a festering 
uprising in Somaliland. Churchill agreed. The results were dramatic: Somaliland was pacified at 
a cost of only £77,000, rather than the £6,000,000 it would have cost for the two army divisions 
originally planned.180 
Secretary of State for Air during the 1920s, Sir Samuel Hoare originated the phrase 
‘control without occupation’. This was the primary goal of the RAF during the 1920s, 
to enable control of a region of the Empire without the need for a permanent garrison. 
In addition to policing Somaliland, the RAF was also responsible for maintaining 
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control of Iraq saving untold sums of taxpayer money and ensuring its survival at the 
same time.181 
 This early success gave Trenchard valuable breathing space, allowing the 
demand for the use of air power in the Empire to grow. The example of Somaliland 
was especially powerful given the dramatic reduction in defence spending following 
the end of the First World War. Had the RAF been split between the Admiralty and 
the War Office, the responsibility for training and funding of an air force would have 
been spread between the two. However, as Trenchard and Churchill were able to 
demonstrate the need for an independent air force, so long as it remained cost 
effective it could stay.  
 In understanding Air Staff thinking throughout the early-mid 1920s with regard 
to aircraft development and procurement we must consider the circumstances 
surrounding the RAF and the aircraft industry immediately following the War. The 
Aircraft Supply Committee report of 1931 gives a good account of some of the 
problems of design after 1918. Bearing in mind the massive surplus left over from the 
First World War, the report hints at the origins of early design stagnation: 
…the strength of the Royal Air Force, in the immediate post war years was subject more than 
once to reductions as the result of Government decisions, and these naturally caused a further 
redundancy of material. During this intensive period of pruning and selection the aircraft 
industry, consisting of those firms which had manufactured aircraft during the war and had 
decided to continue if possible in peace, was kept alive mainly on the repair and reconditioning 
of war types of aircraft and engines.182 
Furthermore, Britain was operating under the so-called ‘ten year rule’, which 
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supposed that Britain would not be involved in a major war for at least ten years.183 
The result was that while there was a general incremental progression in military 
aircraft R&D, there was ultimately no need for widespread, heavily funded 
development into new types of aircraft for the RAF. Indeed, the ‘ten year rule’ 
originated as a basis for the formulation of defence spending thus radically curtailing 
funding to the RAF and aeronautical research.  
 Despite the efforts of the Air Ministry to keep firms alive following the end of 
the War many firms did go out of business while others merged to create many of the 
firms best known throughout the inter-war years and the Second World War. 
 The Sopwith Aviation Co. was liquidated and reformed as Hawker Engineers; A. V. 
Roe was taken over by Crossley Engineering to make car bodies, but also continued to make 
aircraft. Sometimes firms were lost but design teams were kept together. Airco, the largest 
wartime producer, was taken over by the small-arms, motor-cycle and car (Daimler) firm BSA 
for its plant, but it spawned two independent aircraft firms, de Havilland and Gloucester 
Aircraft. The Handley Page company tried car assembly and lost a lot of money…The Bristol 
Company, under strong Air Ministry pressure, took over a highly successful engine design team 
led by Roy Fedden…Bristol engines were very successful in the 1920s and 1930s: not only were 
many exported but foreign firms acquired licences (including the mighty French company 
Gnome-Rhone) which brought in tens of millions of pounds. By 1930 Bristol provided ‘the 
principal engine of nearly half the world’s airline and more than half the air forces’. Of the 
many firms which made and designed aero-engines during the war, only two others stayed on as 
a significant force in the industry: Rolls-Royce and Napier.184 
The pressure placed on the aircraft industry due to the reduced market for aircraft was 
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acute and in 1919 the Civil Aerial Transport Committee185 asserted that an aircraft 
manufacturing industry was essential for the national defence and that the government 
must necessarily play an important role in aeronautical development.186 The proposed 
solution to this problem was the creation of a small ring of preferred manufacturers 
that would receive preferential treatment from the government. For instance, in times 
of hardship orders would be taken from larger, more affluent firms and subcontracted 
to the less fortunate, struggling ones, thus keeping a small hub of firms operational at 
all times.187 
 There were several important consequences of this system. Firstly, with the 
government as paymaster it had very nearly absolute control over the firms within the 
ring. This control was exercised in a number of ways but by far the most effective was 
to threaten ejection from the ring to any firm who, for whatever reason, refused to tow 
the Ministry line and accept recommendations from the Air Staff. The system had the 
further effect of heavily influencing aircraft design as the Air Ministry were simply 
able to feed firms the type of work they were keen to specialise in.188 
 While this system did keep the industry alive during the ‘lean years’, it was 
limited, primarily by the funding available to the Air Ministry for the procurement of 
new aircraft at that time.189 Furthermore, it had the undesirable effect of producing too 
many different types of aircraft, and the short production runs that were characteristic 
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of this period made the aircraft that were produced more expensive. For instance, 
Zeitlin notes that by 1931 the RAF were using 44 different airframes and 35 types of 
aero-engine.190 Nevertheless, at a time when aircraft procurement was very low, and 
the danger of a firm going out of business was very high, the Air Ministry was able to 
provide enough business for the industry with the long-term goal of keeping it strong 
enough to expand when needed.  
 The focus of Declinist historians has mainly been centred on the firms that went 
out of business or struggled during the years after the war.191 There were, however, 
several highly successful firms within the industry that were not reliant on Air 
Ministry support/control and thus had autonomy regarding the design of their aircraft. 
For instance, although de Havilland was a member of the ring they produced no 
military aircraft for the RAF between 1920 and 1941, concentrating instead on civil 
aircraft, and by 1938 had constructed 43% of all civil aircraft registered in Britain.192 
Furthermore, Supermarine were highly successful in the production of flying boats for 
civilian use as well as for the RAF.  
 Sir Robert McLean of Vickers and Supermarine perhaps best described the Air 
Ministry ring system when he said: 
The position of Supermarine is typical of all aviation businesses…they rely upon designing 
acceptable new types for the Air Ministry and when they succeed the profits are very large; 
when they fail it is still the policy of the Air Ministry to keep them alive.193 
During the amendment of RAF procurement policy during 1924 the Air Member for 
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Supply and Research (AMSR) commented that: 
In selecting firms without examining their design, I have assumed that the 18 firms now in the 
SBAC [Society of British Aircraft Constructors] have advanced sufficiently under Air Ministry 
tutelage to be relied upon to produce good work…194 
The implication here is that by 1924 the Air Ministry could reasonably expect the 
industry to do what it was told. The control exercised by the Ministry in terms of 
allocating work, specifically the type of aircraft to be built and the fact that many 
firms relied upon Air Ministry favour to survive ensured this to a great extent. 
 The charge levied against the Air Ministry by the industry’s representative body 
the SBAC was that such strict specifications laid out by the Ministry was having a bad 
effect on design: 
The present position in aircraft design in this country has, in the Society’s opinion, been brought 
about by rather too much restriction on design and equipment and to changes which the designer 
is called upon to make in the course of construction.195 
However, all of this disagreement over design specification detracts from one of the 
most interesting and technically progressive movements in British aircraft design, that 
of the change from wood to metal in the construction of airframes, which for the most 
part occurred during the so-called lean years.  
 
 
THE WOOD TO METAL SHIFT (I), 1919-1925 
 
Of the changes in aircraft design and construction that took place during the 1920s 
and 1930s certainly one of the most significant was the move from the use of wood to 
metal in the structure of aircraft. The change took place in different countries at 
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different times, and in Britain the use of metal for the construction of aircraft was 
considered by several manufacturers throughout the years before a large-scale change 
was made. The widespread adoption of metal was not a purely technical choice, by 
which I mean it was not simply obvious that metal was superior to wood and therefore 
adopted without question. In Britain the pace of change was governed to a large 
extent by the government, specifically the Air Ministry, and its relationship with the 
aircraft industry.  
 Therefore, in order to adequately explain how and why the change took place 
when it did, we must ask several questions. In the first instance we need to understand 
how wood became the first choice material for constructing aircraft, effectively 
eliminating the initial widespread use of metal in the process. We need to understand 
the factors that led to the popularization of metal as the next most important step and 
then how this belief in the superiority of metal spread to and throughout Britain. 
Finally, we need to understand how this change was directed and managed by the Air 
Ministry and industry.  
 This section will argue that the change from wood to metal was made possible 
by virtue of a number of inter-linked factors, and was not merely the choice of Air 
Ministry officials or the industry. Metal construction of the airframe was possible 
from the earliest days of flight and so it was not a case of the process having to be 
invented when the change in Britain took place, but rather it had to be refined and 
adopted by a community of manufacturers as well as the government. 
 
WOOD OR METAL? THE INITIAL CHOICE, 1909-1918 
 
The first question to be addressed is how wood came to be the most commonly used 
material in the construction of aeroplanes. Many of the pioneers used the Wright 
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brothers Flyer as the starting point for their first successful machines after numerous 
unsuccessful attempts.196 This was particularly the case in France, where the Wright’s 
demonstrated and sold their machine. Captain Ferdinand Ferber wrote: 
Just think of it, that without this man (Wilbur Wright) I would be nothing (je ne serais rien); 
for I would not have dared, in 1902, to trust myself to a flimsy fabric if I had not known – 
from his account and from his photographs – that it would bear me. Think of it, that without 
him, my experiments would not have taken place…I would not have had [Gabriel] Voisin197 
as a pupil; the backers such as [Ernest] Archdeacon and Deutsch de la Merthe would not – in 
1904 – have offered the prizes you know about; the press would not have sown the good seed 
everywhere; your journal…would not have quadrupled its circulation; and other specialised 
journals would not have been born.198 
Drawing on the work of Sir George Cayley, Otto Lilienthal, Octave Chanute and 
others, and bringing their own originality to the process, pioneers like the Wrights, 
Ferber, Farman, Verdon-Roe and de Havilland were able to make their first flights in 
home-made aircraft. Thus, like the Wright brothers before them, Ferber et. al. very 
much stood on the shoulders of these aeronautical giants. 
Initially, around 1909, the prevailing belief amongst this fraternity was that 
wood was lighter than metal for the same strength, though far more bulky.199 Indeed, 
by 1909 there were at least two firms who specialised in the manufacture of hollow 
beams and struts made from wood for the purpose of manufacturing aircraft.200 
Thus, the very first aircraft to achieve ‘powered, sustained and controlled flight’ in 
Britain were made from wood. 16th October 1908 marked the first successful light in 
Britain, undertaken by Samuel Cody in the British Army Aeroplane No. 1 at 
                                                
196 Gibbs-Smith, The Rebirth of European Aviation: p. 128. 
197 Another successful pioneer (1880-1973). 
198 Gibbs-Smith, The Rebirth of European Aviation: p. 36. 
199 Anon, "The First Paris Aeronautical Salon," p. 8. 
200 Ibid. 
 89 
Farnborough.201 1908 also saw the entry into the world of aviation of another British 
pioneer, Geoffrey deHavilland, whose first aircraft was made from timber purchased 
from a lumber yard in Fulham, simply “asking which was the lightest wood 
obtainable”.202 The material of choice was American whitewood, chosen by de 
Havilland because of his belief that such a choice would obtain a straight grain. 
However, having crashed his first attempt after some 35 feet of flight, the fractured 
wood displayed an internal softness which was not immediately obvious. Upon 
starting construction on his second machine, essentially designed to the same 
specifications but also to be stronger, he chose silver spruce, ash and hickory.203 In a 
1909 article on ‘The Building of a Flyer’, Flight suggests that: 
So far as the material is concerned, we may assume that wood is to be employed for the entire 
framework, and the question at once arises as to what wood is the best. If a reference book on 
the subject of timber be consulted, it will be found that a certain number of trees produce 
timber which is both light and strong, but it is not alone sufficient to have mere figures of this 
sort; practical knowledge of timber and the peculiarities of different kinds is essential for 
success. For instance, Short Brothers, who are building the Wright flyers in England, use 
nothing but spruce, while the Voisin machines are constructed of ash. Now spruce is a wood 
which is lighter and stronger than ash, but, as a rule, is a timber blemished by a number of 
knots. To obtain a sound spruce spar of 15 feet in length is a matter of considerable 
difficulty.204 
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Metal is not even mentioned as a possibility, and as we will see, despite the early 
successes of Hugo Junkers in Germany in 1914-15, the belief in Britain that metal 
was ‘impracticably heavy’ persisted well into the 1920s.  
 
HUGO JUNKERS, THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND EARLY BRITISH INTEREST IN 
METAL 
The first commercially and operationally viable all-metal aircraft were pioneered in 
Germany by Hugo Junkers during the First World War.205 It has been suggested that 
German pioneering of metal construction stemmed from a reduced industrial capacity 
and a subsequent need for some kind of technical edge.206 Addressing the Royal 
Aeronautical Society in 1923 Junkers explained his pursuit of metal aircraft as the 
answer to most, if not all, of the major technical problems with wooden aircraft.207 
 Junkers first successful machine was the J. 1 of 1915. In his 1923 lecture 
(before metal construction was adopted in a widespread fashion in Britain) he noted 
that: 
Among the advantages [of metal construction] the first is the greater durability. Wood is 
subject to the dangers of fire and decay, and splinters when breaking; it bursts and warps from 
the effect of humidity and change of temperature and the glued joints split; finally it is 
attacked by insects. No wooden aeroplane, serviceable for any length of time in the Tropics, 
has been produced as yet. Metal is free from all such drawbacks.208 
It is worth noting that Junkers was first and foremost a businessman, metal 
construction being his particular métier and, therefore, he had a vested interest in 
extolling the virtues of metal to the great and good of the British aircraft industry. 
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Nevertheless, his aircraft were successful, though in terms of performance no more so 
than machines made of wood.  
Junkers concern that wood was susceptible to the influence of heat and 
humidity, which thus made continuous “re-setting” of the aeroplane necessary, has a 
particular resonance for the British with its Empire spanning regions in which such 
conditions were common. Robert Brooke-Popham, Director of Research at the Air 
Ministry209 had already investigated the question of ‘Aeroplanes in Tropical Climes’ 
in 1921.210 Furthermore, Junkers noted that, “a constancy of form is necessarily 
important in aeroplane wings, slight changes frequently producing a distinct 
deterioration of the aerodynamic qualities”.211 
Junkers spent a great deal of time developing his all-metal machines during 
the First World War. The J. 1, J. 2 and J. 4 were all entirely metal machines (metal 
fuselage and skin), they were possessed of fully-cantilever (unsupported by external 
bracing such as struts and wires) wings and were built for the German air force in 
number. The J. 1 (1915) was initially viewed with some suspicion on the part of the 
German authorities because it was felt the machine was “impractically heavy”.212 
Although the J. 1 was able to produce a relatively good top-speed of 105 miles-per-
hour, the authorities were unconvinced. Junkers was able to press on, however, and 
the improved J. 2 made an appearance in 1917. Also appearing that year was the J. 4 
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 92 
which was markedly different from his previous machines, built largely from the 
aluminium alloy duralumin. The J. 4 was the first all-metal aircraft built in large 
numbers, making use of mass production manufacturing processes.  
The progression of Junkers aircraft during the First World War allows him to 
be fairly credited with “the design and construction of (a) the first practical cantilever 
wing aeroplanes, (b) the first practical all-metal aeroplanes, and (c) the first practical 
low-wing monoplanes, all of which he continued to develop successfully over the 
years”.213 This expertise developed during the First World War also made Junkers an 
expert in methods of metal construction, and of course organisations such as the 
RAeS were keen to hear from him about his processes and design. However, Junkers 
was not the only advocate of metal construction. In Britain there was a growing trend 
towards metal, chiefly born from Britain’s own ‘experts’, or those who had 
persevered with metal construction where others had not.  
The points put forward by Junkers in his lecture were the same arguments in 
favour of metal put forward by several people in Britain shortly after the First World 
War.214 But while Junkers advocated the use of metal for both resistance to the 
elements and the aerodynamic benefits that could be achieved through greater 
structural stability, British thinking was more concerned with the fact that “metal 
aeroplanes will stand adverse climatical [sic] conditions, long storage and…the wear 
and tear of every-day use in temperate climates better than aeroplanes largely built of 
timber and joined with glue…”.215 
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 Eric Schatzberg has argued that the change from wood to metal in American 
aircraft construction came about through a change in public perception and a 
symbolic relationship between the use of metals and ideas of technical progress.216 In 
Britain, however, early flirtations with metal construction were driven by far more 
practical considerations. A shortage of timber was one such reason for British 
experimentation with metal but for the most part continued construction in wood was 
cheaper that changing to metal during the war. Change during the war would also 
have involved a vast purchase of new plant and machinery involving great cost and a 
lot of time.  
 British warplanes did not suffer for their construction materials. The R.F.C. 
fighters entering service in 1917 were capable of performance equal to that of their 
German opponents. The Junkers D.1 aircraft was manufactured from metal and 
offered no significant advantage, in terms of performance, over the British S.E. 5. 
Both could achieve speeds of around 120 miles-per-hour and reach altitudes of over 
19,000 ft. But perhaps the largest benefit from the use of metal construction (in terms 
of manufacturing) was the ability to mechanically guarantee the quality of the 
materials. Indeed: 
The advantages of metal were obvious. It could be checked scientifically, it was more 
homogeneous than wood, it was better for large scale production, and its life was longer. 
Wood could not be cut as accurately as metal, consequently wooden aeroplanes, even though 
built to the same design, could differ considerably in weight and performance. However, the 
cost of designing and preparing drawings for a British military machine of metal construction 
in 1925 could well exceed the whole cost of building a similar machine of wood.217 
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In 1918 the Air Ministry commissioned a report on the Junkers D.1. The report was 
written by Robert Brooke-Popham and much of the language is helpful to 
understanding Air Ministry and RAF thinking on metal machines by the end of the 
First World War: 
It may be mentioned…that the machine had been dumped in the open and had shared the 
varied weather of several months with other machines constructed of wood and fabric 
materials. The Junker had hardly suffered, while the orthodox type of machine [i.e. that which 
was used in Britain] had seriously deteriorated.218 
Thus, British, or more accurately Air Staff, interest was more concerned with the 
longevity which could be achieved by metal machines rather than any particular belief 
in the superior strength or aerodynamic benefit of metal. Reports and comparisons 
made between metal and more conventional machines of wood, such as those from 
John Dudley North219 or Junkers went a long way towards suggesting the potential 
benefits of metal to wider audiences such as the RAeS.  
 That being said, initially the technical community and aviation press had far 
more interest in the potential for metal aircraft design than the Air Staff. As A.P. 
Thurston220 who was chief assistant and designer to Sir Hiram Maxim from 1903, and 
during the First World War he was a technical inspector for the Royal Flying Corps, 
noted: 
The War has been fought with machines made of wood, a most unsatisfactory material from a 
constructional point of view. Wood warps and cracks; is unsuitable for tropical climates; 
splinters easily in a crash; is liable to transfix the aviators; is non-homogeneous; uncertain in 
strength and weight; weakens rapidly when exposed to moisture, and is not produced in any 
quantity in this country. 
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  On the other hand metal does not splinter; it is much safer in a crash, the members 
hanging together and forming a shield to protect the aviators; its properties are known to a fine 
degree and may be relied upon; it can be produced in immense quantities, and, moreover, 
metal members, after breaking, can still carry a considerable load.221 
Thurston’s belief was that is would take ten years (from 1919) before metal 
construction would reach the stage of development that it would have done in ten 
months under war conditions.222 He further argued that the advantages of metal 
construction “are not confined to greater strength, lightness, reliability and ultimate 
cheapness. Its use will enable many new developments to be made in the actual 
design of aircraft [such as variable camber wings or load bearing skins]”.223 The 
object of Thurston’s paper was to do more than outline why metal was a preferable 
material. It was intended to call for and encourage Government support for the 
continued development of metal machines.  
 
 
CREATING A CONSENSUS: DEVELOPING METAL AS A CHOICE 
 
The change from machines made of wood to those of metal required something of a 
consensus within the aviation community. An amount of momentum was needed to 
prove the case for metal construction to the Air Staff who were, at that time, in a 
position of almost total control over the military aircraft industry. The aeronautical 
press was instrumental in putting out the message for those advocates of metal 
construction. J. D. North’s paper ‘The Case for Metal Construction’, mentioned 
above, was printed in both the Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society and Flight. 
It represented one of the early scientific efforts to persuade the aeronautical 
community of the virtues of metal construction. In fact, North was not the first to do 
                                                




so, his paper joined a growing number of voices inside the industry and community 
who favoured a switch to metal.  
The first serious treatment of the wood-metal question in the United Kingdom 
was a paper given in 1919 by Dr. A. P. Thurston. In this role he was able to replace 
many of the rule-of-thumb methods for measuring structural failures through the 
application of scientific procedure. His paper ‘Metal Construction of Aircraft’ laid 
down many of the ideas picked up by North in 1922, and he hoped that “by drawing 
public attention to the problem, and placing information at the disposal of firms 
interested, [they could] hasten the development of this important industry”.224 
Thurston lamented the fact that of the one thousand or so metal machines that had 
been used with success in the allied air services, “not one had been made in [Britain]”. 
He further believed that the future of Britain as a nation and its place in the world 
depended to a very great extent upon its position in the air – “we cannot afford to 
neglect so important a subject”.225 
 Thurston’s experience with structural failures made him uniquely familiar 
with the shortcomings of wooden construction (as noted above) and it was his belief 
that the vital members of aircraft structures could be, and were at the time, made 
lighter and stronger in metal than in wood. One of the most striking points that he 
makes about the shortcomings of wood is on the variation in the strength and weight 
of spars of the same type of wood from the same type of machine. He notes that: 
“Spars for one type of machine were found to vary in weight from 6 ½ lb. to 16 lb., 
and the strength varied in practically the same proportion”.226 He also noted that: 
                                                




The strength decreases with the amount of moisture absorbed. Thus, the strength of spruce in 
compression decreases 230 lb. per sq. in. per 1 per cent. of moisture between 10 per cent. and 
25 per cent. moisture.227 
This was a crucial part of the argument in favour of metal for an Air Force tasked with 
policing a vast empire, and this fact was actually more important to the Air Staff than 
might be supposed as one of the major rationales for the continuation of the Royal Air 
Force following the First World War was the fact that it could police the Empire at a 
fraction of the cost of a standing army (see Somaliland example above). This meant 
sending aircraft to hot and humid locations and for Thurston: 
Wooden machines sand tested under the very favourable conditions of a dry 
workshop…showed a much greater strength than in the field. A sodden machine in the tropics 
may have only half the strength of the same machine when tested in the workshop at home. 
Moreover, owing to the disposition of wood to warp or split, particularly under tropical 
conditions, a wooden machine quickly gets out of truth and requires trueing up.228 
He also believed in the potential for the further development of aircraft components 
utilising metal, such as variable camber wings which would allow for a lower landing 
speed.  
Thurston and North were not the only ones advocating, to greater or lesser 
extents, the virtues of metal construction. In Brooke-Pophams’ report to the Air 
Ministry mentioned above describing the major design characteristics of a Junkers D. 
1 metal monoplane, the main benefit was its reaction to poor weather and storage 
conditions, not the the fact that it was a metal monoplane fighter. Therefore, British 
interest in metal construction initially arose from a belief, proven empirically by 
machines developed and used abroad, that metal would last longer and was more 
durable to the effects of the elements. 




Three years later in 1921, John North gave his paper to the RAeS. At the time of 
writing the article, North was the Chief Engineer and Designer for Boulton & Paul 
Ltd. and had by that time devoted a lot of his attention towards all-metal machines. 
The essence of his paper was to suggest that metal aircraft would be lighter for the 
same strength as wood because so much more wood is needed to achieve the same 
strength as metal. The example he gives is convincing: 
…with a power loading [pounds of weight per horse power] of 15 [lb per h.p.], which is 
representative of most modern commercial aeroplanes, a reduction of structure weight from 
34 per cent. to 26 per cent. increases the revenue load [useful load] from 34 per cent. to 43 per 
cent., an increase of nearly 25 per cent. in the utility of the aeroplane. In the case of the high 
performance aeroplane, the increase will be seen to be vastly greater, and in many cases 
makes possible a type of aeroplane which will be placed out of court with the heavier structure 
weight. I have every reason to believe that the structure weight of aircraft can be reduced from 
an average of 33 per cent. to an average of 25 per cent. to 27 per cent. by the use of metal 
construction, an advantage which…is absolutely imperative in the case of military 
machines.229 
North considered that it would not be possible to achieve this reduction in weight 
straight away and he was not offering a “process of design”, but he based his belief on 
both “theoretical considerations and practical experience”. Indeed, he had actually 
made an aircraft from metal for Air Ministry approval. The Bolton was a metal 
biplane developed as a photographic and reconnaissance machine. One prototype was 
built under contract and flew in November 1922 but was not adopted for service use.  
There are no official records detailing the machine and one can only assume 
that either it did not fly well or the metal construction put off Air Ministry officials 
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who believed there was a lack of aircrews skilled in working with metal machines.230 
It is, however, very interesting to note that the Bolton is referred to as being all-metal 
or all-steel in certain publications.231 It was a steel airframe covered in doped fabric, 
thus it was really still a hybrid of the old school (doped fabric covering) and new (all-
steel framework). It was believed that the extra weight involved in covering the wings 
with metal “would outweigh any advantage arising out of metal covering”.232 
This belief illustrates two important facts; firstly, that metal skin had not yet 
been developed as a part of the load bearing structure of aircraft; and secondly, that 
power-to-weight ratio’s had not yet become favourable enough to justify the increase 
in weight required to adopt a metal skin. Still, North’s experiences of metal 
construction gave him hope that with “experiment on broad lines…unhampered by 
the necessity of obtaining immediate results from experimental expenditure…” 
structure weights could be reduced by adopting metal at “no very distant date”.233 
However, North had a major problem with the way in which structural members of 
aircraft were designed and is worth quoting at length: 
Firstly, the conditions of flight for which the aeroplane is to be designed. These are fixed by 
an Order in Council, and are interpreted by a series of good round numbers delivered after 
much labour by a committee. Over the manner of arriving at these numbers a decent veil is 
cast which it would be unwise to disturb. But the Committee seems to know its job in so far as 
the aircraft are not abnormally heavy, nor do they collapse in the air. These numbers are 
converted to external forces in a particular manner founded on precedent supported by very 
doubtful aerodynamic data and also fortified by the same Order in Council. The loads in the 
members are then estimated by ignoring those members to take account of whose presence 
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would seriously complicate the calculations and by making what are often the wildest 
assumptions as to the nature of the joints between the members.234 
North was thus concerned not just about this apparently inaccurate method of 
determining the loads operating on structural members and how strong they should 
be, but also about the process of design by committee. This process was a result of the 
top-down approach to aircraft design and procurement which characterised the post-
war years whereby decisions made at the top regarding the desired characteristics of 
an aircraft heavily determined what designers could and could not do. In essence, 
such figuring of coditions set the boundaries within which a designer could work. 
This type of design by committee was a major feature of aircraft procurement 
throughout the 1920s and well into the 1930s. Despite this, North conceded that the: 
…whole process works after a fashion because aeroplanes are not designed by science, but by 
art in spite of some pretence and humbug to the contrary. I do not mean to suggest…that 
engineering can do without science – on the contrary, it stands on scientific foundations – but 
there is a big gap between scientific research and the engineering product which has to be 
bridged by the art of the designer.235 
The first advocates of metal construction were ‘experts’, people who had had constant 
exposure to aircraft with structural failures such as Robert Brooke-Popham and A. P. 
Thurston, or those designers who simply believed that aircraft of metal would be 
superior to those of wood such as J. D North and of course Hugo Junkers.  Eric 
Schatzberg has argued that: 
The technical arguments advanced by…advocates [of metal] were fairly uniform, whether 
published in Germany, France, Great Britain, or the United States. These arguments claimed a 
multitude of advantages for metal in fire safety, weight efficiency, manufacturing costs and 
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durability. Yet in each of these four areas, practical experience with metal aeroplanes in the 
1920s failed to confirm metal’s purported superiority.236 
Whether or not this was in fact the case in Britain is actually not as important as the  
question of how convincing these arguments were, and to what extent they informed 
and shaped the decisions that were eventually to be made by the Air Staff. There is no 
doubt that certain claims made by the early advocates of metal in Britain were not 
provable. ‘Proof’ could only be ascertained through the experience and testing of 
working examples. Certainly, there was a great deal of emphasis on what was 
‘expected to be achieved’ through research and development. This is what Constant 
called a ‘presumptive anomaly’, the idea that in the future the conventional and 
accepted form would be found wanting or that, as in this case, a different paradigm 
would do a better job. 
However, Thurston and North, for example, clearly state that their intention is 
to grow the industry through debate, suggestion, and the transfer of information. 
Furthermore, it was not just those who wrote for the aeronautical press who were in 
favour of such a change. In replies to Henry Tizard in 1920: A. J. Sutton-Pippard; 
Major F. M. Green; F. S. Barnwell; J. D. Siddeley and The Royal Aircraft 
Establishment were all in favour of the use of metal in the structure of the airframe, to 
greater or lesser extents.237 None of what might be termed ‘technical specialists’ – 
those who were intimately involved in the design and construction of airframes – 
argued against the adoption of metal, nor suggested that a change over to metal would 
not happen.  
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It is hard to accept Schatzberg’s claim that “practical experience with metal 
aeroplanes in the 1920s failed to confirm metal’s purported superiority”. Indeed, 
exposure to the Junkers machines had gone a long way to proving the longevity of 
metal over wood. Those named above, North, Siddeley, Green and the rest, were 
aware of the limited research that showed the potential for further development along 
similar lines; that metal could provide the same strength as wood but weigh less. 
 
THE AIR MINISTRY AND THE METAL QUESTION 
 
The reasons behind the beginnings of interest in metal construction in Britain are one 
thing, but it still leaves the most important question of how such a widespread change 
took place. How did the interest and belief of a few pioneers become the standard for 
the military aviation industry by the early 1930s?  
 During the First World War a shortage of timber led to the use of steel tubing 
in the manufacture of aircraft fuselages, and while the practical results were 
“meagre”238 experimentation continued after the War: 
Owing to the shortage of many essential materials, large numbers of aircraft in War service 
had been built of materials which would not have been accepted for such purposes had other 
conditions prevailed. Thus, although the Royal Air Force at the close of the war had thousands 
of aircraft of many types, all were not suitable for Service use in peace. The Supply of silver 
spruce and other special timbers of which aircraft had been mainly constructed, was always a 
difficulty during the war; and towards the end, steel tubing made its appearance, for use in the 
construction of fuselages notably in the Vicker’s twin-engined bomber. Experiments in the 
manufacture of planes without the use of timber were also initiated by certain pioneer firms. 
The practical results achieved from metal planes during the war, however, were meagre and 
for various reasons this type of construction was not developed or adopted.239 
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 The problem for the designers of the industry and the Air Ministry was a fundamental 
lack of orders for new machines.240 
 As mentioned above, the ring system put in place by the Air Ministry after the 
First World War put the government in control of military aircraft design and 
construction. The consequence of this control for the change from wood to metal in 
military aircraft was that the Air Staff had almost complete control in governing the 
pace of change. They were concerned not just with the actual timescale of the shift, 
but they also had a hand in directing the more technical aspects of it. The technical 
specifications laid down for aircraft to be designed for the Service often specified the 
parts of the aircraft which were to be designed with metal and those to be designed 
with wood.241 
 As mentioned above, one of the major arguments in favour of replacing wood 
with metal in aircraft construction was the resistance of metal to tropical climates and 
bad weather more generally. However, in the 1919-1924 period there was much 
debate within the aircraft industry and Royal Air Force about just how big an 
advantage metal would give over wood. Robert Brooke-Popham spent just over a 
month in Egypt and Mesopotamia (modern day Iraq) investigating the problems faced 
by aircraft in tropical climates.242 
 He considered that, broadly, the main troubles facing aircraft were focused on 
timber shrinkage, punctured tires, inadequate shock absorbers, petrol supply and 
hangers/aerodromes. His assessment of the use of wood in tropical climates is of most 
interest to us here, however, and he noted that:  
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With regard to timber shrinkage [in Egypt], I feel that this is a nuisance but not a danger. It is, 
of course, due to the humidity in the East being different to what it is in England. Timber 
undoubtedly does shrink when it arrives in Egypt or at Bagdad [sic], but in the former case a 
definite limit is reached in about two months, after which no further shrinkage occurs, and 
once the necessary adjustments are made to allow for this, no further difficulties are 
experienced from this cause.  
There must also be a definite limit to the amount of shrinkage in Mesopotamia, 
otherwise one would have the finest conjuring trick on record, but I have no definite figures as 
to when this limit is reached.  
Certainly in Egypt there is no sign that the timber swells again in the cold weather. As regards 
Mesopotamia, all I can say is that I could get no evidence to show that any reswelling occurs. 
So long as a machine has to fly merely in Egypt and Mesopotamia there is no necessity to 
make them all metal, but I still believe that when machines fly constantly from London to 
Bombay and back it will be necessary to do away with wood in their structure.243 
Frederick Handley-Page, in the discussion which followed Brooke-Pophams’s paper 
referred to his experience of metal aircraft in the United States Postal Service: 
He was not altogether convinced that their [metal machines] would come very quickly. When 
one had wood, spare parts could easily be carried or made on the spot, and wood had so much 
greater local strength than steel. If one had steel an enormous supply of spare parts must be 
carried to repair the wings with the special kind of material that was necessary for aircraft. So 
he was not altogether convinced yet that they had completely done away with wood for these 
big tropical temperatures…When he [Handley-Page] was over in the States this year he 
examined metal machines which had been in operation under service conditions on the postal 
service. There was first of all trouble with the petrol tanks leaking. The petrol tanks being in 
the planes were blown off with the inevitable explosion that occurred after an engine back-
fire. They had also had trouble with the metal covering of the planes corroding and being 
eaten away by electrolyte action, especially where those parts were heavily stressed. That 
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simple little trouble seemed to be a considerable one from the point of view of keeping the 
machines in condition for flying.244 
It seems highly likely that Handley-Page is referring to the Junkers F13 (named the 
JL-6 in the United States), eight of which were purchased for the U.S. Air Mail in 
1920 for $200,000 and had serious problems with its fuel system. Within weeks four 
of the eight machines originally purchased had burst into flames while in flight and 
the Post Office sold the remaining four for $6,044.245 
 At around the same time in 1920, the first truly all-metal aircraft designed and 
built in Britain appeared, the Short Silver Streak. The major distinction between the 
Silver Streak and other machines claiming to be all-metal is that the Short Bros. 
aircraft was made with a metal structure and metal skin, as distinct from the usual 
metal framework (or metal and wood hybrid) and fabric skin.246 It was an 
experimental machine, but one was purchased by the Air Ministry for testing and a 
further machine, the Springbok, was developed but neither saw service with the RAF 
and machines of this type of construction were not seen again in Britain for some time 
after.247 The Springbok was developed under specification 19/21 as: 
[A] replacement for the Bristol fighter in use in the Middle East, requiring an all-metal 
structure to avoid the problems created [by] the high humidity of the region…Trials were 
completed satisfactorily but defects in the wing skin…led to its replacement with doped 
fabric. Due to rudder blanketing, the Springbok proved susceptible to spinning, [one of the 
prototypes] was lost in such a manner. It has been suggested that the Springbok did not go into 
production as a type for the RAF due, in part, to the lack of RAF maintenance personnel 
familiar with metal structures and stressed skin repair.248 
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Of particular interest in the case of the Springbok is the delay from the issue of the 
specification in 1921, to the prototype’s first flight in April 1923. The so-called 
‘Geddes Axe’ reduced national defence spending from £189.5m in 1921-22 to £111m 
in 1922-23.249 The plans for the Springbok were shelved at the publication of the 
Geddes reports (December 1921-February 1922) and eventually re-instated at the end 
of 1922.250 
 The Aircraft Supply Committee (ASC) of 1931 commented that: 
 After the war experiments were continued, but owing primarily to the lack of orders resulting 
from the large surplus of existing machines very little progress was made for the first few 
years beyond further development of the manufacture of planes from steel strip.251 
Arguments in favour of a wide-spread shift to the use of metal in the construction of 
aircraft do much to highlight the arguments against such a change. As suggested in 
the ASC report above, a lack of orders for new aircraft in the years immediately after 
the First World War did not allow for widespread experimentation into the use of 
metal in the main structural members of an airframe, let alone research into all-metal 
machines requiring a metal covering. The prevailing belief at the time was noted by 
A.J. Sutton Pippard in 1920 in reply to a request for information from Sir Henry 
Tizard: 
[On the ‘Materials used in design’] The present structure composed partly of timber and partly 
of steel is, I feel convinced, bound to disappear very soon. The earliest form of structural work 
in civil engineering practice was of course stone or wood. When metals became available the 
first use to which they were put was to re-inforce [sic.] the beam, but the flitched beam is now 
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practically extinct and the great majority of structural work is of course done in steel. The 
disadvantages of composite structures are obvious and where there is such a low margin of 
safety as in the aeroplane I think it is certain they cannot survive. I think then that 
concentration should be made upon metal construction. It is difficult to say whether steel or a 
light alloy will be the ultimate material. At present I am strongly in favour of steel but the 
discovery of a suitable light alloy would of course modify design very appreciably.  
Another material which I feel will disappear is fabric. Durability will be one of the 
essential features for commercial success and fabric is not an ideal material from that 
standpoint. I imagine therefore that considerable importance attaches to the discovery of a 
suitable metal covering for wings, which in my opinion should form part of the structure for 
actual load carrying and not be a covering merely.252 
This view was shared by John North in 1923: 
All the history of engineering relates the gradual displacement of timber by lighter and more 
durable structures of steel, but such a transition in aeroplanes [it is felt by the engineers and 
constructors] is difficult, if not impossible, to realise with advantage.253 
As an advocate of metal construction North was referring to others within the 
community who felt metal aircraft would be too heavy. Nevertheless, movements 
were made towards utilising metal more frequently within the airframe. One of the 
first had its origins in a First World War fighter, the Siddeley-Deasy S.R. 2 Siskin of 
1918. This particular aircraft was powered by an ABC254 Dragonfly radial engine 
which was, as it became immediately obvious to those involved, highly unreliable, 
prone to overheating and severe vibration. Also, there was a large disparity between 
the power promised (320 h.p.) and the power which was delivered (270 h.p.).255 
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Despite this glaring shortcoming, enough flight time was had to allow an assessment 
of the handling and manoeuvrability characteristics of the airframe which, it was 
deemed, were excellent. A new engine was added, the Siddeley Jaguar, which 
achieved much better results and the newly dubbed Siskin II made its first flight on 
20th March 1921. A specification was issued by the Air Ministry in 1922 for a single-
seat, high performance landplane (14/22). This specification was essentially a 
directive for the newly formed Armstrong-Whitworth company to develop the Siskin 
II into a military machine. As well as fitting it with a new engine as mentioned above, 
the designer Major F. M. Green decided to redesign the Siskin II with a composite 
wood and metal structure, retaining the fabric skin of the previous models, and it was 
issued as the Siskin III.256 The composite method was much favoured by aircraft 
designers: 
The aeroplane engineer, designer, constructor or user, not unnaturally, is inclined to pin his 
faith to the system of composite construction, which, brought to a state of high perfection, he 
has found to serve him well in the past.257 
The Siskin was a great success. Around 500 were built and the aircraft itself was in 
service for more than a decade. It took part in races like the Kings Cup due to its 
excellent aerobatic qualities.  
 
THE RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENTS: ACA, ARC, RAE & NPL 
 
The Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (ACA) was created on the 30th April 1909, 
its mandate was to examine and give order to questions of aeronautical research, and 
also to advise the Government on aeronautical research. At its inception several of the 
most eminent physicists, mathematicians, and engineers were members of the 
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Committee. The ACA was founded by Lord Haldane while he was Secretary of State 
for War; its first President was Lord Rayleigh, and its first Chairman, Sir Richard 
Glazebrook, who was Director of the National Physical Laboratory (NPL) at the time. 
The main function of the ACA was to “address technical problems presented to them 
by the Admiralty and War Office”.258 Thus, the problems encountered by the 
Admiralty and War Office in the construction of aircraft and airships would be 
analysed and passed to the NPL or Royal Aircraft Factory (later the Royal 
Aeronautical Establishment) for experiments and tests, the results of which were 
passed back to the Admiralty and War Office through the ACA in the form of Reports 
and Memoranda.259 An early priority for the Committee, and one that would remain 
central to British aeronautical research throughout the inter-war period was stability. 
In 1919, the ACA was renamed the Aeronautical Research Committee (ARC). They 
performed the same function, but reported to the newly formed Air Ministry.  
 In the years immediately following the First World War (1919-1923) the 
defence budget was slashed and funding for research and development (R&D) in 
aviation technology was cut back. Edgerton has argued that by the mid-1920s 
research and development in aeronautics was stronger, or certainly better funded, than 
at any point previously: 
In the interwar years it was stronger than before the war, and perhaps stronger than during the 
war itself. The RAF and the Air Ministry prided themselves on their support of research and 
technological development. In the 1920s and early 1930s the Air Ministry’s R&D spending 
represented more than 20% of total expenditure on aircraft and equipment. The Air Ministry 
was easily the largest R&D spending institution in Britain. In the mid-1920s it was spending 
£1.34m on R&D, compared with £0.98m by the Admiralty, and £0.49m by the War Office.260 
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In 1920, Professor Leonard Bairstow of the ARC wrote a memo outlining how work 
should be divided between the Air Ministry and the Research Council . He suggested 
that: 
….some broad line of demarcation should be recognised between the work of the 
Aeronautical Research Committee and that of the Air Ministry. To the former it would be 
appropriate to allot research and non-routine test work and to the latter the routine test 
work.261 
He went on to argue that: 
A general investigation of the lateral control or stability of aircraft would originate with the 
ARC whilst the testing of [more specific] Avro type ailerons on F boats would arise at the Air 
Ministry. Further, it is suggested that the routine or specialised type of test should, as far as 
possible be carried out at establishments under direct Air Ministry control.262 
Bairstow alludes to early problems in the programme of R&D for the research 
establishments under the Air Ministry and ARC in the same memo: 
The programme of the RAE…contains 126 items. That of the NPL…48-50. A return from the 
RAE shows that to meet these requests (in addition to Air Ministry tests not reported to the 
ARC) there is a scientific and technical staff of 60-70 whilst the NPL probably accounts for a 
rather smaller number. The number of items in the programme appears to be too diffuse for 
adequate advance against difficulties. There will be a tendency to change effort to easier 
problems rather than run the danger of an apparent slow rate of progress…263 
The ARC for their part “agreed to adopt generally the recommendations contained in 
the [Prof. Bairstow’s] paper without accepting quite so rigid a distinction as that 
drawn…” and also that “…it may not infrequently be necessary to proceed with a less 
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urgent research because the means of progressing with the more urgent is for the 
moment wanting”.264 
The ARC was split into six sub-committees’, each with a designated sphere of 
interest.265 In 1920, the most pressing R&D concerns were the improvement of the 
stability and control of aircraft, and, “…to develop a reliable engine suitable for Civil 
Aviation”. In materials, the concentration was focused on structural materials for the 
wings, rivets, and the fatigue properties of steels.266 The simple fact was, of course, 
that the direction research took was heavily prioritised, but it was governed more by a 
realistic sense of what could be achieved than simply budgetary or bureaucratic 
concerns. That being said, there were some financial problems for the NPL in 
particular following the short-lived, post-war economic boom. From 1921 until 1924 
their expenditure fell before rising again in 1925.267 Certainly, by 1925 the Air 
Ministry was faring better (in terms of budget share) than others for scientific research 
funding: 
Air Ministry………………….. £1,373,000 
 Admiralty…………………….. £983,000 
 War Office…………………...  £495,000 
 DSIR…………………………. £380,000 
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In 1925, the Air Ministry’s research money was still dealing with flying 
characteristics, stability, and airflow. Furthermore, there was “…urgent need for 
better information on the characteristics of biplanes with unequal wings, an 
arrangement now widely used by designers”.269 For the engine sub-committee 
development of a sleeve-valve engine was paramount, “The practical results already 
obtained with stratified charges (the type of ‘charge’ within the cylinder of the 
engine) are promising enough to warrant much further investigation”.270 
 The ARC had an interesting and difficult relationship with the industry’s 
representatives to government, the SBAC. For the 1926 programme of research at a 
joint meeting the SBAC suggested four additional items of research.271 The ARC was 
not convinced that SBAC proposals should be the focus of ARC, NPL or RAE 
research but would be suitable enough for SBAC firms to ‘pool’ the research 
themselves. Interestingly, the proposed experiments on monoplane wing positions 
show a good deal of foresight from the SBAC, and a willingness to move 
development forward. While the ARC thought this was a good idea, their immediate 
reaction was to have the firms do it themselves.272 
 The work directed by the Air Ministry and ARC, and carried out by the NPL 
and RAE was not the only source of aeronautical technology development. The air 
races and world record flights, largely undertaken privately by the aircraft firms 
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provided an informal kind of research and testing which will be explored in a later 
chapter.  
 
ATTEMPTS TO INCREASE LIFT, STABILITY AND CONTROL 
Government research establishments were not the only source of important research 
and innovation in aeronautics. Private firms such as Handley Page developed crucial 
technologies which enhanced both the stability and safety of aircraft. While firms like 
Bristol made great strides in engine research, de Havilland improved the wooden 
aircraft and Supermarine innovated in both high-speed aircraft and flying boats, 
Handley Page can be credited with developing one of the most important technologies 
in the immediate post-war years, the slotted wing.  
In his patent of 1920 H. F. Parker suggested that: 
The most important single problem in aeronautics awaiting solution is that of increasing the 
speed range of aeroplanes. In recent years maximum speeds have been increased very greatly, 
and will no doubt be still further increased, but each addition has been accompanied by an 
increase in the landing speed. The landing speed has always been about half the maximum and 
could not be reduced below that amount without entailing the expenditure of additional power. 
This is primarily due to the properties of the type of wing which has been used.273 
This was a serious problem. Landing speed was always a crucial specification of any 
aircraft. The maximum landing speed dictated to an extent the maximum top speed 
which could be achieved. A variable camber wing, such as those suggested by Parker 
and Handley Page could offer a supplement in lift during take-off and landing. This in 
turn would give a greater degree of control over the aircraft at low speeds and speeds 
close to a stall, as well as greater flexibility in landing speed.  
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It was around 1925 that military aircraft began to move away from the First World 
War types. Aerodynamic work proceeding throughout the 1920s identified a number 
of problems to be solved. Most notably were the issues of stalled aircraft and aircraft 
entering into spins. The Aeronautical Research Committee report for 1924-1925 
outlined that: 
Research upon the control of stalled aeroplanes has gone steadily forward throughout the year, 
the causes leading to defective lateral control in these circumstances having been thoroughly 
investigated by the Stability and Control Panel; the characteristics required in an aeroplane to 
make it controllable when stalled are now understood, and it has been demonstrated that these 
characteristics can be given by means of practicable modifications to the organs of control. 
 It appears from the investigations that conventional aeroplanes, when stalled, are 
defective in two respects; they have insufficient rudder power and the ailerons when applied 
cause the aeroplane to turn and by doing so neutralize their direct effect on roll. It has been 
found by analysis, and proved by experiment, that either an increase of rudder power, or the 
use of an aileron which does not turn the aeroplane, would give the pilot power to regain an 
even keel from any position and so prevent the fatal spinning dive. Estimates of the increases 
in rudder power required to do this without using the ailerons have been made and 
communicated to designers to provide an immediate cure for the worst forms of loss of 
control.274 
The report goes on to discuss the most successful ‘cure’ for stall and spin 
characteristics, the combination of the Handley Page slotted wing275 and Bristol-Frise 
ailerons. The slotted wing was patented by Handley Page in 1919 but it is interesting 
to note that, as is often the case in aeronautics, a very similar design was first 
attempted independently of Handley Page by Gustav Lachmann (who later worked at 
Handley Page) in Germany. His idea came as a response to an air crash caused by 
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stalling. It was rejected, however, as the German patent office did not believe in the 











Handley Page Slotted Wing (1920)277 
Lachmann, writing in 1921, attributed the idea of increasing the lift of an aerofoil by 
subdividing it to experiments with gliders conducted by himself before the war: 
A crash in August, 1917, with a Rumpler C airplane, on account of stalling, caused the idea to 
be put into concrete form and presented for a patent in 1918. The patent claim reads: 
“Supporting surface characterized by its being divided into a number of tandem components 
which together form a wing section”. The application was at first rejected because the patent 
office did not believe in the possibility of increasing the lift by dividing the wing. The issuing 
of the patent was made dependent on conclusive proof of such increase.278 
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In 1922 Albert Betz279 gave a lecture on the Theory of the Slotted Wing in which he 
discussed the two main ways the slotted wing was understood to work. However, he 
began his talk by discussing the origin of the slotted wing and its effects on 
aeronautical research and development: 
Through the intensive study of all technical aviation problems during the war, the most 
important airplane parts, especially the wing, were so thoroughly tested as to create the 
impression that no further substantial improvement was possible. The characteristics of the 
different wing sections were sufficiently known to enable one to select the most suitable 
section for almost any purpose. 
Then the discovery [of the slotted wing] by Lachmann and Handley-Page suddenly 
revealed entirely new possibilities and the wing section again became a rich field of 
problems…this discovery consisted in making one or more slots in the wing section. In this 
way it is possible to use the wing at higher angles of attack and thus considerably increase the 
lift…The advantage lies principally in the ability to vary the coefficient of lift, and hence the 
speed, within considerably wider limits. Hereby, the difficulties of taking off and landing are 
diminished and greater flight speeds made possible. Our knowledge of the behaviour of such 
slotted wings under the most diverse conditions is, unfortunately, very limited, and there is 
still much work to do before we shall have carried our investigations so far as to be able to 
choose, from the many possible modifications, the one best adapted for any given purpose.280 
In this instance, the development of the variable camber wing opened up a new area 
for theorists, aerodynamicists and the like. The slotted wing to an extent redefined the 
problem of air flowing over an aerofoil; that is to say, the invention solved one set of 
problems and raised an entirely new set. Before the slotted wing, so much work had 
been done on optimum or definitive wing shapes, angles of incidence, thickness, 
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chord281 and so on that it was felt, as noted by Betz, that ‘no further substantial 
improvement was possible’. The slotted wing allowed for greater speeds and reduced 
the difficulty of take off and landing by allowing a greater speed range. The problems 
raised by this invention, however, were concerned with the best type of shape, 
incidence, thickness and chord of the new auxiliary wing.  
From reports published by the Aeronautical Research Committee from 1923-
1927 it is clear that their highest priorities were stability and control of aircraft, 
particularly at low speeds, and the problem of spin. Research into improving the 
performance of aircraft was to be achieved by enhancing engine technology and work 
in aerodynamics. In 1926 the ARC considered that “The most important subject dealt 
with by the [ARC] is aerodynamics”. By this time: 
Now that the subject of control in stalled flight which has occupied such a large portion of the 
available time during the past few years, has reached the stage at which its salient features are 
understood, more time has been available for the study of other matters now of equal 
importance. The mechanics of spinning have accordingly received considerable attention, and 
it is satisfactory to record that appreciable progress has been made and a better understanding 
of the notion has been reached. A good deal of further work, however, needs to be done in 
order that a detailed knowledge may be obtained of the steady spinning positions which 
aeroplanes of standard design can reach by means of conventional controls, and that the 
characteristics of an aeroplane which might lead to difficulty in recovering from a spin may be 
completely understood.282 
Placing the mechanics of spin at the centre of ARC-directed research into 
aerodynamics had both practical and theoretical consequences. Wind tunnel work was 
conducted at the National Physical Laboratory and grants given to research the 
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problem elsewhere. For example, by the mid-1920s universities were becoming more 
fruitful sites of aeronautical research.  
In a more practical sense, however, the ARC were strongly in favour of the Hill 
Tailless Light Aeroplane (the Pterodactyl) and funded research into the machine. It 
was the brainchild of Geoffrey T. R. Hill, an aeronautical engineer who was primarily 
concerned with the design and potential of tailless aircraft. More specifically, he was 
interested in developing aircraft which would never, through pilot error, get out of 
control. Hill felt the flying wing to be the best design for his purposes. From Hill’s 
patent, filed in the United Kingdom in September 1924: 
The object of this invention is to provide apparatus which will permit aeroplanes to be 
controlled over a large range of flying angles, including the larger angles of incidence where 
under ordinary conditions the machine would become stalled and out of control. The invention 
comprises the employment of controlling surfaces angularly adjustable about lateral axes and 
situated in free air, not following wing surfaces.283 
 
Figure 6 – Hill Tailless Light Aircraft ‘Pterodactyl’ (1926) 
Tailless aircraft were seen at the time to offer aerodynamic advantages over 
conventional machines by increasing stability whilst reducing the overall drag penalty 
through the lack of a tail plane. The Air Ministry were very keen to subsidise work on 
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this type of aircraft and Hill’s design was for the most part practical and a prototype 
glider powered by the Bristol Cherub engine convinced the Ministry to provide 
further funding.284 Beginning in 1926 Hill and the Air Ministry embarked upon a 
series of designs none of which were produced in numbers but the evolution of the 
type is worth noting.  
 Following on from the Mark 1a, the next design produced to Air Ministry 
specification was the Mark IV under specification 16/29 in 1929. It was built 
primarily to demonstrate the practicality of the type and layout and was enough to 
convince the Ministry to release further funding to try and exploit the clear field of 
fire provided by the tailless pusher layout. The Mark V of 1932 represented a 
significant departure from the previous Pterodactyl’s. The major change was from the 
pusher to tractor type layout which limited the unobstructed field of fire which was 
hoped for with the type.285 It was of all-metal construction and performed well with a 
maximum speed of 190 miles-per-hour, a service ceiling of 30,000 ft and three 
machine guns. However, the project was then abandoned by the Air Member for 
Supply and Research: 
The abandonment of this specification is said to have resulted from the view of Air Vice 
Marshall Sir Hugh Dowding…who considered that the projected aircraft, with a pusher engine 
and a forward gun turret, did not represent a sufficient advance over the standard fighter 
aircraft of the day.286 
Hughes’ concept of the reverse salient in technological development is useful here. 
Wood to metal was a transition requiring development of many different components 
(the manufacture of exisiting components like struts and longerons in metal instead of 
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wood, for instance). The concentration on stability over performance is another where 
components of the aircraft system had to be developed and advanced. The elimination 
of one reverse salient might solve that problem but raise several others. Ultimately 
development in all the components of an aircraft was necessary to facilitate change.  
Another interesting aspect of this story which will be developed more fully in the next 
chapter is that in 1930 the Air Ministry experience a great deal of change and key 
positions in the Ministry changed hands. Hugh Trenchard, who for so long was the 
driving force of the RAF and had such a powerful influence over the selection of new 
types of aircraft and even new technologies was no longer Chief of the Air Staff, and 
Hugh Dowding became the Air Member for Supply and Research, a position which 
carried complete autonomy over the selection of aircraft for the RAF. These changes 
would prove to be highly significant factors in the shaping of aeronautical technology 
throughout the 1930s.  
 
EARLY AIR FORCE DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY, 1919-1925 
Besides the high degree of technical development carried out by designers working on 
aircraft such as the Schneider racers, aeronautical technology for the Royal Air Force 
was shaped largely by other pressures. The most notable shaping mechanism was the 
ring system implemented by the Air Ministry following the First World War. More so 
than anything else this system directly shaped aeronautical technology in both direct 
and indirect ways. Directly, the Air Ministry would ask for some feature or 
specification on an aircraft which, if not provided, would lose the tendering company 
business. Indirectly, this policy was to shape the way companies viewed risk for the 
next decade or more. Risk in design was not something to be tried. Trenchard was 
suspicious of technology or ideas which he did not ask for, and so the industry were 
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less inclined to push the technological envelope. This is in contrast to a civilian 
company like deHavillands who operated outside of Air Ministry control and 
produced many innovated and progressive designs. The institutional doctrine, strategy 
and policy of the Royal Air Force was to play one of the major roles in the shaping of 
British aeronautical technology. As noted by Phillip Meilinger the terms ‘doctrine’, 
‘strategy’ and ‘policy’ are sometimes used interchangeably but actually have distinct 
meanings, for instance: 
Doctrine, in essence, is a set of fundamental beliefs regarding the best way to fight wars and 
conduct campaigns. Doctrine is based on both theory and practice, and it tends to be relatively 
unconstrained by factors such as politics or economics that are crucial in war but which are 
not generally determined by military leaders. Ideally, practice should play the most important 
role in the formation of doctrine.287  
Also relevant to this section is his definition of strategy: 
Strategy is the use, in peace or in war, of a variety of military, political, economic, cultural, or 
psychological levers in order to attain a country’s national objectives…A country’s political 
leaders determine goals, and devise a strategy to achieve them. Military leaders, in turn, use 
that guidance to devise a military strategy focused on achieving military objectives that will 
lead to the accomplishment of the country’s objectives.288 
As he points out, for those working on developing a coherent air doctrine during the 
1920s, there was very little evidence upon which to base it. U.S. Army General Billy 
Mitchell argued in 1925 that, “In the development of air power, one has to look ahead 
and not backward and figure out what is going to happen, not too much ‘what’ has 
happened”.289 It was Mitchell, through a variety of means, who focused attention on 
the potential of the bomber in the United States at the expense of his career. Indeed, 
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his outspoken critique of U.S. air policy throughout 1925 was to have a decisive 
effect on the future of U.S. military aviation.290 
 Meilinger goes on to say that in lieu of ‘the main pillar of doctrinal 
formulation’ (actual experience): 
…air thinkers came to rely on the other key input, theory. Air doctrine therefore became 
increasingly theoretical during the 1920s and 30s. It was assumed that future technologies, 
equipment, and aircrews, although speculative and untested at the present, would provide 
definable results. In truth, these exercises in logic, although articulate, cogent and seemingly 
rationale, were still theoretical.291 
The doctrine and strategy of the Royal Air Force during the early 1920s had been 
largely formed by the experiences of aviation in the First World War and underpinned 
by the seminal work Command of the Air (originally published in 1921) by Giulio 
Douhet who advocated strategic bombing of enemy industry and infrastructure and 
believed that sufficient pressure from bombing civilian populations would break the 
will of the people.292 For British theorists it was a case of inference and extrapolation. 
Inferences drawn from British experiences of German bombing raids during the First 
World War were then extrapolated to allow for assumed continuing improvements in 
aviation technology. Reflecting upon the effects of German bombing during the war 
was fairly widespread, with the following a typical assessment: 
The enemy’s primary motive was to undermine the morale of the British public. He realised 
that the moral effect of bombing from the air and its various secondary consequences, such as 
the stoppage of railway traffic and reduction in the output of munitions, far outweighed the 
somewhat limited material damage possible. Although it may justly be claimed that the failure 
of the German effort to achieve any considerable moral effect was due, firstly, to the pin-prick 
nature of the raids themselves, and, secondly, to the success of the defensive measures which 
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were extemporised, we cannot ignore the effect of the raids, which decreased our munition 
output and obliged us, in response to public demand, to retain valuable material and personnel 
in this country. For instance, the defence of London alone employed 14 service squadrons, 10 
balloon aprons, 370 searchlights, 180 guns and some 30,000 men.293 
In 1921 the Air Staff addressed its theory of aerial warfare: 
One half the aim of an offensive air policy was moral effect. If there were no defensive 
aircraft [fighters] it would affect national morale adversely before the enemy had arrived at 
all; we would thus be playing into the enemy’s hands…night bombing produced the greater 
moral effect, but this moral effect could be produced with comparatively small numbers of 
aircraft by night…All agreed that it was not necessary to despatch a weight of bombs by night 
as by day; but continuous bombing throughout the whole night was essential.294 
This was a view shared by the Chief of the Air Staff Hugh Trenchard who was a firm 
believer in the idea of ‘morale bombing’ and that the development of bombers should 
be of paramount concern and, if nothing else, should act as a deterrent to aggressors. 
He agreed with Douhet’s Total War mentality that said bombers should be employed 
against enemy industry, infrastructure and civilian populations with the aim of 
destroying their will to fight. Trenchard’s views were succinctly summed up in 1923, 
a time when France was considered to be the main threat to Britain, when he said: 
Would it be best to have less fighters and more bombers to bomb the enemy and trust to their 
people cracking before ours, or have more fighters in order to bring down more of the enemy 
bombers. It would be rather like putting two teams to play each other at football and telling 
one team they must only defend their own goal, and keep all their men on that one point. The 
defending team would certainly not be beaten, but they would certainly not win, nor would 
they stop the attack on their goal from continuing…I feel that although there would be an 
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outcry, the French in a bombing duel would probably squeal before we did…The nation that 
would stand being bombed the longest would win in the end.295 
This view was echoed by Deputy Chief of the Air Staff (DCAS), John Steel: 
There is in the air no such thing as absolute destruction and defeat of the enemy air forces. 
However much his pilots and machines suffer, the enemy’s resources are still there and he can 
(perhaps with much inconvenience and interruption) go on building aeroplanes and training 
pilots. There is always hope, so long as the invading army can be kept away and so long as the 
civilians hold out…296 
It is interesting to note that over a decade later these beliefs had not changed. In 1932 
Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin said in a speech to Parliament that “the bomber will 
always get through. The only defence is offence which means you have to kill more 
women and children more quickly than the enemy if you want to save yourselves”.297 
The idea of an offensive bombing strategy was to cripple enemy industry and 
break the will of the enemy population. The debate amongst historians over the 
operational roles of the RAF is concerned with whether or not an offensive bombing 
strategy was pursued at the expense of a strong aerial defence (which would 
necessarily incorporate a number of fighter aircraft) of Britain in the 1920s, and at 
what point aerial defence became an important consideration for the RAF. Largely, 
the historiography points to the belief that British air defence did not begin until 1934 
and even then simply because radar technology became available.298 John Ferris has 
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disputed this thesis, arguing that Trenchard’s view (that sustained bombing of enemy 
population centres was the most effective use of air power) was gradually 
marginalised in the face of a growing number of Air Ministry staffers who believed 
that an effective strategic air defence could be achieved. “Virtually alone, Trenchard 
argued that strategic air defence was impossible”.299 Almost everyone else, however, 
was of the opinion that it could be made to work and that the Home Defence Air 
Force should be pursued as a top priority “equalling the development of a bomber 
force”.300 On the subject of air defence and the need for a strong fighter development 
programme RAF Flight Lieutenant C. J. Mackay considered, in 1922, that “the 
primary weapon with which aircraft must be fought is aircraft; too much emphasis 
cannot be laid on this point”.301  
 Discussions held in 1923 between high-level members of the Air Staff and 
recognised experts in the field of air defence help to illustrate that the balance of 
opinion was that research be divided equally between an offensive bomber force and 
such technologies to be used for the location and destruction of enemy formations: 
To my mind in an air war if it comes 5-10 years hence the improvements in sound locating 
and W/T [wireless telegraphy] and R/T [radio telephony] will cause all enemy’s attacks to be 
closely followed and aircraft of the defence concentrated to meet them. There will be less and 
less evasion and more and more fighting to reach one’s objective.302 
Indeed, by 1924 some kind of balance had been struck between bombers and fighters, 
with six types of the latter and nine of the former under various stages of 
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development.303 Still, by 1925 Air Staff opinion looked towards developing the best 
fighters possible for a home defence force, and indeed to blend the functions of the 
fighter and bomber under certain circumstances: “There is no doubt that in the future 
single-seaters will be required to attack ground targets with bombs. This will be so 
particularly in small wars”.304 They went further, however, by suggesting the need for 
a second type:  
The fighter…will not be of much use in a first class war (e.g. against France) when opposed 
by the fastest modern single-seaters. It seems absolutely necessary to have this type for army 
co-operation in small wars and for night fighting in any war, but it seems a pity to let the big 
military required for these duties stand in the way of the production of the really first class 
high-performance fighter which will be needed for day fighting in home defence and in any 
European war.305 
Crucially, the Air Staff distinguished between Imperial/Colonial defence and “any 
European war”, and it must be remembered that throughout the 1920s the most 
pressing duties performed by the RAF were actions against insurgent populations of 
British colonies: 
The aeroplane…can be located within [the] typology of technological imperialism, of which 
the police bomber was in some respects the culmination. The main concern of air policing was 
with the consolidation of imperial power, but aircraft were used in all three technical phases. 
They penetrated territory little known to Europeans, mapped areas obscure to the imperial 
power, and – when equipped with floats – used rivers as routes of access to the interior. 
During the phase of conquest, bombers were used to crush ‘primary’ resistance movements: 
during the phase of consolidation they helped break rebellions against imperial rule. Once a 
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region had been brought under nominal European sovereignty, aircraft helped to extend state 
power to marginal areas of swampland, mountains or deserts.306 
The assumption made was that for such colonial policing there was no particular need 
to spend vast sums on developing military aircraft with higher performance, the 
unruly populations of overseas colonies had no air force and so the relative 
performance of aircraft was simply not an issue. However, it was keenly felt that 
should there be a war with any European power that the pursuit and development of a 
first class fighter would be crucial. That being said there were still movements to 
develop special types of machine based around colonial policing: 
Discussions on a [single seat] armoured machine: This subject has, of course, been under 
consideration for many years but it was disposed of temporarily in June 1924…it was laid 
down that armour could not be used in aircraft until a lighter form of armour plate was 
produced, or until some other improvement in aircraft, such as a greatly increased 
performance, was made. The matter remained dormant until the [Secretary of State for Air] 
brought it up again as the result of casualties during the last Akhwan troubles. S. of S. thinks 
the specialised ground strafing which we indulge in in Iraq warrants the consideration of 
developing a special type of machine.307 
It seems, then, that the effects of doctrine and strategy in the 1920s on the shaping of 
aircraft technology had more to do with what kinds of aircraft to develop rather than 
individual component technologies such as engines, propellers and so on. There was 
simply no urgency, no need for the highest performance machines that could be 
attained. That would change in the 1930s with the rise of Nazi Germany and their 
increasingly aggressive foreign policy, but the main consideration in the 1920s was an 
offensive bomber doctrine and a strategy of colonial policing that did not require a 
technological revolution and did not present any crisis or pressing need for radical 
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new aircraft technologies to be pursued. Development continued, however, and the 
next chapter attempts to illustrate how fragmented and gradual a process it was, 



























































THE AIR STAFF AND THE METAL DEBATE, 1924-1930 
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Definitive interest in the all-metal machine and the decision to pursue an all-metal 
agenda for the RAF first came around 1924-25. It is worth noting that the Air 
Member for Supply and Research (AMSR) at that time had complete autonomy over 
which machines to order and could, if he chose to do so, completely ignore the wishes 
of the Air Staff. 
Whatever the source of a proposal for a new aircraft, they were all regarded as experimental, 
and were brought together in annual Experimental Aircraft Programmes. These programmes 
were drawn up by the AMSR’s department and discussed with the Air Staff, but the AMSR 
could, and did, proceed with projects which were not approved by them.308 
By 1925, AMSR and others such as the Director of Contracts (D. of C.) considered 
that all-metal construction was the best way forward for the Service: “Metal 
Construction will be imperative in war and the proposed step will be a real 
advance”.309 Plans were discussed and then set in motion to bring the industry in to 
line with Air Ministry thinking. D. of C. noted in 1925 that: 
I quite see that firms, especially the weaker ones, will shrink from the capital outlay entailed 
by preparation for metal construction, and that if left to themselves things will drag on for a 
long time. Hence, the importance of a fixed date.310 
The problem for the Air Staff was to somehow persuade the industry to convert to 
metal construction and, therefore, to spend the capital required in making such a 
change. As D. of C. mentioned above, this would not be easy, requiring the firms to 
spend a great deal on new tools, proper jigs, not to mention changes in labour and the 
“acquisition of knowledge and practice of metal processes”.311  
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It was decided that it would take four to five years for the industry to be able to make 
such a change and yet the question remained as to how best to make the industry fall 
in line with such a plan. It was believed that: 
…mere exhortations to the firms will not be efficacious. [One] course would be to send a 
circular letter here and now to all the firms to the effect that we had decided at no distant date 
to equip the RAF with metal machines. That within a short period a date would be notified 
after which the Ministry would order only metal machines and that it would be advisable for 
firms to decide whether they wished to be considered for metal production, having regard to 
the fact that considerations of cost point to the profitability of large order to a much smaller 
number of firms than at present exists.312 
Despite this strong movement in favour of as rapid a change to metal construction as 
could be managed, other voices within the Air Staff were not as convinced, most 
notably the Chief of the Air Staff, Sir Hugh Trenchard. He was partly in favour of 
metal construction but was highly skeptical of the time frame aimed for by AMSR 
and D. of C.: 
…I see that metal construction is the basis of the whole scheme. I feel that although we might 
try to work towards metal construction, this alone will take several years before we can make 
any decision as to whether all the machines must be of metal construction, when one considers 
the negligible number of metal machines we have now in being, on order, or even 
forecasted.313 
This was directly at odds with the ideas of AMSR and D. of C. They wanted the 
industry to switch to producing metal aircraft to remain up to date in warfare, 
considering it “imperative”; Trenchard in his role as CAS believed that it would take 
years before they could say if they even needed all machines to be manufactured in 
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metal. The differing attitudes illustrate the fact that switching to metal construction 
was not a simple matter and its importance and the rate of change was debated at the 
highest levels of the Air Staff. Hence, it was more a question of how long it would 
take rather than any specific objections to metal construction. Trenchard’s attitude to 
the proposed changes seems in a sense more measured than AMSR or D. of C., 
although some would call it a regressive, unimaginative outlook.314 
 It is worth noting that traditionally it has been the Air Ministry and Air Staff 
that have come under fire for delays in moving to metal and that these delays 
stemmed from a lack of enthusiasm for the new technology. However, I would 
suggest that attempting to paint a straightforward picture about the choices made and 
who was to blame for delays and so forth is actually misleading and not at all helpful 
if we actually want an accurate sense of what happened and why.  
 As mentioned above, there was a distinct worry about adopting metal 
machines without ground crews adequately trained in the repair and maintenance of 
metal machines. Indeed, until 1927 there was no such infrastructure for the training of 
such crews. A scheme for training apprentice aircraftmen was begun in 1920 and each 
year there was a call for recruits, each year there were three positions available to 
train for; ‘carpenter-rigger’, ‘aero-engine fitter’ and ‘wireless operator-mechanic’. 
The ‘carpenter-rigger’, as the name suggests, would be responsible for the repair and 
upkeep of wooden machines, or those of a wood/metal hybrid. In 1927, however, 
there was a call for 600 vacancies to be filled and for the first time the ‘metal rigger’ 
position appeared.315 It is significant that the RAF and Air Ministry were creating an 
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infrastructure to support the changes in aircraft design that they knew were coming, 
and from 1927 those people training to become ground crew were trained to deal with 
metal structures.  
The aircraft industry itself has also come under fire for being “unprogressive 
compared to the continent, and later the United States”.316 The charge is that when 
building machines of metal, constructors should have taken the opportunity to make 
major design changes resulting from the “inherent lighter strength of the metals which 
makes them suitable for the construction of cantilever wings”.317 Hoff means metal 
monoplanes, and it is interesting to note that for historians it is not the performance of 
aircraft that illustrates success or failure but by 1930 it is very much the form, the 
structure and the materials that mark a successful, modern, or progressive aircraft.  
Comparing any aircraft with another can be a tricky business and one must be 
careful not to misrepresent the purpose of a machine as its operational role will affect 
the nature of its performance and handling characteristics as well as its structure and 
form. However, carefully controlled comparisons, made to illustrate one particular 
point, can be of some use in explaining why judgements such as those of Hoff above 
are without much value. It would be one thing to make such assertions as to the 
conservatism of the British aircraft industry if competing aircraft in other countries 
were achieving significantly higher performances than their machines, but in the 
1929-33 period this was not the case. Again, however, attempting to determine which 
nation had the faster aircraft or the most ‘modern’ aircraft and so on does not help us 
determine how and why choices were made. 
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 It is clear that in the years after the First World War the consensus amongst 
designers in Britain was to continue in the wood-metal hybrid, or all-wood vein. 
Substantial capital outlay would be required in order to adequately tool-up for a full-
scale shift to metal aircraft. 
 
 
AIR STAFF PLANNING AND TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT IN PEACETIME (I) 
 
By 1926 Air Staff thinking was still firmly in the grip of the so-called ‘ten year rule’ 
but a report carried out into the procurement process for the RAF by Air Commodore 
Charlton318 began a debate within the Air Ministry about the future of this policy and 
its technical ramifications. Particularly, the debate centred around a plan for the future 
which would allow for an adequate peacetime Air Force which maintained high 
technical standards and provide a cogent strategy for the re-equipment of the Royal 
Air Force. In response to Air Commodore Charlton’s survey of the aircraft industry 
the Air Member for Supply and Research considered that the adoption of a regular, 
systematic programme for the equipment of the RAF in peace, and organisation in 
peacetime of an industrial system for war production would be necessary.319 
Furthermore, he prescribed a much leaner system of aircraft development and 
procurement emphasising far more standardisation amongst types and designs of 
aircraft. For instance: 
Systematic Programme of Equipment of RAF in peace. 
    1. Metal construction of aircraft to be adopted as the basis of the whole scheme. 
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2. Each main type of aircraft (i.e., single-seat fighter, etc.) in use by the RAF to be replaced 
once in five years. 
3. One design only (Horsley, Fox, etc.) to be in standard use by the RAF for each type. 
4. On re-equipment after five years’ service all aircraft of a type being replaced to be 
transferred to and held in reserve for 10 years complete with engines and accessories. 
5. Development of a new design of a type to be put in hand as soon as the previous design is 
taken into service as standard by the RAF. 
6. Specification, construction and trials of experimental aircraft, construction and service trials 
of development aircraft, incorporation of all modifications, organisation for peace production 
of new design to be complete in 5 years so as to replace previous design.320 
This plan assumed continued technical progress in both airframe and engine design to 
the extent that it would be worthwhile replacing complete designs every five years, 
but it also aimed to solve problems plaguing the design and adoption of new types of 
aircraft for the RAF. Continuous interference on the part of the Air Staff meant that 
modifications were constantly to be made in the stages of design and production as 
well as when the aircraft were actually in service.  
The Society of British Aircraft Constructors (SBAC) had highlighted this 
problem as early as 1925: 
The present position in aircraft design in this country has, in the Society’s opinion, been 
brought about by rather too much restriction on design and equipment and to changes which 
the designer is called upon to make in the course of construction.321 
Robert Brooke-Popham also discussed the subject a little later in 1930: 
When service aircraft takes [to] the air with its full equipment on board, it looks like a 
neglected bramble hedge owing to the vast number of excrescences in the form of service 
equipment. What is the use of designers streamlining their machine?...we require navigation 
lamps and identification lamps which are streamlined into planes and fuselages instead of 
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being stuck on the end of brackets and which do not require young power stations to work 
them!322 
 Frederick Handley Page also weighed in: 
…the open cockpits, projecting gunrings and guns, pumps and other excrescences of the 
present fuselages add to resistance and tend to reduce all aircraft to one common level of 
inefficiency.323 
The plans from AMSR in 1926, therefore, attempted to provide a cohesive method for 
aircraft to be designed, modified if necessary and tested by the time existing service 
types were due to be replaced. It also aimed to cut down on the variety of aircraft 
designs used to fill a particular type and so reduce the number of designs in use by the 
RAF.  
CAS Lord Trenchard was not enthusiastic about the majority of these plans, 
doubting whether all RAF aircraft should be metal and whether they could make any 
plans actionable in less than two years. Again, it is interesting to take note of the 
influence Trenchard had, not simply over technical choice, but over the whole system 
of design and development of RAF aircraft. One fairly unique example comes from 
the Fairey Fox test pilot, Norman MacMillan: 
I remember the occasion as if it were yesterday. After my flight demonstration the CAS asked 
me to accompany him apart from all the others and we walked on to the grass of the airfield 
well out of earshot. There the CAS asked me what I really thought of the Fox; did I think it 
was an aeroplane that could be handled safely by young and less experienced pilots of the 
RAF? I told him frankly that it was one of the easiest and most viceless aeroplanes I had ever 
flown. We walked back to the hardstand, and Sir Hugh Trenchard looked at Dick Fairey and 
said…”Mr Fairey, I have decided to order a squadron of Foxes”.324 
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On the subject of AMSR’s proposals CAS said: 
In my opinion, it will take at least another year or two before we can come to any decision on 
all the points put forward here. I see…that it is necessary to adopt a systematic programme for 
the equipment of the RAF. This I agree should be striven for, but it will not be practicable for 
many reasons.325 
Essentially Trenchard’s memo to the Secretary of State for Air sounded a cautionary 
tone, warning against moving too fast and decrying any attempts to speed up the time 
from the issue of a specification, to the development of a prototype and finally a 
production aircraft. As mentioned in the previous chapter, however, the Air Staff had 
decided by 1925 that from around 1930 only all-metal machines would be considered 
(again, all-metal in this instance simply means an all-metal frame, allowing for a 
fabric skin). Trenchard’s concern was that reducing the process from seven to five 
years might not provide enough time to swap existing machines with the best possible 
replacements. He was, however, of the opinion that certain points put forward by 
AMSR should be considered, namely: 
1. To try and move towards metal construction. 
2. To press towards the adoption of only one design of machine for each type of duty. 
3. No machine should come into the Service until it has had, besides the technical trials, a 
preliminary Service trial of a month, and a trial by a whole Squadron for a year, before 
ordering in greater numbers. 
4. That a machine should be held in the Service for a period of 7 years, which period could 
be reduced if it is found possible to produce machines more quickly. 
It seems to me that it is necessary to choose a few points in the report and settle them, as a 
means of illustration for the settlement of other points in the future.326 
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Director of Contracts (D. of C.) appraised AMSR’s proposals more favourably, 
however, commenting from a finance and contracts perspective: 
…I am bound to sympathise with the object of any proposals directed, as AMSR’s are, to a 
greater degree of regularity and systematisation of the aircraft and aero-engine 
programmes…I hope, however, that if the procedure suggested by CAS is adopted, the need 
for working towards a more regular and consequently economical system of demand and 
production will be kept steadily in view during the discussions as a practical requirement by 
all concerned.327 
The main disagreement between CAS and AMSR was the timescale. Indeed, AMSR 
reported that he was “very concerned with [CAS’s] idea that nothing definite can be 
done for another 12 or 18 months and that the matter is not one of urgency, in view of 
the Cabinet’s decision that no first-class war need be provided for until 1938”.328  
It is not simply a question of providing for a production organisation for war. As I pointed 
out…it is one of the features of Air Commodore Charlton’s scheme that it promises a solution 
of the present highly unsatisfactory position of the Air Ministry with regard to the aircraft 
industry…the root of all these difficulties is to be found in: (a) the unnecessary number of 
firms at present in the industry, and, (b) the perpetual uncertainty as to the orders which any 
firm will get owing to our present method of placing orders. This position of affairs cannot be 
cured merely by palliatives such as we are now obliged to resort to in order to keep firms in 
being for a short time longer. There must be a revision of our system of ordering. Until that 
system is revised our expenditure on supply will continue to be wasteful to ourselves without 
even being correspondingly profitable to the industry.329 
With this memo, AMSR was attempting to highlight the wasteful nature of the current 
scheme of ordering, but he was also relating it to problems with the ‘ring system’, 
organised for keeping the industry alive and in the business of designing and 
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manufacturing aircraft during the 1920s. He was also concerned that in delaying such 
plans as to bring greater stability and systematisation to the process of designing and 
ordering aircraft for the RAF, there was a risk of falling behind in a technical sense, 
that in not pressing for the best technology and its implementation into Service 
aircraft there remained a very real possibility of potential rival air forces gaining a 
technical and tactical edge over the RAF. The idea that RAF procurement was not, 
and would not become, an urgent matter until some short time before 1938 was to him 
a dangerous one, and a problem that could be solved by reducing the time between 
commissioning new aircraft and thus also providing more regular opportunities to 
implement newer, and presumably more advanced technologies into Service aircraft.  
 In 1927, Robert Brooke-Popham stated that: 
I feel certain that we must go on asking for what are stated to be impossibilities. We have just 
about got now what we asked for as far as I can remember, in 1916, but we never should have 
got it in 1927 if we had merely asked for what we were told we could get in 1916.330 
Brooke-Popham therefore believed that asking designers for more than was available 
provided valuable stimulus to the design and innovation process.  
 As an example of this, in 1927, Deputy Director of Technical Development 
(DDTD) wrote a memo outlining the benefit of sacrificing the top speed of certain 
Service machines: 
I understand that for some time we have adopted certain arbitrary landing speeds for various 
types, and on the whole wisely. What I am not clear about is whether you have had 
alternatives put clearly before you and are satisfied that we have invariably chosen the best 
compromise. Would it interest you, for example, to know that a sacrifice of: 
  3 m.p.h., top speed on the Siskin 
  2 m.p.h., top speed on the Horsley 
  1 m.p.h., top speed on the Virginia 
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will give you a design offering not only a landing speed in each case 10 m.p.h. slower, but a 
climb improved by around 10%. The service ceiling would also rise from  
  27,000 ft. to say, 30,000 
  15,000 ft.  21,000 
  7,500 ft.  9,000 
 
To my mind there is little question that the slower machine is much the finer proposition. 
Even on the Siskin the loss of 3 m.p.h. top speed seems to me more than compensated for by 
the much improved climb and ceiling giving the upper gauge so much more readily, and 
improved handiness.331 
 Deputy Director of Operations and Intelligence (DDOI) replied by explaining how 
Service aircraft came into being: 
The points raised by DDTD are interesting, but I cannot see the object of bringing them up. 
All specifications for new types are put through the Air Staff for any remarks they may have 
to make. In some cases the type is discussed by the Air and Technical staffs before the 
specification is prepared; an example is the Interception Fighter we recently asked for. It is 
surely the obvious duty of the technical staff to advise us from every point of view as to how 
our various requirements may affect the design of a type. With the few types we have 
considered lately this has been done, but I doubt very much if it was on the three machines 
given in the example [by DDTD]. The Virginia and Siskin were produced at a time when the 
Home Defence Force was being rapidly expanded, and both were such vast improvements on 
existing types that they were willingly accepted. The Horsley was one of four competitors in a 
class of which it was the only private venture, it was accepted without the Technical staff 
having anything to do with it.  
 In the latest specification (Partridge) even a freer hand has been given to the 
Technical Department; we have only asked that the speed at 15,000 ft should be as great as 
possible and the landing speed not more than 52 m.p.h. I do not know what greater margin 
could be allowed, but it is certain that whatever we ask for we shall be given something 
inferior…But there is one point that DDTD seems to have forgotten. The fighter is a cheap 
machine to experiment with and to build, and to the successful designer there is always a large 
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market. The result is that the majority of fighters that are offered to the Air Staff are private 
ventures built to no particular specification. The designer has therefore a free hand and the 
machine is accepted usually because is has a better performance than existing types. It is then 
probably too late to bring in any of the alternatives mentioned by DDTD.332 
DDOI went further in writing to the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff that: 
As regards fighters I cannot agree with DDTD. In time of war the demand is for greater top 
speed and climb, while slow landing speed is scarcely considered. In peace time, on the other 
hand, there is always a tendency to sacrifice high speed to those other factors which contribute 
towards safety. Personally, I would rather ask DDTD to say what would happen if we ask for 
an additional 10 m.p.h., top speed on the Siskin IIIA.333  
The examples cited by DDTD were introduced around 1922-1923 and by 1927 
ordering and development procedures were becoming more standardised. DDOI 
mentions above that the majority of fighters offered to the Air Staff were ‘private 
ventures built to no particular specification’, while that is not strictly true as the Air 
Ministry offered plenty of specifications covering fighter aircraft of various types, the 
specification process became far more rigid in the later 1920s and early 1930s. 
However, specifications were an integral part of Air Ministry procurement, AMSR 
had set out in 1924 that: 
 I think the procedure should be as follows: 
a. We should issue to all approved firms a specification for the machine it is desired 
to produce, asking them to tender by a certain date for the production of one machine. 
b. When the tenders have been received, four selections will be made, of which two 
will be the lowest tenders and two will be arbitrarily selected according to various 
circumstances, such as: 
 i. Special capacity of the firm for the type involved. 
 ii. Amount of design work in hand already. 
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333 Ibid., DDOI to DCAS, ‘On DDTD Performance Memo’, 4th July 1927 
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c. As soon as possible…comparative trials will be held, including service trials, with 
a view to arriving at a decision as to which machine is to be selected either for the service or 
further development…334 
Unsurprisingly, perhaps, the Society of British Aircraft Constructors (SBAC) 
considered that “the specification should be worded as broadly as possible” and that it 
should be “a statement of requirements rather than a specification”.335 The SBAC also 
thought that rather than the Air Staff picking the aircraft based upon price, they 
should instead state the price they were prepared to pay “and it should be the business 
of aircraft designers to give the best possible aircraft within the price laid down”.336 
 However, before the Air Staff were able to issue any specifications decisions 
had to be made on what types of machine to concentrate on, for what sort of 
operational roles and so on.  A conference was held in 1926 to look at the new 
programme of experimental aircraft for 1927-1928.337 
The table below outlines the growth in performance of some of the RAF’s first 
line fighter aircraft between 1923 and 1931. What can be seen is a gradual but steady 
increase in speed, a faster rate of climb and a higher service ceiling. The service 
ceiling of an aircraft is the altitude at which an aircraft will be expected to produce a 
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Year. Type. Best Speed. ROC to 15,000 Service Ceiling 
1923 Grebe. 146 m.p.h. @ 
ground level. 
14.24 minutes 22,000 ft. 
1925 Gamecock. 151.5 m.p.h. @ 
5,000 ft 
13.15 minutes 23,000 ft. 
1927 S/Charged 
Siskin. 
149 m.p.h. @ 
7,000 ft 
13.7 minutes 24,500 ft. 
1929 Bulldog. 177 m.p.h. @ 
9,000 ft 
9.75 minutes 28,800 ft. 
1931 Fury. 205 m.p.h. @ 
13,000 ft 
7.37 minutes 29,000 ft. 
Growth in Performance by British Aircraft (Fighters)338 
Perhaps the most important factor in improving all of these aspects of aircraft 
performance is the engine. Rates of climb are affected by many different factors, for 
instance, the wing span, weight of the aircraft, parasitic drag coefficient, propeller 
efficiency, and so on. 
 
THE SCHNEIDER TROPHY, 1913-1931 
 
An interesting aspect to the story of inter-war aircraft development is that of the 
Schneider Trophy. Within this story there are two aspects of particular significance to 
this thesis. First, the races provided a valuable stimulus for new technology in 
parituclar areas. The focus was on the improvement of aerodynamics and the overall 
structure of the aircraft in a constant effort to achieve better performance. Secondly, 
the races were significant as they demonstrated new and cutting edge technologies.     
While by no means the only air race in the world, it was certainly the most significant. 
Aircraft competing for the Trophy routinely set world speed records. The races 
themselves drew vast crowds, and the competition evolved from one where machines 
were largely funded privately to one where the interests, and money, of the state were 
closely intertwined with the outcome. It became a matter of national pride, and as 
                                                
338 NA AIR 20/70 – Development of Fighter Planes, Jan., 1925 – Oct., 1940. Growth 
in Performance by British Aircraft, undated, likely 1931.  
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such, state involvement and funding grew from minimal assistance in development to 
one of near total financial control and the expenditure of vast amounts of money. 
There was, however, at least in Britain, the idea that money spent on Schneider racers 
would reap some kind of technical reward in the design and development of future 
aircraft for the Royal Air Force, and in many ways (speed, integration of aerodynamic 
theory and airframe form, for instance)339 they set a benchmark to be hit by future 
designs. Of course, meeting these standards was not immediately possible as 
Schneider aircraft were optimised purely for speed. Engines were designed and tuned 
so as to generate enormous power outputs by the standards of the time and had very 
short operational lives, but the real advances were made in the science of 
aerodynamics. The design of the Schneider aircraft changed radically between 1921 
and 1931: 
 
Figure 7 - Macchi M. 7bis (1921) 
                                                
339 Ermanno Bazzocchi, "Technical Aspects of the Schneider Trophy and the World 




Figure 8 - Supermarine S. 6b (1931) 
Supermarine designer R. J. Mitchell summed up progress from 1919 to 1929 in the 
Schneider Trophy: 
Quite a lot of information and experience is gained in the development of racing aircraft 
which is of undoubted value to the designer in all branches of aeronautical engineering and in 
many ways this has had a pronounced influence on the design of both military and civil types 
of aircraft. 
During the last ten years there has been an almost constant increase of speed in our 
racing types. To maintain this steady increase, very definite progress has been essential year 
by year. It has been necessary to increase the aerodynamic efficiency, and the power-to-
weight ratios of our machines, to reduce the consumption, and the frontal areas of our engines; 
to devise new methods of construction; and to develop the use of new materials. The results 
obtained in the form of speed have been a direct and absolute indication of our progress in 
aeronautical development…Speed in the air must always be a measure of aerodynamic 
efficiency…340 
The power output of racing aero-engines for this competition also increased at a rapid 
rate from around 260 horsepower with the Macchi M. 7bis of 1921341 to around 2,350 
                                                
340 Reginald J. Mitchell, "Racing Seaplanes and their Influence on Design," 
Aeronautical Engineering Supplement, The Aeroplane (1929). 
341 Enzo Angelucci and Paolo Matricardi, World Aircraft, 1918-1935  (Milan: BCA, 
1977). p. 149. 
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horsepower of the Supermarine S. 6b in 1931.342 It is interesting to note that the 
output of 2,350 horsepower would not begin to be approached by engines used in 
RAF fighter aircraft until well into the Second World War.343 
 The changes experienced by British Schneider Trophy aircraft were the result 
of increasing the power output of aero-engines and extensive work carried out by the 
National Physics Laboratory and the Royal Aeronautical Establishment. The most 
radical changes came after the major involvement of the State in terms of funding and 
research, not to mention the use of pilots from the Royal Air Force’s high-speed 
flight.  
 
BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE CONTEST 
The contest was initiated in 1913 by Frenchman Jacques Schneider who believed that 
flying boats would be of great importance in the future and thus started the 
competition as a means to encourage and foster development of this type of 
aircraft.344 The inaugural contest in 1913 was won by the French SPAD Deperdussin 
Monocoque345 seaplane at an average speed of 45.71 miles-per-hour. The Monocoque 
was revolutionary at the time for several reasons; it was the first aircraft to exceed 100 
miles-per-hour (achieved after the Schneider win), it made use of a single shell 
design, and was monoplane in configuration.  
                                                
342 Ibid., p. 85 
343 Thetford, Aircraft of the R.A.F.: p. 484. Bill Gunston, World Encyclopedia of Aero 
Engines - From the Pioneers to the Present Day, Fifth ed. (Sutton Publishing, 2006). 
p. 36, 190.  
344 Anon., "The Schneider Cup Seaplane Race," Flight XVII, no. 39 (1925): p. 609. 
345 A monocoque (single shell) airframe is one that relies on its outer surface for 
support rather than internal bracings. Also, SPAD is the short-hand name for  Société 
Pour L'Aviation et ses Dérivés, a major French aircraft manufacturer between 1911 
and 1921. 
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Despite such progressive design elements, the trend at the time was moving towards 
the physically stronger biplane, which resulted in few private orders for the aircraft.346 
During the next contest in 1914 the speed of 45 miles-per-hour was almost doubled 
by the British entry, the Sopwith Tabloid, at 86.83 miles-per-hour. The contest was 
postponed at the outbreak of the First World War and resumed again in 1920 with 
Italy as the sole competitor, and unsurprisingly the winner. Italy won again in 1921 
with the Macchi M. 7bis pictured above and a speed of 117.85 miles-per-hour, the 
other competitors failed to start the race. For the 1922 race, Britain submitted the first 
Supermarine entry, the Sea Lion, a biplane of similar construction and appearance to 
the Macchi M. 7bis, and won the competition that year attaining a speed of 145.67 
miles-per-hour.347 
Entries from the United States won both the 1923 and 1925 contests at 177.27 
miles-per-hour and 232.57 miles-per-hour respectively. The British entry for the 1925 
contest was the Supermarine S. 4 monoplane. It was the first of Reginald Mitchell’s 
monoplane racers designed for the Schneider Trophy, and the first monoplane to take 
part in the contest since the SPAD Monocoque of 1913. Unfortunately, due to a 
weakness in the wing design, the S. 4 crashed during a trial run before the contest. In 
1926 the Italians won yet again with the new Macchi M.39 and a speed of 246.50 
miles-per-hour. The M.39 followed on from Mitchell’s S.4, being an exceptionally 
clean monoplane design. The 1927 contest again revived Mitchell’s interest in racing 
monoplanes, and Supermarine S.5 won with a speed of 281.66 miles-per-hour. The 
S.5 was a result of extensive research carried out at the National Physics Laboratory 
and the Royal Aircraft Establishment. It had an all-metal fuselage and was designed 
                                                
346 F. T. Jane, Jane's All the World's Aircraft  (London1913). p. 89. 
347 Angelucci and Matricardi, World Aircraft: p. 72. 
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entirely around the engine – a powerful Napier Lion VII B which developed 876 
horsepower.348 
 
DECLINING GOVERNMENT SUPPORT 
By 1929 Air Ministry enthusiasm for competing in the contest was failing. According 
to the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) Lord Trenchard: 
I am frankly against this contest. I can see nothing of value in it. High speed machines will be 
developed by [the] Air Member for Supply and Research as and when necessary for research 
purposes, and they can race against the clock when it suits the Department, at a minimum of 
cost and of infinitely greater value.349 
He concluded that: 
The contest is certainly not a good thing from the Service point of view; it is certainly a bad 
thing from the point of view of efficiency, and it is not good for the morale of the Air Force as 
a whole.350 
Trenchard did not expand on his reasoning for suspecting a negative effect on the 
morale of the Air Force, but it is hard to imagine how this could be so given the 
position of ascendancy enjoyed at that time by RAF High-Speed Flight pilots in the 
competition. In the event, the Air Ministry did not entirely withdraw from supporting 
the 1929 race. They provided funding for the airframe but offered no money for a new 
aero-engine and also withdrew the offer for pilots of the High-Speed Flight. For the 
Air Staff it was a question of value for money, and the prevailing belief was that they 
would not get “value for the expenditure of effort (let alone the monetary cost)”.351 
This was not, however, the explanation given to the media and public. Suggested 
                                                
348 Ibid., p. 84 
349 NA AIR 2/1303 – Schneider Trophy Race: Future Policy after 1929 Race – CAS 
to Secretary of State for Air on the Schneider Trophy, 10th September 1929 
350 Ibid. 
351 NA AIR 2/1303 – Schneider Trophy Race: Future Policy after 1929 Race – AMSR 
to Secretary of State for Air, ‘Comments on CAS memo’, 10the September 1929 
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wording for notifying the newspaper media and the Air Attaches of participant 
nations, reflecting the continued popularity of the contest amongst the public, read as 
follows: 
The participation of the RAF in the last two contests has undoubtedly given a valuable 
stimulus to the development of British high-speed aircraft, but a position has now been 
reached when further development, so far as the RAF is concerned, can better take the form of 
normal research and experiment. Experience moreover has shown that competition between 
governments, backed by national resources, has tended progressively to give the contest a 
character that is not in accordance with its original intention.352 
It is interesting that this decision was not made by the Air Ministry so much as it was 
the Government: 
…there was no feature of air policy in 1929, which has been more controversial or has 
aroused wider public interest than the Government’s decision that in future, participation in 
the Schneider Trophy Contest should be left to private enterprise. The issue of policy involved 
was of sufficient magnitude to have been brought specially before the Cabinet, and the 
decision to discontinue Royal Air Force participation was not an Air Ministry decision, but a 
decision taken by the Government…Indeed, so great was the public interest in the matter that 
I should think that after the announcement of the Government’s decision we had more 
Parliamentary questions on this topic than on any other single issue from all quarters of the 
House for some weeks.353 
Eventually, the Air Ministry declined to offer any support at all for the 1931 contest: 
…although the entry of a Royal Air Force team was calculated to give a much needed impetus 
to the development of highspeed aircraft – and did so notably in the two latest contests – 
sufficient data have now been collected for practical development in this direction, and the 
                                                
352 NA AIR 2/1303 – Schneider Trophy Race: Future Policy after 1929 Race – Minute 
21 to AMSR, 22nd October 1929 
353 NA AIR 2/1303 – Schneider Trophy Race: Future Policy after 1929 Race – 
Charles Bullock to Air Attaché to Berlin, 7th March 1930 
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large expenditure of public money involved by government participation is, therefore, no 
longer justifiable.354 
Mervyn O’Gorman, superintendent of the Royal Aircraft Factory and head of the 
Royal Aeronautical Establishment took an entirely different view and cited the 
invaluable influence on civilian research work that came from competing in the 
contest: 
Government research workers will find themselves once more obliged to press their work 
forward for use by a given date…Such work is helped by the spirit of emulation and if side 
issues of more remote scientific interest are in some degree made subservient to the purpose 
of improving a very good aircraft, this is a good result…By this contest the Scientific workers 
are pressed to produce their results in a readily assimilable form, for the industry and then 
these results are tested in practice against the results of independent researchers in other 
countries, again a rare experience and valuable…Manufacturers and designers are by the 
urgency of their desire to win, pressed into the closest contact with research, therefore their 
practical problems are exposed in more detail to the research side than would normally be the 
case…355 
However, the Air Ministry’s reluctance to offer any funding for a new engine in 1929 
was to prove highly significant as it led to a close relationship between Supermarine 
and Rolls-Royce (who provided their ‘R’ type V-12 engine).  In a letter to Air 
Commodore Holt of the Air Ministry, Air Commodore Chamier (a director at 
Supermarine) discussed the upcoming contest of 1931: 
Supermarine and Rolls-Royce have been discussing the possibility of defending the Schneider 
Trophy in the absence of any direct government entry. We set ourselves the task of obtaining 
an increased speed of 25 miles round the course, and for this purpose we decided that we 
should require 400 h.p. more from the Rolls-Royce ‘R’ engine. In order to obtain this horse 
                                                
354 NA AIR 19/126 – The Schneider Trophy Contest, ‘Future Schneider Trophy 
Contests – Government’s Decision not to Participate’, 1929, p. 1. 
355 Ibid., ‘Plea for Government Support of the Schneider Cup Contest 1929’ by 
Mervyn O’Gorman, 22nd November 1927, pp. 1-2 
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power, which it is hoped could be got without appreciable increase of weight or dimensions, 
some 100 hours of development running would be required by Messrs. Rolls-Royce.356 
The 1931 contest (and subsequent British outright victory) was made possible by a 
donation of £100,000 (roughly £4,500,000 today) from Lady Houston.357 This money 
was to prove significant as the Air Ministry had denied the use of its pilots of the 
High-Speed Flight and insisted that the 1929 machine could not be used.358 Curiously 
however, the Air Staff did acknowledge the importance of the Air Races for ‘proving’ 
the superiority of certain design features. Deputy Chief of the Air Staff (DCAS) 
considered that “the Schneider Trophy definitely proved the supremacy of the 
monoplane for pure performance”.359 AMSR Hugh Dowding (who would later 
become Air Chief Marshall in charge of Fighter Command) noted that: 
If for instance we take the history of our successful endeavour to win the Schneider Trophy, it 
may be said that the knowledge gained in the field of aircraft and engine design amply repaid 
the time and money spent on it up to a certain stage which I might put at the attainment of a 
speed of 300 m.p.h [for Service aircraft].360 
What is interesting about Dowding’s thoughts (from 1933) on the Schneider Trophy 
is that he regards the attainment of 300 miles-per-hour by Schneider racers to be the 
most useful outcome for RAF aircraft technology.361 By the last meeting in 1931, 
however, the Supermarine S. 6B won the contest outright with a speed of 408 
                                                
356 NA AIR 5/537 – Schneider Trophy, 1931 – A/C Chamier to A/C Holt on the 1931 
Schneider Machine, 14th March 1930 
357 NA TS 28/207 – Lady Houston’s Offer of £100,000 for a Schneider Entry. As the 
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359 NA AIR 20/70 – Development of Fighter Planes, Jan. 1925 – Oct. 1940 – DCAS 
to DDOI, ‘Service Personnel Ideas to Improve Fighters, 4th November 1932 
360 NA AIR 2/639 – World Record Flights: Policy on Future Participation – AMSR to 
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361 As the Schneider Trophy was mostly a contest of speed, other considerations such 
as a high rate of climb or low landing speed were of no importance.  
 152 
m.p.h.362 It is probable, therefore, that the speed of 400 miles-per-hour was of little 
real benefit to the RAF due to limitations on airframe design for the Air Force. 
Indeed, as Dowding put it: 
The increase in knowledge which we obtained by putting the speed up to 400 m.p.h. scarcely 
perhaps repaid the amount of time and energy diverted from other objects, although, of 
course, the moral effect of our victory was a very great asset to the prestige of the nation and 
to the prosperity of the industry.363 
Dowding’s comments were directly in opposition with those made by Trenchard 
above regarding the value of the Schneider Trophy. In essence, the Air Staff lost 
interest in the Schneider Trophy because the technologies in use for racing seaplanes 
could not, without great effort and expenditure, be immediately integrated into 
Service machines. Despite the great promise of the speeds attained by the Schneider 
machines, the feeling was that the contest had done its job in driving the extreme 
speeds which were required for international competition, but that it would be some 
significant time (which could be considered to be around ten years) before such speed 
could be achieved by Service aircraft.  
 
Figure 9 - Supermarine Sea Lion II (1922) 
                                                
362Angelucci and Matricardi, World Aircraft, pp. 83-85 
363 NA AIR 2/639 – World Record Flights: Policy on Future Participation – AMSR to 
CAS on Air Ministry policy of World Record Flights, 28th April 1933 
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The changing nature of the contest certainly provided the scope for radical change in 
Schneider Trophy technology; in making money, time at the National Physics 
Laboratory and so on available, designers had the opportunity to perfect their aircraft 
as far as possible. The most straightforward way to illustrate this is to look at the 
designs of Supermarine which were involved in the competition.  
Their involvement began in 1922 with the Sea Lion II (Fig. 3). It was a flying 
boat rather than a seaplane, of biplane configuration and with a ‘pusher’ style engine 
and propeller. As can be seen there is very little in the way of streamlining apart from 
the hull. There was no effort to house the engine in an aerodynamic casing, or to 
streamline the struts and wires between the wings. Nevertheless, it won the 1922 
contest at an average speed of 145.67 miles-per-hour. As mentioned above, the United 
States won the 1923 contest with the Curtiss CR-3 seaplane and also claimed second 
place with another CR-3 while the Supermarine entry was relegated to third place. 
Supermarine had taken the Sea Lion II and given it a new engine taking it from 450 
horsepower to 550.  
 
Figure 10 - Curtiss CR-3 (1923)  
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The American CR-3 made use of an aerodynamic cowling for the engine and 
streamlining of the floats, wings, braces and struts is evident. While still retaining the 
biplane configuration the CR-3 was possessed of a much cleaner aerodynamic design 
than the Sea Lion III. Furthermore, the CR-3 made use of a new type of engine 
technology, the wet-sleeve monobloc D 12. It was light and possessed of a very small 
frontal area allowing for further streamlining behind the engine.364 
 
Figure 11 - Sea Lion III (1923) 
Fig. 5 shows the slightly remodelled hull of the Sea Lion III, and an attempt to 
streamline the engine with a cowling of some sort. Despite these changes, the 
Supermarine entry came in 20 miles per hour slower than the CR-3. The failure of the 
Sea Lion III marked the end of the racing flying boat at Supermarine and convinced 
chief designer R. J. Mitchell that a radical solution would be required to dislodge the 
American racing biplanes.365 
Following the 1923 Schneider Contest, the next race in 1924 had never been far from 
Mitchell’s mind. In June 1924 the Air Ministry ordered two experimental racing aircraft; a 
flying boat from Supermarine and a seaplane from the Gloster firm. Although Mitchell had 
                                                
364 Anon, "The 470 h.p. Curtiss D.12 Engine," Flight Vol. XVI, No. 17(1924). 
365 Mitchell, Schooldays to Spitfire: p. 53. 
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lost faith in the flying boats as a racing machine, he did design one powered by a Rolls-Royce 
Condor engine. Difficulties occurred during construction and the design, which was to have 
been called the Sea Urchin, was abandoned. Mitchell had a good eye for the right design and 
he knew that this one was wrong. He was convinced that a seaplane was needed to challenge 
the Americans.366 
By 1925 Mitchell had abandoned the flying boat in favour of the seaplane. His 
response to the challenge presented by the new American Curtiss types was even 
more radical than the choice of Curtiss to switch to seaplanes. Mitchell opted for a 
cantilever monoplane seaplane design: 
 
Figure 12 - Supermarine S. 4 (1925) 
The British aeronautical press were surprised and fascinated by the new machine: 
The Supermarine-Napier S.4 is an exceptionally fine piece of work from every point of view, 
and at first sight one cannot help feeling a certain amount of surprise that a British designer 
has had sufficient imagination to produce such a machine. Perhaps one may describe the 
Supermarine-Napier S.4 as having the appearance of having been designed in an inspired 
moment, but having all that is considered best in British construction incorporated in its 
details.  
That the design is bold, no one will deny, and we think the greatest credit is due to 
Mr. R. J. Mitchell, chief designer of the Supermarine Aviation Works, for his courage in 
                                                
366 Richard Riding, "The Sparrow," Aeroplane Monthly 13, no. 498 (1985). 
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breaking away from stereotyped methods and striking out on entirely novel lines. When it is 
remembered that Mr. Mitchell has hitherto almost exclusively devoted his attention to the 
flying-boat biplane, it is little short of astonishing that he should have been able so entirely to 
break away from the types with which he has been so intimately connected for the past seven 
or eight years, and not only abandon the flying-boat type in favour of the twin-float 
arrangement, but actually change from the braced-biplane structure to the pure cantilever wing 
of the S.4367 
The S.4 utilised several uncommon methods and features in its design such as: 
stressed skin on the single-piece wing, a plywood skin covered fuselage, aluminium 
cowling for the engine bay and radiators mounted on the underside of the wing. It also 
utilised the Fairey Reed-type propeller.[ref] Some problems with the S.4 were noted 
after the test flight, poor visibility was one, the other, more worrying problem was a 
vibration detected in the wing which, it was considered, might prove problematic 
given the two sharp turns often included in Schneider races.[ref] Given the impressive 
speed achieved by the S.4, however, it was decided that it would be entered into that 
year’s contest. 
 The S.4 crashed on the first turn of the race and the pilot Henri Biard believed 
the crash was due to wing flutter. However, experts believed it was more a case of a 
design far in advance of current aerodynamic theory.[ref] Mitchell wrote only a 
handful of papers discussing the development of his Schneider racing machines. 
However, he discussed the development of the S. 5 at length in ARC Reports and 
Memoranda No. 1300. A close look at this paper will give a very good idea as to how 
this particular development process was conducted. Mitchell considered that: 
It was obvious that private enterprise could not shoulder the burden of the next contest 
[1926]…the problems which were faced by the S. 5 may be broadly classified as: a) 
                                                
367 Anon., "The Schneider Cup Seaplane Race," pp. 612-13. 
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Reduction of weight; b) Reduction of drag; c) Providing a satisfactory performance on the 
water.368 
The first point he makes in this paper is to highlight the flaw in the unbraced wings of 
the S. 4, deciding that bracing the wings with wires to the floats and chassis offered a 
lighter and more rigid structure. He further points out that the structure weight of the 
S. 5 was 36% compared with the 45% of the S. 4. Interestingly, Supermarine 
determined that “the biplane type would offer a very small further reduction of 
structure weight, which would be outweighed by the increase in drag. The biplane, 
moreover, gives a worse field of view for the pilot”.369 In reducing the drag of the S. 
5, Mitchell considered that the reduction in weight was indirectly responsible for “a 
considerable reduction in drag, inasmuch as the wing area, the size of the floats, and 
the length of the fuselage are all affected by the weight of the aircraft”.370  
One of the most important aspects to this story is the collaboration between 
Supermarine and the National Physical Laboratory: 
The story of Mitchell’s subsequent S.5, S.6, and S.6B and their engine development has been 
told many times, but with too little emphasis on the many hours of wind-tunnel testing at NPL 
[National Physics Laboratory] which whittled away at the profile drag of these machines so 
that, for example, the fuselage of the S.5 had 29 per cent less drag than that of the near-
perfect-looking S.4.371  
Indeed, Mitchell lauded the efforts of the NPL in his paper citing an extensive 
programme of wind tunnel research and the hard work of the NPL staff “so that no 
effort was spared to get the resistance down to the minimum possible…”.372  
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 The extensive programme of tests covered every aspect of the aircraft; model 
tests for pitch, roll and yaw moments, tests on component parts, tests to ascertain 
interference effects, tests on the struts and wires and ‘special tests’, for example the 
study of flow round air intakes and the calibration of air speed indicators.373 The 
following table374 illustrates the reductions in drag achieved by these tests: 
   













in lb. at  
100ft per 
sec. 





f t .   
8.46 5.18 3.70 3.19 -  -  
Surface 
area sq. 
f t .   
197 136 98.6 88 -  -  
Resistance 
per. sq. f t .  
of cross 
sectional 
area in lb 
1.1 1.27 1.35 1.39 0.9 0.94 
Resistance 
per sq. f t .  
of surface 
area 
.047 .0485 .0505 .0504 .034 .058 
 
Mitchell notes in his paper that:  
…while the actual drag in each case is considerably reduced, it is only by reduction of the 
frontal area that this is achieved. The drag coefficient, expressed in terms of the frontal area, is 
greater on the S. 5 than on the S. 4 both for wings and floats. The coefficients in terms of 
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surface area are more nearly equal, suggesting that further decreases of frontal area will only 
pay if the surface area is also reduced.375 
The work carried out with the NPL paid great dividends in terms of increasing the 
understanding of aerodynamics as applied to Mitchell’s racing aircraft. Some of the 
discoveries provided startling results, as in the case of the alignment of struts. It was 
found that a variation in strut angle of five degrees (yaw) increased the drag around 
the strut by approximately 25%. Furthermore, it was originally planned to use wires 
of a particular streamline section in place of the more usual lenticular form. Tests of 
the proposed streamlined section showed it to have more drag that the lenticular form 
by approximately 50% at 70 ft. per second.376 Also, “among the improvements which 
the wind tunnel study confirmed was the advantage gained by using a wing radiator 
with a flat, instead of corrugated external surface”. The following table377 gives 

























surface at 90 
m.p.h. 
100 58 66 50 
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Mitchell ends his paper by speculating on the future of racing aircraft in particular and 
aircraft in general: 
Racing aircraft have now reached a stage when improvement is only possible by giving 
detailed attention to the fundamental problems involved…While these efforts [for the S. 5] 
resulted in a success which was gratifying, their real value lies in the experience gained, 
which is applicable not only to further racing aircraft, but no less to slower and less 
spectacular machines… 
…Having reached a certain stage in development it is always interesting and 
sometimes helpful to indulge in a few surmises as to how further speed is to be attained. 
During the last six years an average increase of 30 m.p.h. per year has been accomplished…. 
The question as to how long this progress will be maintained is a very open one. Our 
machines are gradually becoming nearer to pure streamline form, and the nearer they become 
the harder it will be to obtain increases in speed. Surface skin friction already accounts for 
between 60 and 70 per cent. of the resistance of our machines, so that the room for 
improvement in pure streamlining is not of a very large order. As reduction in resistance is 
easily the most fruitful source of improvement in speed, it is probable that a gradual falling off 
in these yearly increases will be experienced.378 
The importance of developing aero-engines is something which Mitchell touched 
upon in another paper: 
Very extensive progress has been made in engine design. During the past few years the 
weight-per-horsepower of our racing engines has been reduced by 50%, and the frontal area 
per horsepower has been halved. A large proportion of this progress has been passed on to 
standard engines used in service and civil aircraft. 
It is quite safe to say that the engine used in this year’s winning S. 6 machine in the 
Schneider Trophy Contest would have taken at least three times as long to produce under 
normal processes of development had it not been for the spur of international competition. 
                                                
378 Ibid., p. 301 & 306 (My italics) 
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There is little doubt that this intensive engine development will have a very pronounced effect 
on our aircraft during the next few years.379 
Indeed, the influence of racing engine technology was at times profound, and led to 
many breakthroughs in the improvement of engines for general use. The Curtiss D. 12 
wet-sleeve monobloc, mentioned above, was both directly appropriated for use in a 
Service machine by Richard Fairey, under license, and represented a shift in the 
design of aero-engines. It’s small size, frontal area and lightness made it ideal for a 
racing engine, the fuselage being more easily streamlined behind it.380 While the 
racing version of the engine was tweaked in such a way as to increase its horsepower 
and radically shorten its life, the commercial version provides an ideal example of 
how such engines with such racing pedigree could be adopted successfully into more 
standard aircraft.  
A D. 12 license was purchased by Richard Fairey in 1924 intended for use with his 
Fox high-speed bomber which was, incidentally, faster than any RAF fighter of the 
time.381 Fifty such examples were imported from the United States with the intention 
that Fairey would build further engines under the license but the Air Ministry did not 
want another engine manufacturer in the industry. The squadron of Foxes ordered for 
the RAF were re-engined with Rolls-Royce Kestrel’s.382 
 The Schneider Trophy was a hugely significant aspect of inter-war aviation. It 
provided the perfect showcase for demonstrating the potential benefits of the metal 
monoplane in 1925. Although it was difficult to immediately bring the effects of such 
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high-level research and development to bear on military aircraft the process of R&D 
for the Schneider Trophy had profound effects on both the industry and the Air 
Ministry well into the 1930s. The relationships that arose from working on Schneider 
aircraft, most notably between Supermarine and Rolls-Royce, would prove to be an 
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AIR STAFF PLANNING AND TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT IN PEACETIME (II) 
 
The years 1929-1936 represented a major shift in Air Ministry policy towards both 
aircraft design and procurement. By 1936, the Air Ministry would have moved 
entirely away from the conventional biplane of the 1920s for almost all of its 
operational roles. Designers, too, would have embraced the low-wing monoplane as 
the new design paradigm. But before moving on to one of the most fundamental shifts 
in aircraft design it is necessary to examine the changing nature of the Air Ministry, 
the shifting focus of research and the way in which aircraft for the Royal Air Force 
were procured. All of these themes will be picked up in the second section of this 
chapter and used to describe the evolution of fighter aircraft between 1929 and 1936.  
 In 1931 the Aircraft Supply Committee (ASC) reported that:  
The present year finds the Royal Air Force with four years’ experience of war on an intensive 
scale and the accumulated experience of 12 years’ development in peace. It has passed 
through the difficult period of changing policies, wartime types of aircraft and an 
impoverished aircraft industry and has approached a more ordered though not less active 
phase of its development…At the outset it can be accepted frankly that the design, 
manufacture and inspection of British aircraft for Service and commercial use have attained a 
world-wide reputation for excellence; and the result of the efforts made to that end are now 
being reaped in the form of foreign orders to the aircraft industry and in the supply to the 
Service of aircraft embodying all those qualities which only exhaustive research, experiment 
and development can secure.384 
Exports of British aircraft and orders to the industry increased steadily throughout the 
1920s385 but the real value to the industry lay in the sale of licenses for foreign 
companies to build replicas. The Aircraft Supply Committee report continued by 
pointing out: 
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…that the standard of excellence attained in the field of design, manufacture and supply can 
only be secured to the future by the periodic overhaul of the existing organisation, the 
abandonment of  its obsolete parts and the investigation of new methods… Steady and 
continuous progress can only be assured by the adoption of means justified equally by past 
experience and future expectation.386 
In the previous chapter we saw how the Air Ministry searched throughout the 1925-
1929 period for a systematic programme of development and procurement for the 
Royal Air Force. It was shown that many of the problems experienced in the design 
and production of military aircraft were caused by (or at least blamed upon) the 
‘changes the designer is called upon to make in the course of construction’.387  
Following Air Commodore Charlton’s survey of the aircraft industry in 1926, 
the Air Staff defined three periods in the life of an aircraft: experimental, 
development, and production. They decided that following Charlton’s report that 
modifications should not be made while an aircraft is in the production stage.388 
The ‘development year’ was proposed as a way of evaluating an aircraft 
through operation by a Service squadron which was supposed to offer a deeper 
analysis of the aircraft than the standard RAE tests at Martlesham: 
…during the first year of its existence, a new type will be employed in one squadron only. 
The object of this “development” year is that the machine can be thoroughly tested out so that 
any defects can be discovered, necessary modifications prepared, and alterations to the 
drawings made before production orders are places. It also affords an opportunity of not 
proceeding with a type should it turn out unsatisfactory.389 
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 It appears, however, that these changes were not adhered to, as related by Wing 
Commander Welsh (Flying Operations 1, the officer responsible for operational 
requirements): 
This procedure has not been rigidly adhered to owing to the urgent necessity, during the last 
few years, of replacing types of war time design and certain other that have proved 
unsatisfactory…my conception of the procedure is that it was not intended that modifications 
should actually be embodied in the machines during the development year (except of course 
those affecting the safety of flying) but that they should be considered altogether at the end of 
that time…In practice, however, this has not proved to be the case, and opportunity appears to 
have been taken of the development period to embody in the machines any modification, large 
or small, which is thought at the time to be necessary.390 
Welsh points out that given the widespread nature of the faults requiring correction 
over a number of aircraft (he cites the Bristol Bulldog as being recalled to the 
manufacturer three times with thirty-five modifications, and the Boulton-Paul 
Sidestrand requiring twenty-five modifications as examples) this indicated a lack of 
“attention to detail or faulty design on the part of the constructors”.391  
  Welsh had noted a couple of months earlier, however, that it was also difficult 
to apply this policy of non-interference given the “unstable state of aircraft design, 
and particularly to the change-over from wooden to metal construction and the early 
days of metal construction”.392 
It would be a mistake to assume that Air Ministry specifications, the way they 
were formulated and the factors conditioning operational requirements remained the 
same throughout the inter-war period. During the First World War aircraft designed 
and manufactured for the Admiralty and the War Office experienced two entirely 
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different systems of development. The Admiralty’s method was to depend largely 
upon the private enterprise of aircraft manufacturers, add something to the 
requirements of existing aircraft and try again.393 The Admiralty’s ‘specification’ for 
want of a better term, was minimal.  
For example, a specification to Short Brothers Plc. in 1914 specified buoyancy of the 
floats, a metal-covered propeller, fuel for five hours, wireless telegraphy and flying 
stresses. Everything else was to be left to the designer. Furthermore, it appears from 
Richard Fairey’s account that the Admiralty system was far more collaborative, with 
the development of an aircraft depending upon the personal liaisons between the 
heads of the Air Department and the firms.394 
This policy on the part of the Admiralty certainly gave great stimulus to the industry and, 
thanks to their support of private enterprise, there were available effective designs of 
machines at the outbreak of war. The three or four firms who formed the nucleus of the 
industry and played so great a part in the war productions owed their existence very…largely 
to the Air Department of the Admiralty.395 
By contrast the War Office ‘took exactly the opposite line’396 and concentrated on the 
design of aircraft entirely on its own at the Royal Aircraft Factory at Farnborough. All 
design work for the Army was to be carried out there and machines would be built 
from official drawings by industry.397 This system failed due to its inflexibility, and 
inability to cope with the rapid changes that often needed to be made to aircraft and 
the War Office system could not cope.398 The point Fairey made in his paper to the 
Royal United Services Institution was that during the First World War nothing “could 
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be allowed to stand in the way of the application of new ideas which would give a 
quick return in performance”. There was urgency, a need for flexibility and there was 
no time “for laboriously prepared specifications”.399 
 Following the First World War the newly formed Air Ministry and RAF were 
left with yet another set of unknowns to deal with. Before the War there was very 
little in the way of an organised aircraft manufacturing industry or of a government 
knowledgeable enough to use it. The War had rapidly changed that landscape and a 
system, or systems, of design, development and manufacture had emerged through the 
changing nature of aerial warfare and an ever-increasing appreciation of the role of 
aircraft in warfare. Once the First World War ended a new role had to be found for 
the RAF and new systems of aircraft procurement had to be developed. Malcolm 
Smith has noted that “the two world wars lend the years in between a false historical 
perspective…British defence had its own peacetime problems very different from 
those faced or likely to be faced in a European war”.400  
For much of the 1920s the government “committed itself to parity with the 
largest air force within striking distance of the United Kingdom”.401 The whole 
system of defence procurement was in the grip of the ‘ten year rule’, and procurement 
for the RAF was in the grip Lord Trenchard’s arbitrary ratio of two bombers for every 
fighter whilst the development of fighter aircraft took a back seat to the offensive 
‘morale’ bombing doctrine.402 
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Richard Fairey considered that the period after the War saw a greater degree of 
inflexibility in aircraft design due to research and development policy now aiming at 
“greater reliability and range of usefulness of existing types” and that because of this 
“the official organization became, I think, less flexible, to the discouragement of new 
ideas”.403 Fairey believed that during the early years following the War the technical 
experience gained from it was concentrated “into somewhat rigid ideas about every 
item of equipment and construction, there was little or no allowance for improvement 
which might be possible by changes from accepted practice”.404 Furthermore, it was 
now possible to spend time preparing “elaborate” specifications with prescribed 
requirements affecting: 
…not only equipment but structure, engine installation, cooling systems, in fact nearly every 
detail of the machine. In the fixing of detail within such narrow limits the cumulative effect on 
a complete design was lost sight of. There was in fact little left for the designer to do but to 
arrange the lift and control surfaces.405 
The specifications did relax around 1925 and by 1930 Fairey considered that “we now 
see a new type of specification which has produced some highly successful machines 




SPECIFICATION F.7/30 AND THE SEARCH FOR A LOW WING 
MONOPLANE 
 
This section will examine perhaps the most significant turning point in the 
development of Royal Air Force fighter aircraft of the inter-war period. We have seen 
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that to some extent the development of military aircraft technology had stagnated 
during the 1920s. This is largely to do with the vast post-war surplus after 1918 and 
the Air Staff’s adherence to the ‘ten-year rule’. These factors had a remarkable knock-
on effect in that there was very little urgency or need for radical changes to aircraft 
designed for the Air Force. For the Air Ministry there was a ‘perceived need to keep a 
national aircraft design and manufacturing capability in being’407 and that simply 
meant providing the industry (or rather, the chosen few within the industry) with 
enough work to keep them in business.  
Central to this chapter is the development of fighter aircraft during the 1930s 
and of the specifications issued to the aircraft industry. There is a great deal of 
confusion in the literature, firstly about the details of specifications and their origins 
and also about the evolution of the first-line RAF fighters that would be used in the 
Second World War. This confusion is mostly down to a failure to understand the two 
distinct lines of RAF fighter development begun in the late 1920s. These distinct 
operational roles would continue into the 1930s and their influence was to be felt in 
every specification and in every design tendered to the Air Staff for evaluation.  
 The concept of the Aircraft Fighting Zone was begun in 1923 and the idea was 
to have fourteen of the seventeen fighter squadrons then in existence assigned to a 
particular defensive sector and: 
…disposed in such positions as to enable them to meet enemy aircraft in a prepared zone 
drawn round and parallel to the coast at a distance of approximately 30 miles…This zone is 
termed the Aircraft Fighting Zone.408 
Aircraft used in the Fighting Zone were referred to as ‘Zone Fighters’ and because 
such aircraft were to be able to operate in day and night conditions, this necessarily 
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meant a sacrifice in landing speed due to the difficulty of landing at night and a 
correspondingly lower top speed. Their main requirement was to be able to climb 
quickly to meet their patrol height. The ‘interception’ fighter on the other hand, 
operated only during the day and was to be used to catch up with and harass the faster 
enemy day bombers on their way to attack their targets and also on their way out. The 
primary requirement for this aircraft was speed. They needed to be fast to cover 
distances in a pursuit climb, and so performance and volume of fire was to be high at 
the cost of endurance and radio.409 
 In the formulation of specifications issued to firms the core elements of 
landing speed, top speed, rate of climb, manoeuvrability and volume of fire were 
shaped initially by the type of fighter it was to be. Thereafter a good deal of haggling 
would take place at the Air Ministry to finally get to a set of agreeable figures and 
requirements.  
Throughout the 1920s Trenchard’s grip on the Service and his generally conservative 
nature when it came to new technology left the industry with little motivation to go 
beyond what was asked for in the specifications. Indeed, when such instances of a 
designer doing so occurred, most notably with Richard Fairey and the Fairey Fox 
bomber, Trenchard’s conservatism, his unwillingness to compromise and particularly 
his prejudice toward technologies he had not asked for, became apparent and such 
aircraft were rejected.  
The Fairey Fox stands as an example of a highly successful technology that 
never reached its full potential in terms of Service use through beauracratic prejudice. 
The order placed by Trenchard for a squadron of Foxes (using the new wet sleeve 
engine) was designed to spur on Napier and Rolls-Royce and the development of their 
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engine programmes. The Foxes that were ordered eventually had their engine’s 
changed from the American D. 12-type to the Rolls-Royce Kestrel. Specification 
12/26 was issued to firms looking for a replacement for the Fox, Richard Fairey was 
not given a copy of the specification until he protested to the Air Ministry.  The 
Hawker Hart was chosen and the Fox designed for the new specification was ordered 
by foreign governments. Air Ministry prejudices against the Fox stemmed from the 
fact that firstly, it was not designed to an official specification, its fuel tanks were 
housed in the wings but most damningly it had an American engine. On consideration 
of the Fairey Firefly one Air Ministry official noted that he was “anxious to avoid a 
repetition of the Fairey Fox agitation”.410 
In his book The Broken Wing, David Divine gives a damning indictment of the 
Air Ministry up to 1930. Using the example of the Fox (discussed above) he 
condemns the Ministry thus: 
Its requirement procedures – the basic means of maintaining the qualitative standing of the 
RAF – are revealed as dramatically behind existing potential. Its committee system is exposed 
as obstructive and authoritarian. Its morality in relation to the aircraft industry is revealed as 
dubious. And its capacity for petty bureaucratic revenge is demonstrated as 
infinite…[Trenchard] left the Force for which he had fought so valiantly ill equipped not only 
in numbers…but in the quality of the machines for which it existed. He left the Air Ministry 
incompetent to obtain that quality. 
The Air Force that Sir John Salmond inherited [from Trenchard as Chief of the Air 
Staff] was cocooned in the era of the fixed undercarriage fabric-covered biplane. The Air 
Forces of other nations were already emerging from it.411 
Divine’s point is well taken, although largely overstated. The Fighter squadrons of the 
Air Force were equipped entirely with fabric-covered biplanes, and aircraft designed 
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for the Service only gained incremental improvements from type to type. Yet, the idea 
of ‘quality’ is a relative one and in discussing military aircraft the only real standard 
worth anything is that of the quality of aircraft in potential enemy air forces. 
Certainly, in 1930 there was little danger that British aircraft were of inferior quality 
relative to France or Germany. Furthermore, the RAF, industry and the Air Staff were 
only just emerging from the lean years of 1918-1924 and indeed from the ‘ten year 
rule’. While there exists some exceptions to this rule, it should be remembered that 
from the time of initial discussion over operational requirements it would take 
between 5 ½ and 6 ½ years for the first machine to be delivered to the RAF.412 It must 
be understood that the foundations upon which the industry operated throughout the 
1920s were based largely upon these circumstances.  
By 1929, however, things were changing rapidly. Trenchard had left the RAF 
and the Air Ministry, and new officers were coming in with new ideas about how air 
wars should be fought and about the technologies needed to fight such wars. Nowhere 
is this more readily apparent than in Air Ministry specification F.7/30. Wing 
Commander A. C. Maund argued in 1931: 
Past experience shows that, unless special action is taken, we shall inevitably be left to choose 
between certain tractor biplanes. This is because postwar progress has become concentrated 
on ‘cleaning up’ the stereotyped form of aircraft, and firms have accumulated a great deal of 
knowledge of this type. They can forecast closely what they can do, and there is a minimum 
of unknowns to be faced. They regard tractor biplanes as ‘bread and butter entries’; novel 
types as ‘highly speculative’. The inherent shortcomings of the normal tractor biplane are 
becoming increasingly evident, particularly with fighters, and so real progress in the future 
will depend more and more on novel types; but there can be no chance of developing these 
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unless experience is gained in adapting novel ideas to Service specifications, even if the 
Service cannot adopt first practical efforts in new directions.413 
F.7/30 was formulated in an effort to produce a replacement ‘zone fighter’ for the, by 
then ageing, Bristol Bulldog (Fig. 1). Discussions began in 1929 with a view to 
issuing a specification by 1930-1931 and in the beginning the most important 
consideration was to improve the fighting view. The conversations taking place at the 
Air Ministry were no longer as conservative as they had been. For example, Flying 
Operations Officer (F.O.1) Welsh suggested that they “do not waste money building 
experimental machines on orthodox lines. We can always ask for replacements for 
existing types, taking into consideration the gradual development”.414 Furthermore, 
“we want a fighter with a pusher view”.415 A ‘pusher view’ is a view from the cockpit 
unobstructed by the upper wing of a tractor biplane.416 Indeed, Welsh wanted to go 
further and for the purposes of experimentation and observation he recommended the 
AMSR purchase: 
…one of the twin-engine Junkers K. 37 low wing monoplane day bombers, the particular 
advantages being the magnificent defensive arcs of firing to all guns and good view for 
defence. The Technical Branch are inclined to condemn the machine (not having flown it) on 
account of its landing speed.417 
As we will see, the issue of landing speed was to have significant consequences for 
the F.7/30 specification. But in terms of improving the fighting view of RAF aircraft, 
Wing Commander A. C. Maund, taking over as F. O. 1 from Welsh in September 
1930 echoed his predecessor’s belief that: 
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What we do want…is a much improved view in aircraft generally, but especially fighters. 
Frankly, it has always been a surprise to me that we have been satisfied even for day flying, 
much less for night work, with having large engines the size of cartwheels right in our faces 
and obstructing the most important view, namely, forwards and downwards. Last summer I 
tried the “Puss Moth” in which this shortcoming has been eliminated entirely. The view is 
better than with a twin-engined machine; in fact, it is as good as can be attained by pusher 
aircraft in essential directions. I am satisfied that the view from a “Puss Moth” would double 
the efficiency of any existing tractor biplane. The “Puss Moth” view makes flying entirely 
different and much less trying and fatiguing a business. In fact, I went up and found my way 
without discomfort or difficulty during the worst period of the Ascot Wednesday downpour.418 
 
Figure 13 - deHavilland Puss Moth (1929) 
Maund offered several suggestions for improving the view from fighter aircraft, in 
particular the use of twin engined fighters (necessarily placing the engines under the 
wings or at any rate out of the immediate view of the pilot), the ordinary tractor 
monoplane with an inverted engine (of which the Puss Moth is an example), the 
single engined pusher and “the tailless aeroplane. Actually the latter would meet 
operational requirements more satisfactorily than any of the others if only its 
development were pressed forward more vigorously”.419 
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What we also can see within Maund’s proposals is a far more practical approach to 
improving the fighter aircraft in a general sense and this approach is something that 
had been lacking before this point. Attempts to improve aircraft design had always 
been important to designers, but Maund was able in 1930 to highlight several key 
areas where improvement had been sorely lacking. It is very interesting to note that 
many of his proposals at first glance perhaps seem inconsequential. However, closer 
examination shows a careful thought process designed to maximise the effect of his 
suggested changes not only on the overall design of the aircraft but on improved 
functioning of the pilot and machine as a unit. For instance, he raises the issue of the 
armament carried on fighter aircraft at that time: 
Take for instance guns. We still use adapted land guns which were in use in aircraft during the 
[First World] War. The fire power of our aircraft is in no way increased. The guns are so 
primitive that they can only use specially selected ammunition and will only work by the 
negation of production requirements by individually made and hand fitted parts. They are so 
unreliable that they have to be fitted within reach of the pilot so that they can be repaired 
although aircraft carry less than a minute’s supply of ammunition! Consequently their 
efficiency has to be limited still further by heavy, complicated and none too reliable and 
foolproof C.C. gear [interrupter gear]. What we want is a new gun, possibly of reduced 
weight, but sufficiently reliable for two minute’s assured use without failure; so that it does 
not need to be to the hand of the pilot. It can then be outside the slipstream of the airscrew and 
C.C. gear could be eliminated. It would then be possible to use more than two in a fighter…420 
This view of the armament carried by RAF fighters was echoed by Richard Fairey in 
his lecture to the RUSI in 1931: “It is a matter of the gravest astonishment to all 
aircraft designers that in this year 1931 a better machine-gun should not be 
forthcoming”.421 
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Maund also points out that the external windmills used to charge the dynamos that 
powered the navigation lamps, identification lamps and so on were a ‘most inefficient 
form of drive…they were a justifiable improvisation in war, but are a proof of 
engineering ineptitude [when] perpetuated in peace’.422 He highlights more examples 
with regard to mechanical starting of engines, flight clothing and so on and suggested 
that the Air Ministry should ‘concentrate all new funds and efforts for at least one 
year entirely on these very serious shortcomings’.423 Maund also wanted to see ‘all-
enclosed aircraft’ though he conceded that “to design enclosed cockpits with the 
required view is not easy”.424 
 Initially, then, by 1930 it had been broadly agreed that the forthcoming 
specification should place improved fighting view at the forefront and one option for 
this involved the use of a monoplane design: ‘we would try to improve the view for 
fighting by definitely specifying a low winged monoplane’.425 But there was much 
debate about the performance characteristics that the aircraft should have. The 
literature discussing F.7/30 reveals a startling number of inaccuracies which should be 
corrected here. The most common is that the specified speed was 250 mph, that 
monoplanes were not sought (indeed, that there was resistance to monoplanes), and 
that the Rolls-Royce Goshawk engine was specified.426 
When the specification was issued in October 1931 it asked for a speed of not less 
than 195 mph and at no time during the debate that follows was a speed of more than 
                                                
422 NA AIR 20/68 - F. O. 1 to DCAS, ‘New Aircraft Programme, 1931-1932, 6th 
October 1930, ‘Twin Engined Night Fighter’, p. 7 
423 Ibid., p. 9 
424 Ibid., p. 11 
425 NA AIR 2/2815 – DCAS to CAS, 31st May 1930. 
426 An incorrect speed of 250 mph is given in Jackson, Blackburn Aircraft since 1909: 
p. 309. James, Glostor Aircraft since 1917: p. 171. A. Brew, Boulton & Paul Aircraft 
since 1915 (London: Putnam, 1993). p. 321. F. K. Mason, The British Fighter since 
1912  (London: Putnam, 1992). p. 240. Meekcoms and Morgan, The British Aircraft 
Specifications File, 1920-1949. Scott, Vickers: p. 202. 
 178 
215 mph considered. Furthermore, any approved British engine was permitted. As 
stated by Colin Sinnott “It was the Air Staff’s intention to encourage the development 
of a new configuration for single-seat fighters, and in this they succeeded”.427 The 
problem regarding performance characteristics, specifically “the question of an 
acceptable compromise between maximum speed and landing speed was to delay the 
issue of the specification for many months”.428 This issue was problematic for many 
reasons. Primarily it was about gaining a worthwhile improvement in performance 
over the aircraft the specification was designed to replace, but it also involved a great 
deal of input from many within the Air Ministry.  
 The Bristol Bulldog had a top speed of around 176 mph429 and initially it was 
thought that requesting a speed of ‘not less than 195 mph’ would be a sufficient 
improvement over the Bulldog. However, the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff (DCAS) 
believed that this did not represent a sufficient increase and called for a speed of 215 
mph.430 It was found that with the prescribed landing speed of 55 mph that nothing 
higher than 180 mph could be achieved as a top speed. Therefore the landing speed 
had to be raised and the DCAS suggested 62 mph, with revised performance estimates 
projecting a maximum speed of 190 mph.431 Again, this was unacceptable to the 
DCAS who set a 200 mph top speed as the minimum to make the project worthwhile. 
Again, disagreement over the proposed landing speed delayed the specification with 
Maund reporting that: 
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[Director of Technical Development] proposed landing speeds which have gone up from 55 to 
62 miles per hour. Air Staff have not agreed to more than 60 miles per hour. I suggest that, if 
we have erred at all, we have erred in te direction of being generous to D.T.D and that we 
should not allow 60 miles an hour to be exceeded.432 
Around this time the newly appointed Air Member for Supply and Research (AMSR) 
Hugh Dowding entered the picture and stated that “I should like to go a little slow in 
the issue of the specification for a new Bulldog replacement if there is no strong 
objection”.433 For Maund this was welcome news. His belief was that in the meantime 
the £10,000 allotted for the Bulldog replacement work should be spent: 
…in attaining technical progress which will make it possible…to build a machine to meet our 
requirements later. For instance, a large percentage of the disparity between what he [Director 
of Technical Development Holt] says is the maximum he can do and what we say is the 
minimum we can accept, could be bridged if the equipment carried were better.434 
For the Director of Technical Development (DTD), on the other hand, this news was 
not welcome at all. He believed that the £10,000 would disappear from his budget if it 
wasn’t spent, and further, that the resultant lack of design work would cause problems 
for certain firms.435 Sinnott makes the point that such considerations on the part of the 
technical development staff show how factors such as “financial stringency, and the 
RAF’s perceived need to keep a national aircraft design and manufacturing capability 
in being, could influence views on acceptable performance characteristics”.436  
 Ultimately, it was agreed that a maximum speed of 200 mph and a landing 
speed of 60 mph should be sought, but that AMSR would not guarantee that the 
maximum could be achieved. The position regarding the Bulldog replacement 
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programme was summarised by the DCAS for the CAS in November 1930, it having 
been a year since discussion regarding the Bulldog replacement began. He 
recommended to the CAS that unless the minimum requirements could be guaranteed 
the replacement project should be, as recommended by Maund, delayed until research 
directed towards meeting these requirements could be conducted.437 Dowding 
concurred and the CAS delayed the project for six months directing that action should 
be taken on the research issues raised by Maund, Newall and Dowding.  
The researches demanded by the CAS were broadly those pointed out by Maund 
above, namely to improve the equipment carried by Service aircraft by aiming to 
reduce the weight and drag of items like the windmills used to drive the electric 
generators.438 In May 1931 the six month postponement of F.7/30 ended and it is 
interesting to note that the CAS had shifted the priorities in terms of what was most 
desired for this specification. A good rate of climb was the first priority, a top speed 
of 200 mph was second, a good fighting view such as given by a low-wing 
monoplane or pusher third, and manoeuvrability was last on the list.439 It is worth 
pointing out that the relegation of a good ‘fighting view’ in the order of priorities for 
F.7/30 does not actually reflect a change in Air Ministry thinking regarding these 
priorities but rather an “assumption that a low-wing monoplane would be 
specified”.440 
The specification, finally issued on the 1st October 1931, reflected these 
desires and the opening section should for once and for all dispel the myth that the Air 
Ministry was then opposed to low-wing monoplanes: 
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General Requirements 
(a) The aircraft is to fulfil the duties of ‘Single Seat Fighter’ for day and night flying [a zone 
fighter]. A satisfactory fighting view is essential and designers should consider the 
advantages offered in this respect by low wing monoplane or pusher. 
The main requirements for the aircraft are: 
(i) Highest possible rate of climb 
(ii) Highest possible speed at 15,000 ft 
(iii) Fighting view 
(iv) Manoeuvrability.441 
Describing each of the prototypes submitted for testing would take too much space 
but it is important to look at some of the designs to appreciate the steps that some 
manufacturers were taking to move away from the fabric covered biplane. Eight firms 
tendered twelve proposals to meet the specification with six of them biplanes and six 
monoplanes. Four of these remained on paper and a prototype for these designs was 
never built. Perhaps the most advanced tender from a design point of view was the 
Bristol Type 133 which embodied many progressive design elements such as a 
retractable undercarriage, cantilever wings, a stressed metal skin and an enclosed 
cockpit. It used the 640 h.p. Bristol Mercury VIS. 2 air-cooled radial engine. 
 
Figure 14 - Bristol Type 133 (1934) 
                                                
441 Price, The Spitfire Story: p. 27. 
 182 
Unfortunately, despite highly promising test flights yielding a speed of roughly 260 
mph at 15,000 ft, and a rate-of-climb of 2,200 ft./min.,442 on 8th March 1935 the 
aircraft entered a flat spin from which the pilot could not recover and the prototype 
was lost.443 Nevertheless, the Type 133 stands as the best example of what the Air 
Ministry wanted from F.7/30. Modern, unorthodox and representing an attempt to 
push the boundaries of conventional design.  
 Bristol built one further entry, the Type 123, which was a biplane using the 
evaporative cooling Goshawk, and as with most aircraft that used this engine trouble 
was caused by the cooling system. Furthermore, test flights uncovered significant 
lateral instability and without a solution forthcoming it was decided to discontinue the 
Type 123. Performance tests revealed a top speed of 235 mph.444 
 
Figure 15 - Bristol Type 123 (1934) 
It will be remembered that Westlands were heavily engaged in the development of a 
tailless aircraft for the Service. As noted above, F.O. 1 Maund favoured this type over 
the monoplane, but getting it working as a practical proposition was proving difficult. 
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Accordingly, Maund’s fear that firms might cling to the biplane types as ‘bread and 
butter entries’ was justified in this case. The Westland P.V. 4 was originally 
conceived as a monoplane, but in order to meet the wing loading requirement and to 
meet the low landing speed stated in the specification the prototype was converted to 
a staggered biplane.445  
 Many of its design features reflected the specification, such as the enclosed 
cockpit with a pusher view, the pilot being seated forward of the upper wing. In a 
further effort to improve the fighting view the engine was mounted inside the fuselage 
around the centre of gravity, improving balance and manoeuvrability as well as 
allowing for a much cleaner nose.446 It used the Goshawk and was one of very few 
aircraft to have minimal problems with it.  However, the change from monoplane to 
biplane reduced the top speed significantly to around 147 mph at 13,000 ft. Amost 
100 mph slower than the eventually winner of the F.7/30 contract. 
 
 Figure 16 - Westland P.V. IV (1934) 
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Another monoplane entry was the Supermarine Type 224. It has been suggested that 
“Both Vickers and Supermarine, with their F.7/30 tenders, broke away from the 
biplane in spite of the diehard official preference for it”.447 Once again we see the sort 
of mistake that has pervaded much of the aviation literature of this period and 
particularly with respect to fighter aircraft designed for the Royal Air Force. It was R 
J. Mitchell’s experiences in the Schneider Trophy which had convinced him that for 
fighter aircraft, where speed was at a premium, the biplane had had its day. Despite 
this belief, however, the Type 224 showed that while developing monoplane racers 
was one thing, adapting these principles to an RAF single-seat zone fighter was quite 
another.  
 The Type 224 was an all-metal, low wing cantilever monoplane, with a fixed, 
trousered undercarriage and open cockpit. It made use of the troublesome Goshawk 
engine and indeed, a great many of its problems stemmed from the use of this engine. 
The belief was that the liquid cooled Goshawk would offer a significant increase in 
performance over air-cooled engines used in other tenders for F.7/30.448 The problem 
with its use in the Type 224 was the complicated way the pumping system had been 
installed into the aircraft. The Goshawk was cooled by pumping water “under 
pressure into the water jacket and was thereby prevented from boiling; the coolant 
was then released as steam into the radiator system where it condensed before being 
returned to the engine”.449  
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Figure 17 - Supermarine Type 224 (1934) 
As Bill Gunston relates, the biggest problem with the Goshawk was “the impossibility 
of pumping condensate at near boiling point back from a condenser lower than the 
header tank, as it inevitably had to be in low-wing monoplanes”.450 So we can see 
from this example how the Goshawk was more effective in biplanes than monoplanes. 
Ernie Mansbridge who worked with Mitchell on the design of the fighter said that:  
We were a bit over-cautious with the wing and made it thicker than it need have been. We 
were still very concerned about possible [wing] flutter, having encountered that with the S. 4 
seaplane. With the S. 5 and S. 6 we had braced the wings, which made things easier. But the 
Type 224 was to be an unbraced monoplane, and there were not many of those about at the 
time.451 
Furthermore, the overall performance of the machine was relatively poor. The 
problems with the engine had consequences over and above simply overheating, 
although such problems were a direct result of this. For instance, “even if there was 
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no steam blockage at the pump the Type 224’s Goshawk was liable to overheat during 
rapid climb to altitude”.452 Again Ernie Mansbridge said that: 
We always knew when he [test pilot Mutt Summers] got to 15,000 ft because a couple of 
bursts of steam would emerge form the wing tips. The climb was made at full power and 
relatively low airspeed, and when it reached that altitude the condenser was full and steam 
would start to trail back from the relief valves in the wing tips. Once that happened the pilot 
had to level off to give the engine time to cool down a little, before resuming the climb.453 
Unfortunately for Supermarine, the Type 224 did not offer any significant 
performance increase over its competitors which may have bought them some time to 
correct the flaws with the engine, or to find a suitable replacement engine. Its top 
speed was 238 mph, and it climbed to 15,000 ft in eight minutes.454 As we will see, 
the eventual winner of F. 7/30 offered a better performance in both of these critical 
categories. 
 The winner of F.7/30 was the Gloster Gladiator and ironically it was precisely 
the type of machine that Maund and the rest of the Air Ministry wanted to move away 
from. It was a biplane, it used the air-cooled Bristol radial engine rather than the more 
troublesome Goshawk, had a fixed undercarriage and in very few ways represented 
the change in design that was sought from the specification. It had a covered cockpit 
but as can be seen in Fig. 8 attempts to improve the ‘fighting view’ were decidedly 
lacking. That being said, apart from the Bristol Type 133 it had the best performance 
with a maximum speed of 242 mph and it could reach 15,000 ft in 6.5 minutes, 1.5 
less than the Supermarine Type 224. As the DCAS reported to the CAS in 1931: 
Unfortunately, the Zone Single-Seater Fighter is the one class in which, for operational 
reasons, we can least contemplate any sacrifice in attainable performance. Throughout the 
                                                




history of this class, there has never been produced a type which has given us adequate 
performance to meet the fastest contemporary Day Bombers.455 
 
Figure 18 - Gloster Gladiator (1934) 
The most important consideration of an improved fighting view when the Bulldog 
replacement was initially considered in 1929 was subsequently superseded by the 
need for performance. David Divine has argued that: 
In view of the records – and the subsequent accomplishments – of both these designers 
[Reginald Mitchell and Sydney Camm], it is apparent that the reason for the collapse was 
inherent in [the Air] Ministry’s requirement. By its failure to demand even the generally 
acknowledged potential of the design teams, by its failure to demand the customary 
advancement of potential that is the primary purpose of experimental aircraft, it failed utterly 
to provide the necessary sense of urgency and enthusiasm for successful endeavour. It 
epitomised once again the weakness of the administrative machine of the Air Ministry: its 
timidity in progress, the poverty of its imagination, the stultification of its bureaucracy.456 
The ‘collapse’ Divine is referring to is his judgement that the specification failed. 
This account of the ‘failure’ of F.7/30 to produce a fast, quality monoplane is highly 
misleading and entirely one sided. That the specification did not produce an Air 
Ministry contract for a metal monoplane, which is all that declinist authors such as 
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Divine really want, is not disputed. The records and accomplishments that Divine 
refers to are Mitchell’s successes and forward-thinking designs for the Schneider 
Trophy and Camm’s continued successes at Hawker Aviation. But to preface the 
above statement with facts and figures from the Schneider Trophy racers is too 
simplistic. It implies that these designers, Camm, Mitchell and so on should have 
been quite simply able to replicate similar speeds in designing aircraft for the Royal 
Air Force.  
 Richard Fairey actually presented an exercise to the RUSI in which he took 
the Supermarine S.6 and ‘evolved it backwards’ to show the quite serious technical 
limitations which would have to be applied in order to make it a functioning military 
fighter aircraft. The exercise shows that the S. 6 top speed would drop from over 350 
mph to 260 mph and reach 20,000 ft in 9 minutes.457  
 It is fair to state that the Ministry perhaps should have asked for more, but 
again we see the words ‘backwards’, ‘weakness’, and ‘timidity’ applied to the Air 
Ministry. It is simply not accurate. The specification called for a speed of ‘not less 
than 195 mph’, the idea of course being that firms would attempt the maximum speed 
allowed by the landing speed restriction of 60 mph. It strongly suggested the low-
wing monoplane as the form that tendered designs should take and the specification 
itself was delayed for six months while specific research was carried out to improve 
the streamlining of external apparatus required by the Air Ministry.  
 After the issue of F.7/30 the Air Staff continued to push aggressively for 
unorthodox fighter aircraft. The next section deals with the Air Ministry’s pursuit of 
such aircraft in more detail, but it is worth noting again how labels such as 
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‘backwards’ applied to the Air Staff are inaccurate. In a 1932 note to the DCAS, F.O. 
1 Maund noted that: 
…for years past our technical experts have been following purely orthodox lines without 
variation…At least we tell the designer frankly what we want, show him how we want to get 
away from stereotyped tactics, and we leave it to him to make the best suggestions he can. It 
seems to me to be a waste of time for us or anyone else to try and do the designers job for 
them…As a matter of fact, we have ideas in Air Staff of a better form of fighter. But designers 
with their greater technical experience should be able to produce as good if not better 
alternatives.458 
In addition to this statement from Maund, the DCAS also wished to factor in the 
expertise and operational experience in the formulation of fighter designs: 
I have agreed…to ask service personnel if they have any ideas which may lead to improving  
the general form of fighters as we now understand them. AMSR wishes to see if there are any 
ideas going in the Service which will produce an improved conception of fighters to comply 
more fully with operational requirements that is possible at present.459 
A 1932 memo considering the choice of aircraft structures decided that “the 
arguments…point to the use of a low-wing cantilever monoplane for the utmost 
performance”.460 The move towards the metal monoplane was very much in full 
swing by 1934, and despite the winning design of F.7/30 being a biplane, the 
specification itself sparked something of a revolution in British military aircraft 
design, leading to the Spitfire, Hurricane, Mosquito and a host of others.  
 The Gladiator was built in significant numbers (around 750) and saw Service 
with the RAF and other air forces until it was retired in 1957, perhaps the most 
famous being the defence of Malta in 1940.  
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The years leading up to the Second World War from around 1936 were amongst the 
most stable in terms of fighter aircraft design. However, the years immediately 
preceding this period of stability saw some of the most visible and radical changes. 
The Hurricane and the Spitfire made their first flights in November 1935 and March 
1936 respectively. The monoplane fighters which would feature so prominently in the 
Battle of Britain had arrived and were introduced to the Royal Air Force (RAF) in 
1937. This period marked the beginnings of rearmament for the RAF, with the 
expansion of industry production towards capacities not seen since the First World 
War and the creation of the so-called ‘shadow industry’ (the construction of extra 
production facilities to compliment the existing floor space and plant of aircraft and 
engine firms). The rearmament period is significant in that it locked in the low-wing 
metal monoplane fighter design and committed ever-increasing resources to 
furnishing the RAF with the best, most ‘modern’ aircraft that could be acquired. This 
chapter will examine some of the later aspects of the inter-war story. The 
development of the Spitfire and Hurricane will be examined. Their development is a 
crucial part of the biplane to monoplane story.  
Up to this point there had been a slow but steady development in aircraft design 
and technology. Such change was by turns incremental (the development of an 
existing paradigm) and revolutionary (the emergence of a new paradigm). The more 
revolutionary changes, such as the switch to all-metal construction were made 
possible by gradual innovation and growing support for a technology first pioneered 
some twelve years before the Air Ministry mandated metal construction for all future 
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types in 1925. The wood/metal shift was significant, the reasons were largely 
practical and based on what seemed at the time to be sound premises. More gradual 
changes included the refining of aircraft aerodynamics and the strength of materials 
and structure.  
Competitions like the Schneider Trophy (and others like the Gordon Bennett Cup) 
were able to demonstrate the potential advantages of monoplane designs for Service 
aircraft, in some instances almost a decade before the changes were to take place. The 
change to the monoplane itself was again driven by the Air Ministry, but sought much 
earlier than has been noted by most historians. The search for a low-wing monoplane 
fighter was one of the most significant steps during the inter-war years. While initially 
unsuccessful, specification F. 7/30 (issued in 1931) laid down a very clear instruction 
that low-wing monoplanes were preferable, but it would be a further six years before 
monoplane fighter aircraft entered service with the RAF.  
 
BIPLANE OR MONOPLANE? 
At this point it will be useful to quickly review and state clearly some points about 
both the biplane and monoplane and some of the factors involved in the change from 
the former to the latter. The Schneider Trophy had, in the words of the then Air 
Member for Supply and Research (AMSR) Hugh Dowding, ‘proved’ the superiority 
of the monoplane for pure performance. Dowding was talking largely about speed. 
The biplane (and indeed the triplane and quadruplane) were far more manoeuvrable at 
the lower speeds which were achieved given the enormous number of drag inducing 
components made necessary by their design.461 As engine power increased and 
structure weight was reduced monoplanes became the more efficient design choice. 
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The Schneider Trophy ‘proved’ this to be true, to designers like Mitchell and Camm 
as well as the Air Staff, some ten years before the first monoplanes were to enter 
service with the RAF. However, Air Marshall Sir Ralph Sorley considered that: 
[The] low wing loading [of the biplane] had for years been regarded as the first essential for 
manoeuvre in attack. The monoplane was suspect on the grounds of strength during aerobatics 
and rigidity as a gun platform. Most fighter opinion favoured the biplane. But now the 
monoplane bomber began to show such an advantage in performance when fitted with 
retractable undercarriage, flaps, and, later, the variable-pitch propeller, that only another 
monoplane would be comparable. It seemed inevitable that, whatever the aerobatic advantages 
of the biplane, it would no longer catch the bomber, and so a monoplane it must be.462 
In a talk given in 1924 on ‘The Development of High Speed Aircraft’, Major R. H.  
Mayo463 told the Royal Aeronautical Society that due to achievements in France “it is 
obvious that the monoplane…has much to commend it...”, and that “any method of 
increasing the maximum lift coefficient of a wing without increasing the drag at high 
speeds which may be perfected will, I think, tend to bring back the monoplane into 
favour for racing purposes”.464 
In 1929 in comments made to the Royal Aeronautical Society Air Vice-
Marshall Sir William Sefton Brancker465 noted that: 
[Sefton Brancker] was a gentleman who preferred monoplanes, but he was quite prepared to 
transfer his affections to biplanes if their superiority could be proved…The fact remained that 
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since the war all the great world records had been established by monoplanes – distance, 
duration, speed, and all the crossings of the Atlantic.466 
The widespread adoption of the low-wing monoplane for fighter aircraft as it existed 
in 1939 had a lot to do with the wings themselves. Thickness, strength, position, 
bracing and a host of other factors influenced the change. Monoplanes were designed, 
built and were flown from the earliest days of flight. Indeed, the inaugural winner of 
the Schneider Trophy in 1913 was a monoplane. Early monoplane wings were 
externally braced, meaning that the wires attached to the wing were attached on the 
wing exterior and fastened to a central point or points on the fuselage, normally in 
front of and below the pilot. 
 
Figure 19 - Bleriot Monoplane (1911)467 
Strength and safety were two of the most important factors to early aircraft designers. 
The biplane suggested itself early on for precisely those reasons. The low-wing 
loading of the biplane meant that the forces acting on the wings were distributed 
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between the two, they could be braced with struts as well as wires and thus was 
altogether stronger than the monoplane.  
 The challenge for the cantilever wing was to be strong, light and efficient 
enough for adoption with fighter aircraft. Hugo Junkers had already had success with 
cantilever wings as early as 1917 with his D 1 fighter. As technically impressive as it 
was at the time, being the first all-metal fighter in addition to having internally braced 
cantilever wings, it lacked manoeuvrability and was considered unsuitable for a first-
line fighter.  
 Again, this pointed to drawbacks with early monoplanes, while in terms of 
pure performance (speed and rate-of-climb for example) there was no real difference 
between biplanes and monoplanes, in terms of manoeuvrability there was a great deal 
of difference. For fighter aircraft manoeuvrability was essential, and if no appreciable 
gain in performance could be achieved by using monoplanes and if in doing so some 
manoeuvrability was sacrificed, then there was no real incentive for designers to 
develop them. 
Perhaps the most important development from a British point of view was the 
switch from biplane to monoplane configuration in the Schneider Trophy racers 
designed by Supermarine. As noted above, Mitchell’s switch from biplane to 
monoplane proved the superiority of the monoplane for speed and performance, it 
also crucially increased the amount of work done in drag reduction. The first of his S 
series monoplane racers, the S 4 crashed while conducting speed trials in Baltimore, 
apparently due to suspected wing flutter. The S 4 was designed with fully cantilever 
internally braced wings. The next Supermarine effort, the S 5 was designed with 
externally braced wings (due to fears over a repeat of the S 4). The S 5, S 6 and S 6b 
won the contest outright in 1931. 
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 Following this success, Mitchell’s Type 224 fighter designed to specification 
F. 7/30 was a monoplane, but an unsuccessful one. There were other problems 
(described in the previous chapter), including the engine, the uncovered cockpit and 
trouble getting beyond 15,000ft, but one of the biggest problems, and one that shows 
that the monoplane as a viable choice for fighter aircraft was not quite ready were the 
wings. By 1934 as the Spitfire and Hurricane were being designed, the cantilever 
wing was considered by both Sydney Camm and Reginald Mitchell as the only option 




The undercarriage assemblies of early aircraft, those before around 1916 when speeds 
began approaching 150 miles-per-hour, produced only a very small portion of the 
drag created in the overall machine. As aircraft speeds increased throughout the War 
the undercarriage became a more obvious area for aerodynamic improvement and the 
struts used in the undercarriage were designed to be more streamlined, moving from 
“circular to elliptical or aerofoil cross sections”.468 Following the First World War in 
Britain there was a period of stagnation in many aspects of aircraft design where 
“caution and retrenchment” made “new ideas hard to sell”.469 Despite some efforts to 
remove the undercarriage from the airflow, and some effort to improve the fixed type 
(see Figs 2 and 3) there was little interest in developing them beyond First World War 
standards, that is to say, from the fixed assemblies of that period.  
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Figure 20 - Gloster Gamecock (1925) Schematic 
 
 
Figure 21 - Gloster Gladiator (1934) Schematic470 
                                                
470 This 3-angle view of the Gladiator illustrates the last fixed undercarriage used by 
an RAF fighter before the adoption of the Spitfire and Hurricane. It is considerably 
less complex than the Gamecock landing gear of 1925. Comparing the two 
schematics, one can see other evidence of improvement over the nine years between 
them. The Gladiator has an enclosed cockpit, the fuselage is more streamlined, the 
radial engine is also far more streamlined. The improvements in the undercarriage 
should be obvious on sight, the Gladiator has no bracing or struts between the legs. 
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The development of a practical retracting undercarriage was a crucial development in 
the shift to the metal monoplane fighter. It was, however, the low-wing monoplane 
design that first and foremost allowed the widespread adoption of the retractable gear. 
Biplanes had been the mainstay of the Royal Air Force since its creation in 1918 until 
the first Service aircraft with retractable gears appeared in 1936 (the Hurricane and 
Spitfire). In understanding the perceived delay471 in the adoption of retractable 
undercarriages it is important to realise that retracting the undercarriage was a 
complicated and costly process. Firstly, while it was possible to move the wheels into 
other parts of the aircraft, it was considered that to retract the landing gear into the 
wings was “obvious” and furthermore, it was thought that the lower wing of a biplane 
was far too thin to house the retracted wheels.472 Thus, a low-wing monoplane was 
needed to make the retractable gear a realistic prospect in fighter aircraft. They had 
been used successfully in racing aircraft as early as 1920 in the Gordon-Bennett 
Cup473 but their adoption in British fighter aircraft was curtailed by the RAF 
adherence to the biplane. Even still, the adoption of retractable gears in monoplanes 
was not straightforward. In 1930, experiments on the aerodynamic characteristics of 
undercarriages carried out on a Sperry Messenger found that removing the 
undercarriage from the model reduced the parasitic drag of the entire aircraft by one 
third.474 George Dowty, a man famous for his development of, amongst many other 
things, undercarriages and hydraulic systems for retraction, noted that: 
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The landing gear represents a large part of the total resistance [of the aircraft] and, because 
this unit is of no assistance to the aeroplane in flight, its weight and drag must be regarded as 
something of a dead loss.475  
Dowty also considered that (in 1930) it was entirely usual to find mechanical 
complications, an increase in weight and a reduced efficiency in undercarriage 
operation and maintenance. In addition, the increased size of body needed to house a 
folded landing gear was “such that if there is any advantage it [was] so small that the 
additional cost [was] not warranted”.476 Finally, he offered some advice to designers: 
The only way to make improvements is to fix definitely in one’s own mind what is 
unsatisfactory with present-day products…It may be that you cannot get them fixed all at 
once, but until you know and recognize that there is something wrong and that it needs to be 
improved, you have no centre point around which information and facts will crystallise.477 
In 1931 as the RAF searched for a replacement fighter for the Bulldog the monoplane 
designs tendered to specification F.7/30 retained the fixed undercarriage synonymous 
with the biplane. Essentially, speeds were not yet high enough to justify the cost and 
difficulty of developing or using retractable gears.478 Attempts at drag reduction on 
the standard undercarriage were limited to further streamlining of the components. 
Indeed, Supermarine’s Type 224 had a ‘trousered’ fixed undercarriage, where the 
struts were enclosed in streamlined casings.  
In The Retractable Airplane Landing Gear and the Northrop “Anomaly”479 
Walter Vincenti talks about the adoption of retractable gear and of an example that 
bucked the trend. Vincenti points out that the adoption of the retractable gear was not, 
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as has often been suggested, reasoned, obvious or foresighted.480 While there was a 
general adoption amongst the aircraft commonly pointed to as having led the way 
with retractable gears, Vincenti notes the example of John Northrop in the United 
States who stayed with the fixed, trousered landing gear in spite of a general 
movement away from this type. It is important to remember that retracting the landing 
gear actually worked years before its widespread adoption. Various designers tried it 
throughout the 1920s, but they were costly, complicated and difficult to maintain. It 
was simply not worth it, generally speaking. Vincenti points out that today, aircraft 
with speeds below 200 miles-per-hour almost exclusively use fixed undercarriages, 
those between 200-250 miles-per-hour use retractable gear and that aircraft of the 
1930-1935 period were moving towards these kinds of speeds.481  
The fact that aircraft speeds were increasing allowed for more consideration of 
retractable gears. As speeds increased the drag penalty of parasitic components like a 
fixed undercarriage became more and more serious. At 100 miles-per-hour, the effect 
was minimal, but approaching 250 miles-per-hour the effect became a good deal more 
significant. 
 
Figure 22 - Airspeed Courier (1932) 
                                                
480 Ibid., p. 4. 
481 Ibid., p. 19. 
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Actually, the first British aircraft to lead the way in terms of being a low-wing 
monoplane with a retractable gear was the civil Airspeed A.S. 5 (marketed as the 
Courier) in 1932. Its top speed was around 150 miles-per-hour and so it is difficult to 
imagine how a retractable gear was fully justified. 
In May 1933 research presented to the Aeronautical Research Committee 
demonstrated that retraction of the landing gear could reduce the minimum drag of the 
complete aircraft by up to 50%.482 That retraction of the landing gear could lessen the 
drag of a complete aircraft by such amounts was not disputed at the time - the tests 
carried out by the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics in the United States, 
the Royal Aircraft Establishment in the UK and elsewhere showed this to be so. The 
problem was the additional weight, mechanical complication, design and being able to 
fit a retractable gear into an aircraft in the first place. In a letter from the Director of 
Scientific Research at the Air Ministry to the Aeronautical Research Committee, 
retractable gears were found not to “offer any advantage in view of the excess weight 
brought about not only by reason of the necessary mechanism but also on account of 
the strengthening of the wings about the wheel housing”.483 
 Besides the quite radical reduction in drag offered by retractable mechanisms, 
one other benefit realised at this early stage was the effect of landing with no 
undercarriage. It was considered much safer to land with nothing than with a fixed 
gear which would make the aircraft ‘nose over’ at high speed.484 
 In 1935 the Royal Aircraft Establishment produced a report on defects of 
retractable undercarriages and it was prepared specifically for the information and 
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guidance of designers. This shows both a commitment to improving retractable 
undercarriages and that there was enough functional examples to produce a report on 
‘troubles’ that had thus far been experienced. Some of the problems were listed as 
follows: 
1. One side of undercarriage remained locked in up position. 
2. Unequal lowering of port and starboard wheels. 
3. Damage due to sudden lowering of undercarriage. 
4. Malfunctioning indicator lights – reporting fully lowered gear when the 
gear was not locked down. 
5. Overwinding by pilot – no indication when the undercarriage was fully up. 
6. Failure of hydraulic pump.485 
It is interesting to note, however, that in 1936 Dowty stated that: 
Among the many problems of drag reduction engaging the critical attention of aircraft 
designers to-day, that parasitic appendix known as the undercarriage stands out, in more ways 
than one, as probably the most serious singe offender still challenging the ingenuity of the 
designing engineer in his unceasing quest for aerodynamic refinement.486 
Dowty was mindful of the fact designers had been ‘openly sceptical’ of both the value 
and feasibility of retracting the undercarriage “at least in such a manner as to make it 
worthwhile”. Dowty firmly believed that the emergence of the retractable landing 
gear allowed for much greater speeds in commercial aircraft. To support his claim he 
noted the “significant fact that what was once a novelty has now become an accepted 
operating feature of the world’s leading airways, despite a great deal of prophetic cold 
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water in the past”.487 By 1936 he considered that “suppression of the undercarriage 
“parasite” by retraction in flight [had] now passed into the realm of mechanical 
feasibility”.488  
Also by 1936 the majority of high-speed aircraft under development or 
construction, were initially projected with a retractable landing gear as standard.489 As 
we will see later, this was a crucial shift in thinking on the part of designers. Finally, 
it was Dowty’s opinion that “any aeronautical engineer wishing to keep abreast of his 
art, will accept them as part of his normal design technique”.490 
 
THE EIGHT-GUN ADOPTION 
Given that the primary function of a fighter is the destruction of enemy aircraft, the 
amount of firepower generated by a single machine is crucial. Fighter aircraft were 
developed to be, in essence, a gun platform. Generally, a biplane could only house 
guns in the fuselage and not in the wings491, and this greatly limited the space 
available for armaments. The route from the single or double pilot operated machine 
gun of 1918 to the eight-gun monoplane fighter of 1939 is a complicated one, but it is 
an important aspect of the overall biplane to monoplane story.  
Reaction to improvements in bomber aircraft were one major driver for the 
Air Staff in developing monoplane fighters. Considerations of repelling enemy fighter 
formations were largely secondary. For instance, somewhat controversially, Ralph 
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Sorley492 has been credited (in fact he also credited himself) for the development of 
the ‘eight-gun fighter’, the first incarnations of which were the Spitfire and 
Hurricane. His assessment of the necessity for a fighter to have eight guns and be a 
monoplane was simply that, as mentioned above, a fighter must be able to catch a 
bomber: 
And it must have all the new features of retractable undercarriage, enclosed cockpit, flaps &c., 
in order to make it as fast as possible and so give the pilot his change of catching his enemy. 
Now, how to kill?493 
The number of guns used in fighter aircraft had stagnated throughout the inter-war 
period. Originally, pilots armed themselves with pistols or rifles to combat enemy 
scouts and during the First World War there was a good deal of change in the 
armaments of fighter aircraft (indeed, armament changed as the concept of the 
‘fighter’ evolved).494 Variously, guns were mounted in front of the pilot, in the side of 
the fuselage or behind the pilot for use with a gunner in a two-man aircraft. Generally, 
there were one or two guns and they fired through the propeller which made the 
interrupter or synchronisation gear necessary. There was little change in these 
arrangements throughout the 1920s.  
For Sorley, the problem facing fighter pilots as bomber technology improved 
fairly rapidly in the early-mid 1930s was holding the enemy bomber in their sights 
long enough to apply a measure of firepower sufficient to cause catastrophic damage. 
Sorley stated that “after much arithmetic and burning of midnight oil…reached the 
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answer of eight guns being the number required to give a lethal dose in two seconds 
of fire”.495 
We have seen that designers within the industry and some at the Air Ministry 
lamented the fact that better machine guns were not a priority. By 1934 this was 
changing as the Browning .303 machine gun was starting to be tested in Britain. This 
was the gun to which Sorley pinned his hopes. However, as influential as he was in 
shaping the armament aspect of the Hurricane and Spitfire, the claims496 that he was 
solely responsible for this development are “unfounded”.497 David Divine’s 
assessment is probably the clearest example of this misconception: 
[The Air Staff] had also appointed Squadron Leader Sorley as early as 1930 to the Operational 
Requirements Department…to explore his theories of aerial gunnery. Against considerable 
internal indifference and some active opposition Sorley developed a theory that air fighting 
required the maximum concentration of hits within a period of two seconds.498 
Like many parts of this story much myth has grown up around the issue of guns. The 
most common explanation for the eight-gun fighter is Sorley’s moment of genius, just 
like the Spitfire is commonly held to have evolved directly from Supermarine’s 
Schneider Trophy monoplanes. The myth is simple; a more accurate version is far 
more complex. Instead of simply ‘burning the midnight oil’ and doing some 
‘arithmetic’, the idea for a fighter aircraft possessed of more than four guns was 
conceived much earlier. Sorley’s theory that increasing bomber speeds would mean 
less time for fighter pilots to engage them actually originated in 1926. Recognising 
the potential implications of the increasing performance of enemy bomber aircraft, the 
AMSR at the time, Sir John Higgins, reckoned that faster bombers would mean less 
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time on target for fighter pilots and that they would therefore need a higher volume of 
fire.499 For specification F.10/27 he specified six guns with four mounted in the 
wings. Colin Sinnott has stated that: 
The issue of fighter armament is one of perceived need versus feasibility. From 1926 onwards 
the need for greatly increased firepower was recognised. By 1934 it had become feasible to 
meet that need whilst retaining the essential performance characteristics of a fighter.500 
Largely due to concerns over the added weight, much like the retractable landing 
gear, the idea to use six or eight guns was proposed long before it was actually 
feasible. The added weight had to be offset by increased power output, increased 
aerodynamic efficiency and lighter guns.  
 Proposals for increasing the number of guns for fighters was a fairly regular 
occurrence within the Air Staff. By 1930, four guns were specified for the Bulldog 
replacement and in 1931 trials were approved for the Gloster Multi-Gun fighter. The 
trials prompted the Aircraft and Armament Experimental Establishment (A & AEE) 
to state that one six-gun fighter was the equivalent of two conventional ones.501 The A 
& AEE found in further trials initiated by Hugh Dowding, that a single seat multi-gun 
fighter was more likely than a two-gun single seat fighter to direct the amount of fire 
needed to a “vital part of a target aircraft”.502 By November 1932, Dowding wrote 
that he “cordially endorse[s] the contention…that complete destruction of enemy 
aircraft in one attack must be aimed at”.503 
 Thus, the idea of increasing fighter firepower to counter the effect of increased 
bomber speeds did not originate with Ralph Sorely. Indeed, he did not join the Air 
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Staff until January 1933.504 He was, however, responsible for a key design change to 
the Spitfire and Hurricane. Originally designed with six guns in mind (three in each 
wing), Sorely proposed that the Spitfire and Hurricane could be adapted to meet the 
eight-gun standard that had been set in 1934. Writing in 1957, Sorely claimed that his 
“concept was right, but it was built up on rather a lot of imagination and would 
produce a totally different fighter from anything the fighter pilots were accustomed to. 
I was cautious, therefore, where I discusses these ideas in the early stages for fear of 
arousing reaction too soon…”.505  
 The issue of guns stands as another example of the generally perpetuated myth 
of Air Staff stagnation in technical development. The issue of ‘desire versus 
feasibility’ is one that governed the adoption of different technologies, perhaps most 
notably the retractable undercarriage.  
 
THE 1935 AIRCRAFT CONFERENCE 
 
By 1936 a degree of design stabilisation had been achieved in military fighter aircraft. 
The Hurricane and Spitfire were the first monoplane fighters to enter service with the 
Royal Air Force in 1937 and 1938 respectively, and the Spitfire also made use of a 
metal skin. The fighter aircraft that followed them did so along broadly similar lines. 
Each was a monoplane and though not all of them made use of the metal skin their 
internal structure, the airframe itself, was metal. It is interesting to note that the 
complaints of historians about the ‘quality’ of RAF fighter aircraft cease after around 
1935 and instead their focus turns to the ‘production problems’ of these aircraft. The 
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reason for this, of course, is that the RAF fighters now ‘looked the part’ and 
outwardly were every bit as ‘modern’ as their Luftwaffe contemporaries. 
 





Figure 24 - Hawker Hurricane (1937) 
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This point on the historiography is actually quite significant. It is difficult, if not 
impossible, to look at the development of inter-war military aircraft without viewing 
everything in terms of its potential value to the RAF at the outbreak of the Second 
World War and so most studies to some extent frame their arguments in these terms. 
The Air Ministry was, as we have seen, chastised for their apparent conservatism with 
regard to developing technologies (which we should now accept is not accurate). 
They are rebuked further by their delay and lack of interest in the De Havilland 
Mosquito, which we will look at later or for giving Frank Whittle the brush-off in the 
mid-1930s.  
In looking at the shift from wood to metal and from biplane to monoplane we 
have seen that, broadly speaking, the community of practitioners engaged in 
aeronautical research and developing aircraft systems were resistant to change, and 
that for the most part the industry were driven to making such changes by the Air 
Ministry. This is not to say that the industry was not progressive, indeed it was, but 
the financial risk attached to making such changes without a guarantee of success 
dampened enthusiasm for untried and untested technologies. Yet we have seen the 
occasional private venture throughout the period, such as the Short Silver Streak or 
the Fairey Fox, which attempted to break away from what was seen as restrictive Air 
Ministry specifications and produce as good an aircraft as possible.  
 It seems that the research and development of aircraft and aircraft components 
between the wars followed three distinct lines. Firstly, state directed R&D in 
collaboration with the industry carried out at the National Physical Laboratory and the 
Royal Aircraft Establishment. An example of this was the adoption of metal for use in 
all RAF airframes, but in general the annual research programmes covered dozens of 
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items.506 Secondly, the research and development carried out at the firms themselves, 
often with support work carried out at the NPL and RAE. The Schneider Trophy 
provides the best example of this kind of development work where an aircraft was 
conceived at the firm and then wind tunnel work carried out at the NPL would 
develop the aircraft’s aerodynamics. Also, in developing the Spitfire the RAE 
contributed a ducted radiator which helped reduce cooling drag and increase thrust.507 
Supermarine test pilot Jeffrey Quill related that: 
This [the ducted radiator] had been designed as a result of basic research work done at the 
Royal Aircraft Establishment by Dr. Meredith and had been a major factor in reducing the 
cooling drag which would otherwise have constituted a most serious ‘barrier’ to the 
performance of both the Spitfire and the Hurricane…Meredith’s work at Farnborough was an 
excellent example of how basic research at the RAE could make a vital contribution to ad hoc 
design work carried out by industry.508 
Finally there was the research carried out at Universities such as that conducted on 
fatigue and elasticity of materials for the ARC and Engineering Research Board, 
although at the time this kind of work was very limited.509  
 
THE CONFERENCE 
In 1935 the Aeronautical Research Committee (ARC) convened a conference to 
discuss the main aspects of aviation research.510 The importance of this gathering of 
the great and good of British aeronautics should not be underestimated. Such a 
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gathering was a rare thing indeed. Various groups would meet at odd meetings of the 
Royal Aeronautical Society or industry or at government functions but this conference 
gathered the chief designers of the industry, research heads from the RAE and NPL, 
Air Staff, and some of the leading British scientists of the day, including Sir Richard 
Glazebrook, Sir Henry Tizard (who actually chaired the conference), and Professor 
Leonard Bairstow. There were further representatives of the Royal Air Force and 
some of the outstanding pilots and thinkers on aviation technology at the time, such as 
[Moore-Brabazon,] the ever-present Robert Brooke-Popham, and so on. Every area of 
aviation research and technology was represented save, perhaps, for the Universities, 
the work of which was in itself a topic of much debate. They gathered to discuss the 
present state of aeronautical research in Britain, where they were going wrong and 
what they could do to fix it.  
Amongst the very first points raised on the first day was the role and functions 
of the Aeronautical Research Committee and the fundamental nature of the researches 
carried out by both the ARC and the wider industry. Professor Bairstow, who at that 
time was the head of aeronautical research carried out at the National Physical 
Laboratory, believed the industry was not inclined to help itself in regards to research 
and that the industry should be more collaborative amongst itself. Most significantly, 
however, he pointed out that research had moved from a concentration on stability 
and control of the aircraft to one of performance and that this could be problematic in 
the future: 
It seems to me that a time will come when the improvement of performance by better 
aerodynamic design will leave little to choose between the best products, and some new 
selling point will be wanted. I will hazard a guess that that point will be ease and harmony of 
control. Are not we losing sight of this problem in the intensive pursuit of performance, and 
can we guarantee that all other countries will be equally willing to limit themselves in that 
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way? Responsible pilots in contact with responsible scientists seem to me to be required for an 
adequate attack on the problem of control, and much work can be done…511 
As he saw it, the main problem for aeronautical research in the past, and indeed a 
problem that would continue into the future was the (often fractious) relationship 
between the industry and the ARC. The problem for the ARC “has been to get an 
opinion from the aircraft industry, at any rate in simple terms that members of the 
ARC can understand! Biennial meetings have been held for years between the SBAC 
[Society of British Aircraft Constructors] and the ARC, and in my opinion the SBAC 
has never presented a collective case”.512 This view was shared by Sir Henry Tizard 
who chaired the first session: 
…one such discussion which we had a short time ago. There were four members of the 
industry present, skilled people who were very much interested in an important detail – it was 
a detail, but a very important one – and three of them spoke at some length on what they felt 
to be the duty of the Aeronautical Research Committee to encourage and organise a certain 
line of practical development work. At the end of the meeting I said to the fourth member, 
speaking to him privately, “You did not take part in that discussion; why not?” and he replied 
“Oh, well, you see we have solved that already, and I do not agree with them at all”! 
Quite seriously, I ask you to consider my own position and the position of the other 
members of the Committee. The position is this, that the overloaded taxpayer is devoting more 
money to aeronautical research, in relation to size and –though I shall be unpopular in saying 
this – in relation to the importance of the industry, than to research in aid of any other 
industry. What is our position when we are asked to devote some more of the [p. 53] 
taxpayer’s money to a problem suggested by two or three firms when another firm lets me 
know privately that they have solved it? I cannot recommend the provision of the taxpayer’s 
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money to help one firm to do what another firm have done for themselves. I am not even in a 
position to know whether it is true.513 
He advocated for the ARC to take what he termed ‘the long view’.514 That the ARC 
should not be bogged down in directing or undertaking short-term details or small 
individual pieces of research, on a particular type of high-altitude geared 
supercharger, for instance. Rather, the ARC should be directing and shaping the long-
term path of aeronautical research, setting long-term goals to be achieved, letting the 
research establishments and industry decide which research pathways to take in order 
to meet them. We have already seen that this could, and did, work. The Air Ministry 
directed in 1925 that all RAF aircraft should be made of metal and that they would 
only consider machines made to this specification from 1930. The industry 
(somewhat grudgingly) obliged, and the setting of a long-term goal was met 
successfully by the industry.  
 Tizard also lamented the lack of: 
…the kind of thing which I was fortunate enough to get during the [First World] War, namely, 
close contact with users and manufacturers – close personal contact, not through committees. I 
do feel myself to be out of date and out of touch in some respects, and I should like to recover 
that touch as much as I can…anything which can be suggested to help people like myself to 
be in closer touch with the needs and views of designers, whose work, I assure you, we very 
greatly admire, will be of considerable value.515 
Sir Henry concluded his point on industry-ARC relations by pointing out that: 
These are serious difficulties, and if we are to get this close touch, that I for one feel that I am 
in need of, it must be done through someone in the industry who really can represent their 
collective views on important technical matters. If he cannot, then it is obvious that the 
remaining things are things that are properly done by the industry itself. The proper things for 
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the ARC to look after, apart from fundamental research, on which I think we are really all 
agreed, are those which practically the whole of the industry agree should be done, and which 
are best done by the National Physical Laboratory or at [The Royal Aircraft Establishment] 
Farnborough, rather than at any other institution.516 
The conference aimed to improve the research process. More specifically, it looked to 
streamline the whole activity, from the identification of fruitful lines of inquiry, closer 
co-operation between the industry and the ARC, for the industry to undertake more 
research work, and for the industry itself to identify those areas where government 
conducted research would benefit the whole of the industry.  
In his responses to questions during the final session of the conference, Major 
T. M. Barlow, Chief Engineer of the Fairey Aviation Company, touched on several 
very important and revealing points illustrating both the failings of the aeronautical 
research set-up in 1935 and highlighting areas where he, and many others, felt 
improvement could be made. The first and most important point was raised by Tizard 
in his opening remarks on the final day, in addition to those he made in the first 
session when he called for closer co-operation between industry, government and the 
research establishments. This was taken up by Barlow during his discussion. He 
began by reading the very last sentence of the United States Federal Commission 
Report on Aeronautics: “To draw the industry’s personnel engaged in the 
development of aeronautical products more directly in the planning of it’s research 
work”.517 This was, in Barlow’s words, “…one of the things which we in the industry 
are pressing for”.518 
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The structure of Barlow’s remarks in the first instance covered various examples of 
“matters overlooked in this country and developed abroad” raised by members of the 
ARC or Air Ministry, most notably the Superintendent of the Royal Aeronautical 
Establishment at Farnborough and Group Captain Arthur Maund (at that point 
attached to the Air Ministry as Flying Operations officer). These included the 
retractable landing gear and the variable pitch propeller. For Major Barlow, as a 
prominent representative of the industry, he felt criticism directed towards the 
industry from government establishments such as the ARC and RAE, as well as the 
Air Ministry, were unfair: “Surely, this is an instance where the ARC’s advice, if it 
ever gave any on these two points, was not sufficiently strong either to impress the 
industry or the higher officials of the Air Ministry? In fact, I was told personally 
about three years ago by a very senior official of the Air Ministry that they were not 
interested in the development of the variable pitch airscrew”.519 
 As it happened (then) Air Marshall Sir Hugh Dowding, who was at that time 
the Air Member for Supply and Research took issue with Barlow’s comment on this 
matter: 
I do not desire to join in any contentious discussion…[but a point] I want to make is in 
connection with something which Mr. Barlow said. He stated that a high official at the Air 
Ministry had told him that he was not at all interested in variable pitch airscrews. I do not 
know who that high official was, but, as the little boy said, “Please, Sir, it wasn’t me”. I have 
been the highest official at the Air Ministry concerned directly with technical matters for the 
last five years, and I can assure the Conference that not only my own policy but that of the Air 
Ministry as a whole has been wholeheartedly to encourage the development of variable pitch 
airscrews.520 
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Dowding concluded by offering an explanation for Air Ministry policy on variable 
pitch airscrews: 
We have spent from first to last a good deal of money on the development of a British type, 
which, I am sorry to say, has been going very slowly; but if we cannot have a British type then 
we must have foreign types until the British type is ready – which I am sure it will be in due 
course. But I should not like it to get into the records of this meeting that the Air Ministry’s 
policy has been in any way to discount or discourage the development of variable pitch 
airscrews, which is on the face of it of the greatest importance now and in the future.521 
This exchange is revealing. Whether or not the Air Staff were concerned with variable 
pitch airscrew research, or indeed how highly they prioritised it is not as important or 
as interesting as the fact that a leading designer of the aircraft industry was under the 
impression that there was no governmental interest at all. This is precisely what 
Tizard and many others were calling for: a greater contact between industry and 
governmental research priorities. Clearer signals about where the industry should 
direct its own research, and more definitive goals attached to both long- and short-
term research projects.522 [similar case with retractable U/C]. The case of the 
retractable landing gear provides further evidence that research priorities were 
confused and that closer contact and collaboration between all parties concerned with 
aeronautical research could be highly beneficial.  
 In response to Group Captain Maund’s suggestions that industry had perhaps 
been complacent in their search for a functional and efficient retractable undercarriage 
design, displaying a “lack of foresight”, Barlow again placed blame more with the 
ARC than the industry: “…surely the ARC should be in a position to advise the Air 
                                                
521 Ibid., p. 39 
522 Ibid., Major Barlow’s Remarks, p. 8 
 218 
Ministry or the industry on this problem? I venture to say that both knew the 
advantages [of retractable landing gears], but that we did not get the co-operation”.523 
 Again, like Dowding, Maund, who was by no means technically conservative, 
gave evidence to the contrary: 
In 1930 and 1931 I asked a good many designers what they thought about retractable 
undercarriages; as a matter of fact, I asked six designers, and five of them told me that they 
had been into the question thoroughly and found that the extra weight was not worth the 
reduction of drag.524 
Although Maund was actually responding to comments made by Frederick Handley 
Page on the ‘conservatism of pilots’, this confusion and lack of co-operation was 
getting in the way of important innovations that might have helped hasten along 
efficient monoplane designs for the RAF, or at least that was how it was seen by some 
within the industry and Air Ministry.525 Why would Barlow spend his company’s time 
and money developing, or helping to develop, variable pitch propellers and retractable 
undercarriages when he was under the very strong impression that the Air Ministry, 
and in a sense by extension, the governmental research establishments were, as far as 
he was concerned, categorically uninterested in developing them. As we have seen, 
Air Ministry specifications for fighter aircraft could be highly restrictive, as could the 
timetables for the design, development and production of a prototype for 
consideration under military trials (usually not more than twelve months after the 
issue of the specification).  
It is startling to think that it took so long for the whole military-industrial 
complex surrounding aeronautical technology and research to wake up following the 
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Trenchard era. From 1930 until the Conference in 1935 aeronautical research had 
been considered to be lacking “research in structures, methods and technique”.  
I am sure all will agree that we have overlooked this during the past few years and that we are 
trying to make up lost time rapidly now. It may be the industry’s fault; it make be the fault of 
the ARC; but jointly we have to take the blame”.526 
Thus far, this part of the discussion has concentrated on the development of military 
aircraft generally. However, the conference also covered aero-engines, their research, 
design and development one the one hand, but more usefully to the conference-at-
large was the discussion of research organisation as it related to engines. Major 
Barlow considered that the example set by engine research was adopted as the basis 
for Aeronautical Research Committee planning “…in conjunction with 
representatives of the industry on aircraft matters in general, we should go far to 
achieve the object of this conference”.527 
 Arthur Maund pointed out that co-operation and close working arrangements 
which existed on the “engine side” were not present on the “aircraft side”. Mr. Pye 
mentioned in his paper given to the conference on engine development that contracts 
were given for engine research problems to be carried out by the industry and in his 
remarks Major Barlow thought that there was “very little counterpart” on the aircraft 
side of things: 
On the military side the Ministry expect complete design, construction, tests, etc., of a normal 
size machine in one year. The specification possibly implies application of research and 
experiment of which the fringe has only been touched. That means to say that the design must 
be agreed within one month, otherwise there would be no hope of completion in the specified 
time. You will realise, then, the necessity of the industry not only being in the closest touch 
with research but having the information right up to date. They have to have the information 
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up to one month….what we do want is to be kept in touch, so that at the time we are aware of 
all the research of academic, fundamental or general application which is going on…In my 
opinion, as regards the engine side, there are more fundamentals which allow common 
discussion on different types. But can you imagine Mr Fedden, for instance, if after a year’s 
intensive and expensive research he finds, shall we say, a new form of cylinder head or valve 
gear, immediately sending all the details to Major Halford or even to Mr. C. G. Grey!528 
This poses an interesting point. In an ideal situation the exchange and flow of ideas 
relating to military aircraft technology would be free. After all, it would have been in 
the best interests of the nation to have the very best aircraft possible, embodying the 
best of research and development carried out not just at the governmental research 
establishments but also from within the industry. Of course, this was not practical. 
While it was the practise of the Air Ministry to keep it’s ring of manufactures “alive” 
during the inter-war period, the firms within the ring were interested in making the 
most money they could and the best way to do this was by developing or perfecting 
technologies that the Ministry would like but that no one else either had, or had 
perfected yet. The ARC was calling for greater contact between the research 
establishments and the industry, it also wanted more collaboration between firms of 
the industry developing aircraft but this was something that was incredibly difficult to 
achieve given that they were asking, in essence, for firms to give up any technical 
advantage they had, or might possess in the future.  
Further, it is difficult to ask a company to spend time and money on what was often 
painstaking research, and then to simply make the results of that research available to 
any other firm. Indeed, the entire enterprise of research conducted within the industry 
was precisely to give them an advantage, when designing their new machines for 
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tender, over the others. Nevertheless, this was precisely what the Chairman of the 
ARC was asking for; “a greater interchange of research information among the 
industry”.529 In his comments Barlow responded to this plea for greater interchange of 
research information by pointing out that: 
Now the majority of aircraft firms in this country have two markets – the British and the 
foreign, both highly competitive. At home the majority (military firms) have one buyer, the 
Air Ministry, who purchase by competitive selection in design and price. Abroad we are 
naturally not only in competition with British firms but with aircraft firms throughout the 
world. It is obvious that no firm will disclose any research or experiment which is being or 
likely to be of use in placing his aeronautical products ahead of his competitor. Such action 
would be business suicide, and I am sure, if the Chairman of the ARC was a shareholder in 
such a company and knew of such action which lost a contract, he would be the first to 
express his opinion in no mild terms.530 
Barlow goes on to say that: 
The vital spark of progress in industry is competition. Cut that out and the aeronautical 
industry would become copyists with no initiative and no incentive for progress, and the 
country would lose. For those reasons, I do not hold that the industry should agree to the 
interchange of their own research. Research which can be freely discussed are fundamentals 
and points of general application, but why bring in another body, such as the proposed 
Industrial Research Association, for this? I see no place for the ARC if there were such an 
Association. The ARC would be less than advisory – more of a Post Office, passing on 
information to research institutions…All members of this Conference will agree that co-
operation in necessary, but what we do not apparently agree at the moment is the form it 
should take.531 
Roy Fedden, mentioned in his response to remarks made about his paper on engines 
that  
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…of late both our Military and Civil aircraft have, generally, fallen to a seriously low level of 
performance, which matter must be remedied as soon as possible, and must be prevented from 
occurring again in the future. With all due deference, I submit that a real diagnosis of the 
trouble has not been given. I believe we have the necessary research organisation and research 
workers, but that they are not adequately directed and organised, and that we can never hope 
to regain and remain in the forefront of aircraft development, so vital to the safety and welfare 
of this country, until we appreciate these two essential points.532 
Fedden called for a small, elite, carefully chosen and permanent staff to prioritise and 
direct research work; in his words a “thinking department”. In theory, of course, this 
was done at the ARC and Air Ministry. However, in practice the frequent changes of 
personnel within these institutions made it difficult to get any sort of real consistency 
in what was sought with regard to aeronautical technology. Fedden’s suggestion 
called for a smaller, permanent group would “formulate policy, see the complete 
picture, and then direct and instruct, what I believe are already adequate research 
organisations, what to do, and the priority of the work”.533 
 It was also suggested that: 
…secrecy was holding back wider information in certain respects. I think the industry as a 
whole need not shoulder the whole of that blame, because there is the Air Ministry’s secrecy 
regarding service aircraft which is considered by quite a number of people to be really, if I 
may be so bold as to say it, ridiculous, since the information is generally available to all the 
foreign Legations.534 
In the general discussions that followed, there were constant lamentations of the lack 
of practical focus in British aeronautical research. However, the Conference itself 
seemed to have abated those concerns somewhat, but still criticism of the nature of 
the technical publications by the NPL, for instance, was common and, it seems, a 
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serious stumbling block to the practical application of research knowledge as related 
by Stanley Evans of Heston Aircraft Co.: 
…I believe that there is still some hope for a more practical orientation in our research 
programme…This recurrent plea for so-called “long distance”535 research has been the wail of 
our professors and scientists for many a year; moreover, in this country, I strongly suspect that 
they worship the abstract science of the German worker, while silently scoffing at the 
industrial research outlook of the Americans. They ask to be left alone in their “cloistered 
studies”, while the engineer must sell the product of his art on the industrial battle-front or 
perish. All the same, I am quite willing to forgive those transcendental publications of the 
[Aeronautical Research Committee], after wandering through the delightful gardens of the 
[National Physical Laboratory] on Wednesday afternoon. I, too, might be in favour of “A 
Modification of Oseen’s Approximate Equation for the Motion in Two Dimensions of a 
Viscous Incompressible Fluid” if MY Drawing Office window looked out across the City of 
Dreaming Spires! 
In essence the Conference revealed two distinct but interrelated problems concerning 
British aeronautical research. In the first instance, the research directed and carried 
our by the NPL and ARC seems to have been overly complex. As Stanley Evans put it 
“The scientist may be interested purely in the explanation of phenomena, but the 
engineer has to produce a better machine”. Despite the tongue-in-cheek reference to 
the work of the NPL made by Evans, he was raising a serious point. How is he to 
apply such research to the design of one of his aircraft? The other problem facing 
research was, what might be called, competition or collaboration. For some of those 
present at the conference competition within the industry was vital to the development 
of successful aircraft, for others, greater co-operation between designers and firms of 
the industry was crucial.  
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The simplification of technical and research reports from the Aeronautical Research 
Committee was perhaps the most significant outcome of the conference. Simpler 
reports, and perhaps a tighter research focus allowed for a greater dissemination of 
centrally conducted work directed and carried out by the ARC, NPL and RAE. 
However, its emphasis on improving the way research and development work was 





‘I DON’T GIVE A BUGGER WHETHER IT’S ELLIPTICAL OR NOT, SO LONG AS IT 
COVERS THE GUNS’: SUPERMARINE, HAWKER AND THE SEARCH FOR A ‘REAL 
KILLER FIGHTER’ 
 
It is not necessary here to relate the full histories of the Spitfire and Hurricane - they 
have been done many times before - but this section will draw attention to some of the 
design origins and changes experienced by both of these aircraft. The Air Staff had 
been pushing for significantly improved fighters for some years before the Spitfire 
and Hurricane.536 A monoplane was specified as early as 1931, the idea of the multi-
gun fighter was posited as early as 1926, and the idea that fighter aircraft must have 
much improved performance so as to compete with the increasing speeds of enemy 
bombers was realised around the same time. 
It is again worth pointing out here that conventional wisdom surrounding the Air 
Ministry and aircraft industry of this period shows an industry woefully inadequate to 
the task before them, clinging desperately to the ‘bread and butter’ biplanes that 
served them so well throughout the 1920s. The Air Ministry is often simply seen as 
                                                
536 They wanted monoplanes, with multiple guns capable of downing a bomber in 
around two seconds of fire, with significantly improved performance in terms of 
speed and rate-of-climb. 
 225 
backwards, moronic, badly managed and frustratingly slow to act. Therefore, the 
emergence of the Spitfire and Hurricane is portrayed as something of a minor 
miracle. No real attempt is made to understand where they came from and how they 
were developed, how their design changed or the fact that these two aircraft were the 
ones that Air Member for Supply and Research (AMSR) Hugh Dowding was 
pursuing almost as soon as he came into his new position as the head of aircraft 
development and procurement in 1930. In fact, so convinced was he of the need to 
secure the very best fighter aircraft possible, he ordered both the Spitfire and 
Hurricane without consulting the Air Staff.537 In 1933 a memorandum discussing the 
development of interceptor fighters mentioned that: 
It seems certain that political considerations will always force us (at any rate in war) to 
maintain in our defence a certain number of Fighter aircraft giving the highest possible margin 
of superiority over contemporary Bomber aircraft.538 
For the sake of clarity, given the often confusing amount of specification numbers, 
aircraft names and lines of development, it will be helpful before going further to state 
as clearly as possible what we will be talking about in the following section: 
• The emergence of the Hurricane and Spitfire came from two different 
searches for two different types of fighter. The Hawker Fury was the RAF 
interceptor fighter then in service and the Bristol Bulldog was the zone fighter.  
• F.7/30 was the original search for the Bristol Bulldog replacement. The 
relevant aircraft designed to this specification were the Supermarine Type 224 
monoplane and the Gloster Gladiator biplane (which was eventually 
accepted). F.7/30 was issued 1st October 1931. 
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• F.37/34 was for the modified Supermarine Type 224 (the Type 300). It was 
issued in January 1935 thought the decision to order the aircraft was taken in 
September 1934. 
• F.5/34 was the original search for the Hawker Fury interceptor fighter 
replacement. This specification was issued in November 1934. 
• F.36/34539 although no specification was issued this number covered the 
Hawker high speed monoplane design proposal. The decision to order this 
aircraft was also made in September 1934. 
• F.10/35 is perhaps the most significant. It was agreed in March and issued in 
April 1935. It was decided that the Hawker and Supermarine designs (F.36/34 
and F.37/34 respectively) could be developed to meet this specification – these 
eventually became the Hurricane and Spitfire. 
 
 
Figure 25 -  Hawker Fury 
                                                





Figure 26 - Bristol Bulldog 
 
The first proposals for what would eventually become the Hawker Hurricane came 
directly from conversations between the Directorate for Technical Development and 
Sydney Camm, the Chief Engineer at Hawker Aviation in 1934.540 The proposal was 
for “a method of overcoming the limitation of the existing high speed Fury due to its 
biplane construction”.541 For the Deputy Director of Technical Development (DDTD) 
problems with the Hawker Fury had arisen largely due to the fact that Hawkers would 
not separate high speed development from military utility and felt that their new 
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proposal would be no different.542 The original Hawker proposal in January 1934 
specified a top speed of 255 mph at 15,000 ft with a fixed undercarriage.543 DDTD 
considered that “ultra high speed development must be associated with a monoplane” 
and that “the Supermarine F.7/30 [the Type 224] if successful may offer an 
opportunity to proceed with that work”.544  
The Hawker proposal was thus delayed between February and September 
1934 while performance figures were presented for the Supermarine Type 224. 
Eventually, it became clear that the performance of the Type 224 was poor and the 
engine was particularly unsuitable. Hawkers continued the design work in spite of 
having no assurances from the Air Ministry and redesigned their aircraft to take 
advantage of the Rolls-Royce P.V.12 engine, first run in 1933 (which would later 
become the Merlin) replacing the troublesome Goshawk.545 They considered that a 
speed “approaching 300 mph appears possible”.546 By September 1934, in light of the 
disappointing performance of the Supermarine F.7/30 design and the promise of a 
better, more flexible machine from Hawkers, DDTD recommended the “ordering of 
this aeroplane as part of this [high speed] work apart from the question of the Fury 
replacement”.547 His intention was to continue the search for an adequate replacement 
for the Fury (through Specification F.7/30, for instance) and continue with the 
Hawker proposal for a high speed monoplane. 
In the revised September 1934 proposal the Hawker design embodied many of 
the features that would be seen throughout the Second World War: it was a cantilever 
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monoplane and “every effort [had] been made to reduce the drag to the practicable 
minimum and to this end, the undercarriage, tail wheel and radiator are fully 
retractable and the pilot completely enclosed”.548 The proposal from Hawkers also 
highlighted the fact that it could be used as both an interceptor and as a zone fighter. 
In addition, the revised proposal contained provisions for a high lift device to keep the 
landing speed within the specification.  
The retractable undercarriage that was first investigated at Hawkers during December 
1933 was a key aspect of the design. The fixed cantilever undercarriage used by the 
Supermarine Type 224 and specified in the original Hawker proposal for a high-speed 
monoplane was largely incompatible with the desire for a truly high-speed aircraft as 
the parasitic drag of a fixed undercarriage could contribute up to around 40% of the 
total drag of a complete airframe.549 The elimination of such a component, even with 
the attendant weight attached to a retractable mechanism would prove significant. Yet 
the power of aero-engines was, before the Rolls-Royce P.V.12 at least, not enough in 
some cases to justify the increased weight of a retractable undercarriage 
mechanism.550 
While Sydney Camm was getting approval from the Air Ministry for his high-
speed low-wing monoplane fighter, Supermarine were in the midst of tendering for 
Specification F. 7/30. For the firm, F.7/30 was a minor disaster. Having spent years 
designing aircraft which were amongst the fastest in the world the Air Ministry 
requirement of 250 miles-per-hour seemed “a piece of cake”.551 Supermarine’s effort 
was the Type 224 and was, in the words of one prominent Supermarine historian 
                                                
548 Ibid., ‘Proposed Hawker Interceptor Monoplane’, 1st September, 1934 
549 S. Scott-Hall, "Wheel Brakes and Undercarriages," Flight XXIII, no. 50 (1931): p. 
1225. 
550 Anon., "British Aircraft," Flight XXIV, no. 47 (1932): p. 1072. 
551 Scott, J. D., Vickers – A History, (London, 1963), p. 179 
 230 
“decidedly unlovely”.552 It fell short of the Air Ministry requirement by 20 miles-per-
hour and the engine, the Rolls-Royce Goshawk, constantly overheated.553  
Sir Robert McLean, the Chairman of Vickers-Armstrong and Supermarine, felt that 
“they [his design team] would do much better by devoting their qualities not to the 
official experimental fighter, but to a real killer fighter…”.554 Thus began the ‘private 
venture’, outside of Air Ministry funding and control, between Supermarine and 
Rolls-Royce that was to become the iconic Spitfire. It was not a strictly private 
venture however, despite McLean’s best intentions. The Royal Aircraft Establishment 
(RAE) at Martlesham Heath contributed a ducted radiator for the pressure water-
cooled Merlin engine, calculating that it would give some thrust, significantly 
reducing the cooling drag.555 Initial reports prompted the Air Ministry to issue a new 
specification for the Supermarine design (F. 37/34) with specifications that made the 
aircraft qualify for adoption.  
It is often stated that the Spitfire was a direct descendant of the S series 
monoplane racers R. J. Mitchell designed for the Schneider Trophy. In actuality there 
was little about the Spitfire that resembled the earlier S series aircraft. The aircraft 
designed for the Schneider Trophy did, however, convince Mitchell that the 
monoplane was the superior form in terms of performance, and that for fighter 
aircraft, where performance was absolutely paramount, the monoplane must be used. 
This is evidenced by his Type 224 which, although a failure, did not dissuade him 
from designing monoplanes.   
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The Schneider Trophy was also significant in the eventual development of the Spitfire 
as it began an important relationship between Supermarine and Rolls-Royce who 
would eventually supply the Merlin engine for use in both the Spitfire and the 
Hurricane. 
The poor performance of the Type 224 in the F.7/30 trials prompted an 
immediate response from Supermarine. Even as the Type 224 was undergoing 
preliminary trials at the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Martlesham Heath, 
Supermarine were discussing an improved design with the Air Ministry.556 Although 
heavily based on the Type 224 design Mitchell systematically removed or changed all 
the things he believed were impeding performance. The new design, the Type 300, 
was to have a retractable undercarriage, it was to lose its corrugated wing leading 
edge and reduced the span by six feet. All these things would improve the 
performance and a general clean up of the design added to this. Chief Draughtsman at 
Supermarine, Joe Smith, reported that Mitchell was: 
…an inveterate drawer on drawings, particularly general arrangements. He would modify the 
lines of an aircraft with the softest pencil he could find, and then re-modify over the top with 
progressively thicker lines, until one would finally be faced with a new outline of lines about 
three-sixtheenths of an inch thick. But the results were always worth while, and the centre of 
the line was usually accepted when the thing was redrawn.557 
The estimated increase in speed resulting from these changes was around 30 mph to 
give a top speed of roughly 265 mph using the Goshawk engine. The Type 300 was 
also to be included in the High Speed development programme and that it should be 
ordered as  
…a suitable type on which to overcome many of the problems we shall have later with the 8 
gun interceptor e.g. the combination of steam cooling, retractable undercarriage and guns in 
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the wings. It will also be a most interesting experiment with wing flaps on a high performance 
monoplane.558 
The decision to order the modified Supermarine F.7/30 (the newly designated Type 
300) design along with the Hawker high-speed monoplane shows that the Department 
of the AMSR “demonstrated an awareness of need and speed of decision making for 
which the department is seldom given credit”.559 
 As mentioned above, the Hawker high-speed experimental monoplane was 
being developed at the same time as the Supermarine F.7/30 design, though along 
different lines and from different origins. During the Spring of 1934 the Hawker Fury 
replacement was resurrected after some delay. Revised performance estimates were 
undertaken to account for more modern engines, the Fairey Prince and Rolls-Royce 
PV. 12, both liquid cooled in-line 785 hp engines. Squadron Leader Sorely, de facto 
head of the Operational Requirement (OR) section recommended that top speed 
should be prioritised over Rate of Climb (ROC).560 This change in priorities 
represented a major shift in one of the main requirements for home defence single 
seat fighter aircraft as ROC had always been the preferred optimisation. Defining the 
operational requirements for the Fury replacement became more urgent following 
reports from overseas as the Director of Technical Development [DTD] related to the 
OR section: 
We receive from [Air Intelligence] reports of high speeds claimed for fighters built abroad. As 
our new Fighter Specifications F.7/30, F.5/33, and F.22/33 all sacrifice performance for other 
operational requirements, the situation may arise shortly that our fastest fighter is very much 
slower than some foreign fighters.561 
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Specification F.5/34 was issued in November 1934 and was intended to produce a 
new interception day fighter. It called for a maximum speed of not less than 275 mph 
at 15,000 ft and it was to be armed with eight machine guns562 and prototypes were 
ordered from Bristol and Gloster in 1935.563 Some time later, however, the restriction 
to day flying only, as required by interception fighters, was dropped and specification 
F.5/34 (and the Bristol and Gloster machines) were brought into line with the F.10/35 
Zone fighter specification. 
 The F.10/35 specification for a new zone fighter continued the Fury 
replacement’s priorities of speed and firepower over ROC and manoeuvrability. 
Whereas the issue of landing speed had held up F.7/30 for some time, it was not 
discussed at all in F. 10/35. The use of flaps to control landing speed without 
sacrificing the top speed too much was widespread by 1935.564 
Specification F.10/35 was written with the Hawkers high-speed monoplane 
proposal and the Supermarine Type 300 in mind. In general terms the Air Staff 
required:  
…a single-engine, single-seater day and night fighter which can fulfil the following conditions:- 
a. Have a speed in excess of the contemporary bomber of at least 40 mph at 15,000 ft.  
b. Have a number of forward firing machine guns that can produce the maximum hitting 
power possible in the short space of time available for one attack. To attain this object it 
is proposed to mount as many guns as possible and it is considered the eight guns should 
be provided. 
By this time, Air Ministry had moved from issuing highly specific, and, according to 
the Society of British Aircraft Constructors, highly restrictive specifications to ones 
that were more general, emphasising, as in the case of F.10/35 “the maximum 
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possible”. In terms of speed the aircraft should be capable of “not less than 310 mph 
at 15,000 ft” and the rate-of-climb should be “the best possible to 20,000 ft, but 
secondary to speed and hitting power”. In terms of armaments the Air Staff specified 
that not less than six guns “but eight are desirable” and the guns themselves were to 
be located outside the airscrew.565 To give some idea of just how far specifications 
had come, in 1931 when F.7/30 was issued it was several pages long and contained 
fourteen very detailed items for designers to consider. F.10/35 was two pages long 
and contained seven short items the most specific of which concerned performance. 
Hawker and Supermarine had to a great extent demonstrated to the Air Staff what 
designers could do if allowed a freer hand in the conception of their aircraft.  
The development of the Spitfire yields some important information about 
relations between the firm and the Air Ministry. The first level-speed runs for the 
Spitfire were disappointing, showing a top-speed of some 335 miles-per-hour, which 
was little more than the Hawker Hurricane (being developed at the same time).566 The 
Ministry had much higher hopes for the Spitfire: in 1936 the Air Member for 
Research and Development (AMRD) noted that “…[there is] no doubt that the 
Supermarine design holds out the best promise of providing the best aeroplane for the 
use of the service”567. However, because the Spitfire was more time consuming to 
make, it needed to have a significant advantage in speed over the Hurricane, or 
production would not be justified.568 Due to the disappointing initial speed, there was 
little point in sending the prototype to the RAE for official trials until a greater 
performance could be achieved. The fixed-pitch wooden propeller came under 
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suspicion and was changed, affording an extra 13 miles-per-hour, giving a maximum 
speed of 348.569 
 Jeffrey Quill, a Supermarine test pilot, recounted that: 
K5054 [the Spitfire prototype] was flush-riveted throughout in order to achieve the smoothest 
possible surface finish, which the aerodynamicists regarded as vital for drag reduction at high-
speed. But since flush riveting was difficult, expensive and time-consuming in production, a 
practical trial was decided upon. Several bags of dried split peas were purchased…To each of 
the many thousands of flush-headed rivets all over the outer surface of the aircraft, a split-pea 
was attached…thereby virtually converting each into a round-headed rivet. I then took the 
aircraft up and carried out a very careful series of level-speed runs…the effect on the aircraft’s 
performance was certainly significant – something in the order of 22 m.p.h [was lost].570 
While clearly unconventional, this relatively inexpensive set of tests (carried out by 
the firm) afforded them the opportunity to identify where the more expensive and 
time-consuming flush riveting could be avoided.  
 
REARMAMENT: 1934-1939 
This section will examine the rearmament schemes between 1934 and 1939. The 
plans themselves had limited effect on the shaping of aircraft technology but they are 
important in understanding RAF and Air Ministry policy during the years leading to 
the Second World War. Parity with the German Luftwaffe was paramount, as was 
bringing through the most advanced first-line fighter aircraft that could be developed. 
They also show the Air Ministry’s increasing commitment to the ‘modern’ monoplane 
fighter.  
In 1931 the Aircraft Supply Committee reported that on average it took between 5 ½ 
and 6 ½ years from conception to the first delivery of aircraft to the RAF (up to 8 
                                                
569 Quill, Spitfire, p. 95 
570 Ibid. p. 108 
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years for a large aircraft such as a bomber).571 Hand in hand with the rearmament 
programmes that would come, the Air Ministry was anxious to accelerate the design 
and development of aircraft. A report on new types of service aircraft noted that: 
The subject of delays and delivery of experimental aircraft has been under discussion with the 
SBAC for some time, but last year the necessity of expansion gave it a new and altogether 
greater prominence.572  
And also that: 
It is impossible to pursue any rational plan of re-arming unless new types can be developed so 
as to be ready when they are required: and to ensure acceptance of such a programme by the 
firms it is necessary that it should be vigorously and impartially enforced…it has always been 
possible for the constructor to escape criticism for his failure to comply with delivery 
promises, on the plea (justified or not) of interruptions in production through meeting 
[Directorate of Technical Development] requirements. There is widespread demand in the 
industry for a freer hand and it is considered that if this demand is accepted it should lead not 
only to quicker deliveries but to more enterprising and original design.573 
The beginnings of rearmament in 1934 were stimulated by several factors, not least of 
which was the changing political situation in Europe. However, the expansion of the 
military aircraft industry was based upon the government’s realisation that their small 
“ring” of manufacturers would not be sufficient in times of war.574 This subject was 
tackled in 1927, and as a result the ‘shadow factories’ scheme of 1936 was based 
upon this comprehension.575 So how did the military aircraft industry expand and 
cope with the changing demand of the government?  
                                                
571 NA AIR 6/22 – ‘New Types of Service Aircraft – Acceleration of Design and 
Development’, Undated, likely 1935 due to the reference of expansion programmes 
beginning the previous year., p. 1 
572 Ibid. 
573 Ibid., p. 2 
574 Fearon, Peter. ‘The British Airframe Industry and the State, 1918-1935’, The 
Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 27, No. 2, (May, 1974) p. 8  
575 Ibid., p. 8 
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The ‘ring system’, conceived in 1919 succeeded in its objective of keeping a hub of 
aircraft and engine manufacturers operational during the 1920s when the market for 
new aircraft was very low. While the system did keep the industry alive during this 
period it was limited, primarily by the funding available to the Air Ministry for the 
procurement of new aircraft at this time.576 Furthermore, it had the undesirable effect 
of producing too many different types of aircraft, and short production runs made the 
aircraft that were produced more expensive. The most pressing problem however, was 
that no single firm could adequately gauge production runs because orders were given 
on a yearly basis. With this in mind we must now turn to the beginnings of expansion 
of the industry and its relative place within the world market for military aircraft. 
Having taken into consideration these problems of the aircraft industry in 
1925577 the government set about the planning of the expansion of the industry with a 
series of ‘Schemes’. The first major and focused example of these, ‘Scheme C’, did 
not appear until 1935, but it was the first plan for the general expansion of the military 
aircraft industry and subsequently the RAF.578 The plan was set to begin in May 1935 
and give the Metropolitan Air Force (MAF)579 a first-line strength of 1,512 aircraft. 
Under this scheme some 3,800 aircraft would need to be produced by 1937. It was 
still limited, in that aircraft of the modern design, that is, all metal constructed 
monoplanes, were still being ordered in small quantities.580 This was revised in the 
next plan ‘Scheme F’, which made the procurement of modern monoplanes a high 
                                                
576 However, government expenditure on the Air Force increased from 1923-1933; 
see Postan, British War Production, Table 1, p. 2 
577 Fearon, Peter. ‘The British Airframe Industry and the State, 1918-1935’, The 
Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 27, No. 2, (May, 1974) p. 9 
578 Ritchie, Industry and Air Power, p. 3 
579 The MAF was for the defence of Great Britain and London.  
580 Ibid., pp. 41-2, Note: Examples of these small production orders for the modern 
design are given as 150 for the Fairey ‘Battle’ and 96 for the Vickers ‘Wellesley’.  
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priority, ordering 600 Hurricanes in February 1936.581 An interesting point is raised 
here. Though the first Hurricanes were ordered in February 1936, the first Spitfires 
were ordered four months later in June. 300 Spitfires were ordered, to be produced by 
March 1939582. Declinist historians often turn to the fact that the first Spitfires were 
not delivered until seven months after the first Hurricanes as an indication of the 
inefficiency of Supermarine583, but as we will see later on there were several factors 
that influenced these delivery times. Such as the continuous upgrading of the Spitfire 
and the Rolls-Royce Merlin aero-engine, and we must also look at the Air Ministry’s 
considerations over which was the better aircraft.  
In any event, it was not the function of the ‘Scheme’ system to provide Britain 
with anything close to war production - that would come later in the War Potential 
Programme.584 However, it is possible to chart the progress of the ‘Scheme’ system 
with the changing political situation in Europe. ‘Scheme L’ was accepted after the 
Anschluss and was to increase the MAF first-line strength by 37 per-cent, and within 
this figure, fighter production was to be raised by 45 per-cent585, this would require 
the production of 12,000 aircraft over two years. Again, following the Munich crisis 
the decision was taken to further increase the first-line fighter strength by twelve 
squadrons, or 192 aircraft.586 We must now turn to specifics, and look at the debates 
surrounding the expansion of production.  
Barnett’s major argument pertaining to aircraft production is that production 
quotas were never fully met and that we can use this as a measure of its effectiveness. 
                                                
581 Ibid., p. 42 
582 NA AVIA 46/119 Mr Grinstead’s Papers 
583 Barnett, Audit, p. 139 
584 Ritchie, Industry and Air Power, p. 3, this would aim to give Britain the capacity 
for producing 2000 aircraft per month by the end of 1941. 
585 Ibid., p. 43 
586 Ibid., p. 43 
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This is a view shared by Postan in his British War Production, but it is misleading. 
While it is true that production quotas for aircraft were not, for the most part, fully 
met, we must again apply our considerations of relativity. From 1934 Germany’s 
expansion programmes were revised almost every time Britain’s were (out of chance 
and necessity rather than by design). The first German Lieferprogramme, called for 
only 294 aircraft, however, a substantial revision was made with the second 
Lieferprogramme aiming to produce 17,015 aircraft in the 1934-1938 period, the 
majority of which was to be trainer aircraft.587 However, targets could not always be 
met and eight subsequent revisions were made to German plans between November 
1936 and March 1939, ending with Plan 11, and a forecasted production of 24, 317 
aircraft over thirty-seven months.588 The two major problems that necessitated this 
fairly constant updating of aircraft production plans were, firstly, the number of new 
types to be introduced constantly changed, and secondly, modifications to existing 
types held up production.589 These are the same problems that Britain, and in fact 
every other nation, faced. In France, from 1932 until 1934 they produced no aircraft at 
all; the situation there was old equipment and small orders, which could not be 
fulfilled by the available industrial and administrative resources.590 
 1932 1933 1934 1935 
France - - - 785 
Germany 36 368 1,986 3,183 
USA 593 466 437 459 
Great Britain 445 633 740 1,140 
Aircraft Production of the Major Powers 1932-35591 
                                                
587 Richard Overy, "The German Pre-War Aircraft Production Plans: November 1936-
April 1939," The English Historical Review 90, no. 375 (1975): pp. 1-3. 
588 Ibid., p. 3 
589 Ibid., p. 2 
590 Richard Overy, The Air War  (New York1980). p. 21. 
591 Ibid., p. 21 
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Table 1 illustrates the international situation from 1932-35, and by 1935 air parity 
with Germany had become a serious problem, this was achieved and then exceeded 
but not until later on. We cannot judge the health of the industry by looking at its 
output alone, though a steady rise in the production of aircraft can be seen in the table 
above, and this continued until the end of the Second World War. 
In Britain, the first general expansion scheme, Scheme ‘A’, was introduced in 
1934 and aimed to produce 1,252 first-line aircraft.592 Being far too limited this was 
consequently scrapped in favour of the much more concentrated Scheme ‘C’.  This 
scheme aimed to produce 4,126 aircraft and 4,372 engines over the next two years.593   
Furthermore, in 1934, the government promised air parity with Germany, who 
was by then rearming. However, it was also the product of a series of reports 
commissioned by the Air Ministry to investigate British aircraft production. 
Commencing in 1931, the Aircraft Supply Committee (ASC) provided the Air 
Ministry with an annual overview of aircraft production. After World War One, 
Britain had a surplus of 22,600 airframes and 38,500 aero-engines.594 In part, it was 
because of this massive surplus that it took so long for the Air Ministry to address the 
problems of obsolete types of aircraft and also the introduction of modern types.  




1923 £3,602,000 £129,000 
1924 £5,341,000 £97,000 
1925 £5,598,000 £167,000 
                                                
592 Ritchie, Industry and Air Power, p. 41 Note: This scheme was not due for 
completion until 1939. 
593 NA T161/836 – Treasury Memo, RAF Expansion (1935) 
594 NA AIR 2/1322 – ASC Report (1931), Appendix IV, p. 35 
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1926 £5,008,000 £308,000 
1927 £5,080,000 £308,000 
1928 £5,094,000 £250,000 
1929 £5,837,000 £332,000 
1930 £6,487,000 £248,000 
       Air Ministry Expenditure 1923-30595 
 
So, by 1935, expenditure on the RAF had risen considerably, indeed, enough for the 
first general expansion programmes to be brought in. Scheme ‘C’ is the first clear 
illustration that the Air Ministry had moved from its counter-productive sensibilities 
of small production runs and the constant introduction of new types of aircraft, to a 
more concentrated programme of fewer types and longer production runs, essentially 
enabling more aircraft to be built. However, the major benefit from Scheme ‘C’ was 
the incorporation of the all-new, all-metal monoplane.596 The Air Ministry had been 
suspicious of the change to this radical new technology for several reasons; in the first 
instance, it was a matter of cost. The change to the metal monoplane required the 
large-scale investment in new jigs and tools for metal construction costing nearly 
£200,000 for each facility.597 While this is a reasonable concern, there was a further 
worry that the small orders being farmed out by the Air Ministry would not be 
sufficient to make this change worthwhile.  
THE EXPANSION OF THE RAF: 1935-39 
So, as has been seen, it was in 1935 that the first general expansion orders for the 
RAF commenced. The Treasury estimated the cost of the 4,126 airframes and the 
4,372 engines under Scheme ‘C’ at £12,500,000 spread over two years. The Air 
                                                
595 NA AIR 2/1322 – ASC Report (1931) 
596 Ritchie, Industry and Air Power, p. 3 
597 NA AIR 20/3575 – Director of Aircraft Production (D.A.P) Report on Airframe 
Supply, 10th January 1938 p. 6 
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Ministry, however, gave an estimate rather higher than that, some £16,500,000. This 
led Mr E.E. Bridges of the Treasury to write to Mr A.H. Self of the Air Ministry that 
“…we are growing accustomed to shocks in these days; but your statement that the 
provisional total of £12,500,000 for the expansion scheme…has risen to £16,500,000, 
ranks as amongst the largest and least pleasant shocks hitherto administered to us”.598 
Self replied that “…it should come out at about £16,000,000 against the £16,500,000 
mentioned in my letter…”.599 With the Air Ministry justiying this additional spending 
by the “ordering of additional aircraft of new types…to eliminate certain of the older 
and smaller types” and also that “it is the result of purchasing…larger airframes, 
taking two engines…”.600 This exchange between departments of the government 
serves two purposes. Firstly, it illustrates the obvious need of the Air Ministry to 
obtain Treasury approval for spending, but secondly, and more importantly, it shows 
the determination of the Air Ministry to produce more modern types of aircraft, and in 
larger numbers than before. The mention of the twin-engine aircraft is particularly 
revealing as it shows the willingness of the Air Ministry to include medium 
monoplane bombers within the makeup of RAF expansion. This justifies the rather 
substantial increase noted by Mr Self, as the Treasury were no doubt working with old 






                                                
598 NA T161/836 – E.E. Bridges to A.H. Self, 10th September 1935 










A (1934-39) 1,252 n/a n/a 
C (1935-37) 1,512 1,900 1,108 (1934) 
F (1936-39) 1,736 2,667 1,807 (1935) 
L (1938-40) 2,373 6,000 2,218 (1937) 
Table 3 - British Air Rearmament Programmes, 1934-40601 
 
In 1936 it was decided to increase the RAF expansion plans again, this time Scheme 
‘F’ aimed to produce a force of 124 squadrons or a capacity of 1700 airframes per 
month.602 Under this scheme some 24,200 aircraft would be required in the first year 
of a war.603 This scheme, as is the case with the others, was not designed to give 
anything like war production. It was intended as a deterrent, and also to allow 
sufficient reserve for the first year of a war.604 The final extension of the RAF came 
with Scheme ‘L’, which allowed for a significant increase in the number of first-line 
aircraft as well as shortening the time allowed for completion. It also made provisions 
for a more adequate reserve, introduced even more modern aircraft, and placed an 
emphasis on single seat fighters (namely the Hurricane and Spitfire types) raising 
their number by 45 per cent.605 These expansion schemes led, particularly in the 
beginning, to several realisations. Firstly, that more production space would be 
required if these plans were to be completed in full and that more employees would be 
                                                
601 Ritchie, Industry and Air Power, p. 42, the dates in  the left hand column indicate 
the range in years of the programme. 
602 NA AIR 20/3575 – R. Abraham to Air Member for Supply and Organisation 
(A.M.S.O), 15th January 1938 
603 NA AIR 20/3575 – R. Abraham to A.M.S.O, 12th May 1937 
604 NA AIR 20/3575 – R. Abraham to D.A.P, 15th March 1937 
605 Ritchie, Industry and Air Power, p, 43 
 244 
needed to fill said space. Secondly, it led to an ongoing investigation into the 





























Based on archival research this thesis provides a definitive account of British fighter 
development during the inter-war years. It emerged from two main issues. First, to 
some extent it has sought to refute certain declinist claims about the nature of the 
British inter-war military aircraft industry, but the thesis itself has been shaped largely 
by concerns that both declinist and revisionist history has oversimplified the nature of 
technological change and the place of such change in the story of inter-war industry 
and aircraft development. 
As noted at the beginning of the thesis, the history of aviation technology has 
never gone far enough in explaining how technological change occurred. The contexts 
in which decisions were made are often glossed over or ignored altogether and the 
technology (the aircraft) is used for a different purpose. Work centred around industry 
only ever gives us an idea of how aircraft were manufactured, not how, or why, they 
were conceived, designed, tested, altered and then produced. Such histories will tend 
to use the aircraft itself as a symptom of some wider point being made such as an 
inefficient industrial framework, a governing body uninterested in developing the 
‘best’ technology and so on.  
Narrative histories focusing on the various innovations that led from the 
wooden biplane to the metal monoplane have already been done. What they miss is 
any sense at all of the complexity in technological change, how decisions and choices 
were made and the impact or influence of technology on the actors and institutions 
governing it. They are, by and large, determinist in nature with innovation following a 
linear and logical path and where alternatives are dismissed as being doomed from the 
outset. This thesis has, therefore, attempted to fill this gap and demonstrate that an 
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awareness of Science and Technology Studies approaches can help to provide a fuller 
history of technological changes.  
In the first place this is an exercise in the history of technology. As much as it 
is a history of a particular technology, it also seeks to make a contribution to Science 
and Technology Studies. I have not attempted to take a particular standpoint – at least 
not explicitly – such as the Strong Programme, though undoubtedly it has shaped my 
research agenda. In removing the need to make any sort of normative judgement as to 
the quality, efficiency or competence of the industry, government and so on, I have 
been able to focus on telling the story of a technological development as it happened. 
The consequences of this for my analysis are largely positive as I have been 
able to factor into the story all kinds of evidence and thus I have not been hamstrung 
by attempting to build a particular case one way or another – the story is about how a 
technological change occurred, not an appraisal of that change. In instances where I 
have been able to make judgements, such as Trenchard’s largely negative effect on 
technological progress I believe such claims are backed up convincingly by the 
evidence. I cannot say that this is an entirely symmetrical or objective history – such a 
thing is impossible – but in removing the need for normative judgements and the need 
to make a case for them I have been able to come much closer to doing that than I 
otherwise would have.  
 
Methodology 
A social constructionist position has been taken within this thesis and it has shaped 
the research design and the ways in which the data was collected and analysed. The 
central tenant as applied here is that knowledge, and the technology produced through 
that knowledge is socially constructed. That is, not dependent upon a single actor or 
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institution, but rather, produced through interaction between an evolving network of 
different actors and institutions. A broad critical realist perspective is also present 
here centring around the notion that while knowledge and technology may be 
constructed socially, we must nevertheless be aware of very real material constraints 
to this process. Given the subject matter of this thesis, Pickersgill’s example of critical 
realism is particularly apt:  
...a plane, for instance, cannot just be talked into existence, but its components 
cannot be formed and fit together except through social action, nor can the 
cultural meanings ascribed to planes and flight be reduced to the artefacts of 
their technology.606 
The  research process did nothing but strengthen the view presented here that in order 
to adequately engage with the process of technological change we must focus on the 
idea that technology is a social product. While archive work was in this case the only 
option, the epistemological standpoints mentioned above helped to shape the research 
process and focus on certain types of data.  
 
Archives 
The research presented in this thesis was conducted in archives and libraries. Given 
the period in time that this thesis covers the consequences of this kind of research are 
self-evident but are nevertheless worth mentioning. In the first place other kinds of 
research (interviews, surveys, ethnography) were rendered impossible. The reliance 
on archival holdings presented many of the standard problems with research of this 
nature, namely that one can only interrogate a document to a certain point. It is not 
                                                
606 Pickersgill, M., (2009), Ordering Disorderly Personalities: Co-Producing 
Antisocial Personality Disorder Through Policy, Science and Standards, Ph.D. 
Thesis. University of Nottingham., p. 80 
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possible to ask questions of a document, or probe an interesting point that is only 
briefly mentioned. It arrives fully formed and carries with it all the assumptions, 
beliefs and prejudices of the author (or authors).  
 In the main, the holdings at the National Archives (Kew) were of the highest 
importance. While a concentration on documents of this nature may seem limiting at 
first, it quickly became apparent that there was a wide range of different types of 
source. Memoranda from different departments and circulated between different 
sections of the Air Ministry for comment were particularly useful. Collected 
correspondence between the Ministry and the industry was also incredibly valuable 
given the destruction of most company archives during the 1960s. It allowed as 
complete a look at the system of organisation of aircraft development as is possible to 
achieve. Broadly, the data collected fell into four main categories: official 
correspondence, executive memoranda, technical papers and testing literature.  
 The analysis of the data differed depending on the content. It was deemed 
necessary to begin with correspondence and memoranda. These documents offered 
the greatest insight into the shaping of policy, the thinking of participant actors about 
how aircraft ought to develop and how best to achieve those goals. Also, it was 
extremely useful for the identification of choice points and charting the process by 
which decisions and choices were made. The technical papers and testing literature on 
the other hand provided good insight into how aircraft were tested and more 
importantly how this information was appraised at the Air Ministry and by the 
industry.  
  
‘Declinism’, ‘Revisionism’, and the British Military Aircraft Industry 
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One of the main aims of this research, and in large part the reason for its being was a 
dissatisfaction with the existing historiography and the declinist school in particular. 
It might be supposed that engaging directly with declinist historians like Correlli 
Barnett is engaging with a straw man. I would disagree with that view. Given the 
influence of such work on subsequent generations of historian and the pervasiveness 
of an inaccurate view of British science, technology and industry in this period it is 
vital to continue to demonstrate how inaccurate and misleading such claims are. 
Particularly, it would seem, with regards to aircraft. Similarly, the newer revisionist 
school seeks to address the balance by claiming the exact opposite – that there was no 
‘failure’, only success. The primary concern here is not the discussion about 
industries or relative vs. absolute economic decline, but their treatment of the 
technology.  
 If one looks hard enough it is possible to find technologies (and the stories of 
their development) that support any wider assertion as to the health of the industry or 
the competence of those working within it. Claims about the ill health of the industry 
and its technology might cite the fact that F.7/30 failed to produce a decent 
monoplane fighter, or worse still, that the winner was a perfectly conventional 
biplane. Certainly that is David Divine’s discourse, but again, there is no sense at all 
of what was really going on, merely what the result of the specification was and that 
the result was not good enough. For example, his assessment of F.7/30 is simply that 
“four years had been lost over the absurdities of [it]”.607 In fact, his assertion that the 
Air Ministry were only interested in developing a monoplane from 1933 is incorrect 
as F.7/30 (formulated between 1928 and 1929) strongly suggested exploring the 
monoplane and indeed that such designs would be preferable.  
                                                
607 David Divine, The Broken Wing - A Study in the British Exercise of Air Power  
(Essex: Cheltenham Press, 1966). p. 182 
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 For revisionists like Edgerton trying to rectify what he saw as highly 
misleading thinking it was found necessary to construct an entirely opposite case in 
which the British aeronautical endeavour was consistently healthy and well managed 
much in keeping with his position on British industrial, scientific and technological 
status. On balance, the revisionist account is more accurate, however, the same 
problems persist within this literature. The technology is merely a symptom of a 
healthy industry and explanations about its development are largely ignored. This 
research has highlighted weaknesses within the existing historiography and offers an 
alternative to both schools’ treatment of technology and its development by 
demonstrating that their conclusions are based on partial or misleading conceptions of 
technological development generally, and of the nature of military aircraft 
procurement in particular.  
 The metal monoplane of 1939 was more than a decade in the making. 
Excluding the switch from wood to metal which was completed by 1925 and widely 
utilised in biplane designs, the 1939 fighter relied upon a host of incremental and 
some radical changes to evolve. The pace at which these changes took place was 
governed largely by how the idea of an air war was conceived and how those ideas 
changed over time. Fighter aircraft were not a priority throughout the 1920s. 
Trenchard’s doctrine of a strong bomber offensive made sure that fighters could only 
really be used for home defence and even then, in his view, they would achieve very 
little by way of protection (they existed ostensibly to create a positive effect on 
national morale). This is why we see that in the late 1920s, when F.7/30 was 
beginning to be formulated, discussions of the suitability of monoplanes and 
alternative conceptions of the fighter aircraft took place at a relatively low level 
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within the Air Ministry, and it was not until 1930 when Trenchard left that more 
progressive discussions about monoplanes took place at a higher level.  
On the technical side there were various obstacles that needed to be overcome. 
Retractable landing gear was identified as being crucial if the monoplane was to be 
worthwhile and present a truly better alternative to the biplane. At first they were 
deemed too heavy to be of any real use as the added weight negated any aerodynamic 
benefit from removing a fixed undercarriage. As engine power increased the parasitic 
drag of a fixed undercarriage became worse and worse and there came a point where 
retracting it, despite the increase in weight, produced large gains in performance. 
Engines themselves were developed differently to the rest of the aircraft, but the 
development of aeronautical technology as a whole depended a great deal on the 
increase in power and the altitudes at which engines could safely operate.  
 The Schneider Trophy is another example of a significant part of the story that 
is given cursory treatment in the existing historiography. For Barnett, Britain’s 
eventual outright victory was a “shop window triumph”. For Edgerton, the Schneider 
aircraft demonstrate the difficulty of using speed and structure as the only indices to 
describe an aircraft. However, neither look beyond the final aircraft itself. The Trophy 
was an incredibly useful endeavour for the British aeronautical establishment. It 
allowed for relatively risk-free innovation. Though initially offering natural benefits 
over the monoplane, one reason the biplane persisted for as long as it did as the 
dominant design in military aircraft was the risk (much higher during the 1920s and 
early 1930s) of failure and the correspondingly high rewards for success. As such, 
designs were tendered which designers believed offered the best chance of being 
accepted.  
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 The switch to the monoplane in racing aircraft around 1924 (almost a decade 
before such successful designs saw service with the RAF) resulted from two things. 
Firstly, there was the realisation that Curtiss had almost perfected the racing biplane 
and as Mitchell saw it, further progress along such lines would be painstakingly slow. 
The monoplane was fresh ground, and the Trophy allowed for highly concentrated 
aerodynamic research to take place largely funded by the Air Ministry. The reward 
for success in the competition was mostly an increase in reputation and there was 
little in the way of direct financial gain. However, the knowledge gained through the 
research conducted into Schneider aircraft was invaluable. The competition “proved” 
the superiority of the monoplane for performance and the research conducted in 
aerodynamics would be crucial in years to come. All of this is ignored or missed in 
the conventional history. In terms of consensus building the Supermarine ‘S’ series of 
Schneider racers provided empirical proof to everyone watching them that the 
monoplane was the superior performance aircraft. Translating that into a functional 
military machine was the difficulty and would not be realised until the Spitfire and 
Hurricane of 1936. 
More significantly, it should be clear at this point that looking more closely at 
the complexities involved in aircraft conception, design, construction and 
development offer a sharp counterpoint for the often simplified and misleading 
histories produced thus far. Studies centred around an economic, business or 
industrial standpoint cannot provide any sort of meaningful analysis of technology. 
Using the technology as a convenient symptom of their wider analyses cannot be 
considered accurate unless the technology is treated properly and this means looking 
into the social aspects of its creation and change such as the different and varying 
social structures (Air Ministry, SBAC or industry) that evolved over the inter-war 
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years. It also means looking at how research was conducted and how the results of 
that research was utilised.  
This is not meant as a contribution to the literature of inter-war business and 
industrial history, although it does contribute to it. In engaging with it, however, I 
have been able to draw out some weaknesses and offer an alternative conception of 
the state of British military aircraft in the period. How they were conceived, 
developed, manufactured and used. Perhaps most importantly is the fact that by 
utilising concepts from the field of Science and Technology Studies, I have been able 
to provide a deeper understanding of how need and requirement were formulated and 
a real insight into how the whole system of aircraft procurement worked.  
The discourse of declinist historians has been largely debunked by the work of 
the newer revisionist school, though not without limitations. As we have noted, both 
treat the technology in a somewhat throwaway manner. However, while the 
revisionists present a more accurate picture of the socio-technical system involved in 
developing military aircraft, declinist appraisals of the technology and its system of 
production are largely without merit. There are glaring inaccuracies and the use of 
highly selective sources to back up arguments made for the delay in technological 
development. For example, in buttressing his assertion that innovation of smaller 
component technologies was non-existent in Britain, Barnett quotes Clement Attlee 
(then leader of the opposition) speaking in 1938: 
Why is [it] that despite the vast sums of money spent on research at 
Farnborough and elsewhere, all the principle inventions seem to come from 
abroad, e.g., the retractable undercarriage, variable pitch screw, etc etc….608 
                                                
608 Barnett, Audit, p. 129 
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We have seen, however, that work on the retractable undercarriage commenced as 
early as the mid-1920s through George Dowty, and the retractable mechanisms used 
by Supermarine and Hawker for the Spitfire and Hurricane were developed ‘in-
house’. Variable pitch screws, heating systems for guns working at altitude, ducted 
radiators, the Handley Page ‘slot’ wing were all developed at firms within the British 
industry. This is not to say, of course, that many innovations did not come from 
abroad. The wet-sleeve monobloc engine came from the United States, metal 
construction was truly pioneered and implemented with great success in Germany and 
some of the finest navigational components also came from there.  
 For declinist historians the picture painted of British industry and its technical 
ability is enough to suggest that technological failure was commonplace, that 
innovation was stagnant and that management of the socio-technical system was 
flawed. However, if we work backwards, taking the latter as our starting point and 
appraise it properly a different picture emerges. It has been made clear that there were 
instances of success and failure as well as examples of mismanagement and sensible, 
creative courses of action identified and swiftly taken.  
 
STS and Historiography 
It is argued here that based on the case made in this thesis the use of theoretical 
frameworks and concepts from STS can be highly beneficial to the historical study of 
technological change. The limited, one-sided appraisal of technology attributed to the 
existing historiography can be radically opened up when viewed through an STS lens. 
Fundamentally, the history of technology can benefit from such a synthesis through 
an awareness of complexity in technological change and its dependence on many 
different, intertwined contextual factors.  
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 STS as a discipline demands that we be aware of the specific contexts within 
which a technology is created and develops. It asks that we treat each development 
symmetrically, that each development be explained in the same terms regardless of 
success or failure. Declinist literature regarding the inter-war aviation industry and its 
technology consistently compare some approximation of what happened with what 
they believed should have happened. For example, monoplane fighters as they existed 
in the RAF in 1939 should, for them, have been present from the early 1930s because 
that is what other nations (ostensibly Germany and the United States) were able to 
achieve. 
 David Divine has criticised specification F.7/30 and its failure to produce a 
quality monoplane for the service. His critique is based on a misreading of the 
specification and the mistaken belief that the Air Ministry were hostile to the idea of a 
monoplane. The Air Ministry is seen as being even further at fault because it was a 
relatively conventional biplane that was chosen, never mind its quality and the fact 
that the Gloster Gladiator saw service well into the Second World War. His treatment 
of the technology is cursory and while keen to judge the specification, its results and 
the industry, he makes no attempt to understand the context in which the events took 
place.  
 An STS approach also requires that we dispense with normative judgements 
appraising the outcome of events as ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Furthermore, it is argued here 
that even without an STS centred approach to technological history an appraisal of the 
pace of technological change in terms of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ is largely ineffectual as it 
does not add anything to our understanding of it. We may say that the management of 
a particular innovation was weakened by the personal prejudices of some within the 
Air Ministry or that the influence of a particular actor was a significant factor in the 
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success of another. However, surely we cannot dismiss an entire specification and its 
outcome as an ‘absurdity’ simply because Germany had monoplanes and so anything 
less than that must be deemed a failure.  
 Perhaps the most useful aspect of an STS perspective as applied to the history 
of technology is that it allows us to be highly flexible in terms of the collection and 
analysis of data. Our objective was to utilise concepts from STS to construct a series 
of stories designed to highlight the particularly complex nature of technological 
change. The concepts and theories chosen demanded that in the first instance the 
selection of data focused upon anything that had a bearing on technical development 
at any point on the spectrum (for example, engineers, designers, scientists and 
policymakers). The use of Hughes’ concept of the socio-technical system aided in 
mapping out these points, determining their relative influence on the creation, 
development and shaping of aircraft technology.   
 But why is an STS centred approach any better than the standard 
declinist/revisionist discourse that has gone before? Surely it is just a different 
approach to a different set of questions. It is argued here that a key component of both 
schools of thought is the use of technology to support arguments made about the 
management of technological change and the pace at which it was completed but that 
incomplete, partial or misleading discussions about these particular technologies do 
something quite opposite when viewed under an STS framework.  
We will turn now to Science and Technology Studies, the concepts used 
within this thesis to shape the research and analysis of data, the consequences of its 
use and how in so doing a more complete history of technology and the system 
surrounding its development may be achieved. 
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Presumptive Anomalies, Socio-Technical Systems and Consensus Building 
The emergence of new technologies can spur on or restrict the development of others 
very often in entirely unexpected ways. A good example is that of the Merlin aero-
engine. By allowing for a significant increase in the operational altitude of aircraft 
they were used in, a new technological ‘fix’ was required to prevent the guns in the 
Spitfire freezing over and becoming unusable. There is enormous value in theoretical 
perspectives which allow for complexity and which can take account of anomalies. 
Theories advanced by Hughes and Constant are perhaps the best examples of this. 
The use of theory in this thesis has been largely implicit throughout the main story. 
The concepts discussed in the introductory section are those that guided the research 
process and subsequent analysis.  
One of the major findings of this thesis is that of consensus building. In both 
of the widespread switches from wood to metal and the multi-wing format to the 
monoplane, a consensus amongst the aviation community was required in order to 
affect such changes. However, consensus alone was not enough. The switch to metal 
required not only the widespread belief that it was correct, but also the technological 
capacity to be able to affect such a change, not to mention less immediately obvious 
requirements such as a corps of metal workers to keep RAF aircraft in service. The 
change to the monoplane, too, required more than just the widely held belief that the 
monoplane was superior for performance. The F.7/30 specification demonstrates that 
even while monoplane racers were setting world speed records every couple of years, 
transferring that knowledge to a practical, working fighter aircraft was still beyond 
even the most skilled designers.  
 These examples precisely reflect the core message of this thesis. That 
technological change is messy, disorganised and more often than not, it is the result of 
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many factors aligning themselves over time. The element most responsible for 
widespread change, however, is consensus. It is the widely held belief in the potential 
of technology or innovation that sustains developmental work on a wider scale in the 
face of setbacks or dissenting views. It has been shown that much of the criticism 
levelled at the Air Ministry and industry (backwards looking and technically inept) 
has been unwarranted with F.7/30 itself proving that even in 1929 a single-seat 
monoplane fighter was sought after.  
The work of Hughes and Constant has been particularly important in bringing 
together both of these major stories. Each aided in the identification of important 
elements in these changes. The switch to metal in the United States has been 
characterised as the product of an ‘ideology of progress’ – that metal was the future, 
wood the past, and spurred on by developments in Germany and a desire to not be 
‘left behind’. The example of the United Kingdom is directly at odds with this 
assessment. We have seen that work by Hugo Junkers was a definite catalyst in the 
sense that it proved a metal aircraft could fly. However, the practical benefits of a 
metal aircraft took years to be realised in Britain.   
Constant’s concept of the presumptive anomaly is most clearly seen in the first 
movements towards metal construction. Both A. P. Thurston and John North believed 
that metal could do a better job than wood as a material for manufacturing aircraft in 
the future. The development of metal as a viable choice for aircraft construction 
required a consensus between designers, engineers, pilots and government and it took 
time to form. It will be remembered that a presumptive anomaly occurs when 
advances in science or engineering ‘imply future difficulty for the existing system or 
the possibility of a new one’. The emphasis placed on practitioners maintains that 
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revolution can only occur when a significant portion of the relevant community 
moves to a new paradigm and begins work on a ‘new normal technology’.  
One of the major characteristics of technological development throughout the 
period is the creation of consensus around a new technology, design or practice. 
Setbacks were common and work was required to sustain new developments. The 
most influential were perhaps those involving people and prejudice rather than 
technological limitation. While belief in an alternative was growing technical 
problems could be overcome, money could be directed to research, designers had 
faith in what they were doing, and an aircraft firm believed they would eventually 
make money from the development and use of a new technology. The major problems 
came from people (specifically decision makers) and Hugh Trenchard is the best 
example of this.    
Thomas Hughes’ reverse salient concept neatly reflects the development of 
aircraft technology. The progress of a technological endeavour is held up by pockets 
of resistance that must be eliminated by bringing extra resources to bear on those 
particular problems. I believe that this thesis shows a reverse salient can be social as 
well as technical in so far as certain instances of delay can be attributed to poor 
management, or the prejudices of certain actors towards a technology (Trenchard’s 
suspicion of metal, his refusal to support the technically superior Fairey Fox, or 
Dowding’s apparent lack of support for retractable gear are examples). These salients 
needed to be eliminated by a contrary weight of opinion.  
Technologically, however, there were a great many more salients to be 
overcome. Supermarine’s F.7/30 effort (the 224) revealed a host of problems in 
translating design and construction from successful racing seaplanes to a military 
fighter monoplane. The wings were too thick, it had a fixed undercarriage, the engine 
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was not suitable for use with monoplanes and it had an open canopy. Thus, reverse 
salients occur at all levels of technical change: within a design, within a firm, industry 
or governing body.  
The Schneider Trophy provides good insight into the gradual/radical process 
of technical change. In view of the fact that performance was the sole aim the 
designers’ job was relatively simple. Rather than attempting to balance several, what 
might be termed ‘macro’ economies – form, weight, rate-of-climb, top speed, useful 
load and so on – he was tasked with balancing only those necessary to achieve 
optimum performance, i.e., speed. Initially, the race was contested with flying boats 
the aerodynamics of which were refined over the years, the engine power increasing 
each time. This was superseded by the more radical change to the seaplane (an aircraft 
that floated rather than a boat which flew). Again, incremental improvements in 
aerodynamics and power output developed the biplane racer paradigm. The final 
radical shift came in the form of the monoplane racer first developed by Mitchell at 
Supermarine. Thereafter, all that could be done in terms of development was 
marrying increasing power output to refined aerodynamics.   
Hughes’ systems and Frank Geels co-evolution emphasise the interplay of 
components within a ‘socio-technical system’. Do they go far enough? Do they 
explain enough? What they do particularly well is to provide a framework for the 
analysis of technological change. Each approach (for example ANT, SCOT or STS) 
provides such a framework. The issue for many is about how well they do it. As I set 
out in the theoretical section, explanations relying upon one approach are bound to be 
limited in some way or other. Technological change is the result of painstakingly 
gradual progress punctuated by radical innovation. Choices are made. It is difficult to 
imagine that one theoretical approach could provide an explanatory framework for 
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every instance of technological change. What is clear, however, is that each has 
highly valuable insights, concepts, or tools. Specifically related to this thesis are those 
concepts that provide flexibility.  
  
Technological Paradigms, Trajectories and Technological Transitions 
 When discussing technological paradigms it must be made clear which definition one 
is using: the paradigmatic design (exemplar), or the ‘entire constellation of beliefs’, a 
shared vision for a technology? This thesis has looked at both, although neither 
arrives fully formed. In the first instance, a paradigmatic design is the result of both 
gradual work (research conducted in aerodynamics was often painstakingly slow) and 
radical shifts (the movement to the monoplane and its subsequent stabilisation). In the 
second, a shared vision is the result of gradual work done by those with the vision and 
drive to see it through. Thus, the creation of consensus in the case of metal relied 
upon authoritative actors (Junkers, North and Thurston) engaging in a process of 
‘system building’. Not so much in the way of Thomas Hughes’ system builders 
(Edison) – for North and Thurston it was not in the first instance an economic gain 
they chose to pursue but a technical one.  
 Both paradigmatic designs and a shared belief amongst a community are, 
therefore, the result of conscientious ‘system building’. However, the wood-metal 
example is distinct from the search for a monoplane. The case of metal relied upon an 
initial belief held by very few given momentum by constructing a convincing case for 
the widespread use of the material, this was followed by the slow process of 
refinement of new methods of design and construction. The change itself was 
relatively straightforward once the Air Ministry took the decision to switch in 1925. 
Convincing the Air Ministry was the critical point because once it was persuaded of 
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the need for such a change any alternative to metal was removed. Put bluntly, designs 
in anything other than metal would not be considered for purchase.   
 The move to the monoplane happened differently. First World War experience 
in both monoplane and biplane fighters had done nothing at all to convince designers 
that, at that time, the monoplane offered any advantage in performance.  The primary 
driver in the move to the monoplane was ever-increasing engine power and again, the 
Schneider Trophy provides the best example. The Curtiss CR-3 biplane which won 
both first and second place in the 1922 race convinced Reginald Mitchell to switch to 
the monoplane by realising that developing the biplane paradigm further would be far 
more difficult that attempting to utilise a monoplane structure.  
 And yet, the biplane continued to dominate British military aircraft for more 
than a decade. In sharp contrast to the switch from wood to metal, there was no direct 
opposition to the idea of the monoplane. In terms of performance there was no doubt 
that it was superior. However, the expertise in design and construction lay firmly with 
the biplane, and while it was the ‘safe’ choice for designers (at least throughout the 
1920s) the shift to monoplanes required more. Thus, the development of the 
paradigmatic design as it stood in 1939 required two major shifts (metal construction 
and monoplane form) and a host of gradual ones. The constellation of beliefs evolved 
over time, and it is perhaps in this sense that the idea of consensus building is most 
useful.   
The idea of technological paradigm as an exemplar used as a basis for future 
work is useful in that it allows for a different conception of technological change. The 
Curtiss CR-3 racing biplane was possessed of exceptionally clean aerodynamics and 
in order to make significant gains in performance designers (particularly Mitchell at 
Supermarine) were effectively forced to look to a major change in design. His 
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subsequent monoplane, the S 4, provided not just the basis for future work in racing 
seaplanes at Supermarine, but the United States and Italy as well.  
However, the development of a paradigmatic design is largely dependent upon 
the influence of the community of practitioners designing it. This is the constellation 
of beliefs – the development of a particular way of working and a shared view of what 
was the ‘standard’ design. How they got from one to the other has been the basis of 
this thesis and within it I have shown how it complex it was. The factors influencing 
change were social and technological, they operated at different levels (top down: 
Ministry, industry, firm, designer) and across a number of periods (the ‘Lean Years’, 
the early movements towards rearmament in the latter 1920s, the attempt to develop a 
world beating fighter in the early 1930s and so on).  
 
Implications for Future Work 
I believe the biggest contribution that this research makes is to the history of aviation 
and even to some extent to histories of business and industry. One of the major 
limitations of the declinist and revisionist histories of the industry is that in many 
ways they are simply not accurate. Gaining a greater understanding of the technology 
and the way it developed within an industrial or business framework must surely have 
enormous value. Barnett, for example, reduced the Schneider Trophy success to a 
‘shop window triumph’ and yet we have seen just how important this contest was for 
the development of British aircraft. How different might his work have been if he had 
treated the technology and its development with any degree of care? Thus, the final 
proposition of this thesis is that the history of technology can go further by utilising 
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